

ZIMBABWE BRIEFING

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COPAC: Minimalism Remains the Viable Option for the Zimbabwean Diaspora

The Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition recently provided me with the privileged opportunity to travel to Harare and participate as a delegate at the long awaited second all-stakeholders conference that was held under the auspices of the Constitution Select Committee (COPAC). The much anticipated event was held at the Harare International Conference Centre between the 21st and 23rd of October 2012.

The second all-stakeholders were a key milestone in terms of the fulfilment of the crucial provisions of Article Six of the historic Global Political Agreement (GPA). The GPA was signed by three of the leading Zimbabwean political parties on the 15th September 2008. This of course was achieved under the active facilitation of the regional body, the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

My participation at the conference was no under any form of illusion since it was predicated on the premise that the COPAC led constitutional reform process, just like the GPA is in essence part of the broader democratisation process of Zimbabwe.

In other words, both the GPA and the COPAC led initiative are to all practical purposes and intents a transitional process in terms of determining the political destiny of our beautiful motherland.

Zimbabwe is and remains on a long term arduous journey towards real democracy.

As such I have never had any serious issues with the exclusionary nature of both the GPA and the COPAC led initiative. It is in essence a political party led process. It is not a broad national agenda at all.

Indeed just like many other national stakeholders, the Diaspora was excluded from the mainstream aspects of the signing of the GPA and also the setting up of the COPAC led constitutional reform process.

This then has always and continues to inform my level of expectations with regards to both the GPA and the COPAC led initiative. I have always viewed it at best as a small window of opportunity that could help to unlock the political impasse that has bedevilled Zimbabwe since the end of the 1990s.

Put in other words, both the GPA and the COPAC led initiative is not in any way an end in themselves but part of a means to an ultimate end. As such, they must never be viewed in isolation but always in the broader context of an on-going

struggle for a new democratic and prosperous Zimbabwe.

We as the Zimbabwean Diaspora community, just like any other national stakeholders that feel excluded by the political parties must continue to focus on how much momentum can be derived from both the GPA and the COPAC led initiative in our on-going efforts to build a new Zimbabwe.

We must seek to gain as much

cal parties that by and large have the final say on the outcome of both processes.

The truth is that the facilitative role of the Parliament in the COPAC led initiative has been over inflated. The bottom line is that after all has been said and done, it remains for the political leaders to decide if they are indeed happy with the final draft Constitution derived from the COPAC led initiative.



Daniel Molokele

democratic impetus out of both processes. This in essence is what I prefer to call the minimalist approach.

The minimalist approach assumes that even though we do not have a direct say in the dynamics of both the GPA and the COPAC led initiative, we as the Diaspora must not seek to discredit and disengage ourselves from them.

Instead we must continue to explore any pockets of political space that may be available to us to minimally provide some influence on the dynamics of both the GPA and the COPAC led initiative.

I was very fascinated by the honesty of President Robert Mugabe during his address at the opening ceremony of the second all-stakeholders conference. While other speakers like Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara tried to pretend that the people of Zimbabwe are at the centre of both the GPA and the COPAC led initiative, Mugabe did not mince his words at all.

He clearly asserted what I feel is the more realistic position that by their very nature, both the GPA and COPAC led initiative are political party led processes. In particular, it is the leadership of the three politi-

This then explains why Mugabe openly tried to undermine the credit that had prior to his speech been accorded to the Constitution Select Committee, especially the Co-Chairpersons.

This also explains why he openly challenged the decision by COPAC to have a compromised approach of the data analysis by using both the qualitative and quantitative methods. Mugabe clearly reproached COPAC for using the qualitative instead of the quantitative approach that he felt could have come up with provisions in the draft Constitution that were more favourable to his own interests.

But crucially, this further explains why he managed to ensure that Mutambara addressed the opening ceremony as an original principal of the GPA. This of course resulted in the MDC led by Professor Welshman Ncube boycotting the entire morning sessions.

So after all has been said and done, what then are the take aways from the COPAC led process for the Zimbabwean Diaspora?

The following then are my recommendations going forward:

The Zimbabwean Diaspora must accept that both the GPA and the COPAC led

initiative are by and large transitional processes in the broader struggle for a new Zimbabwe. It is common cause that life in general for many Zimbabweans has changed for the better since the all-inclusive government was set up in early 2009.

The Zimbabwean Diaspora must recognise the minimal gains from both the GPA and the COPAC led initiative as small milestones as we march on towards a new and better Zimbabwe. A specific example of this is the mere fact that the draft Constitution allows for the possibility of dual citizenship for all people who are Zimbabweans by birth.

The Zimbabwean Diaspora must hope for a YES vote for the proposed Constitution when the referendum is held. This is based on the simplistic assumption that the new Constitution could provide more democratic space than the current constitutional dispensation derived from the original Lancaster House Constitution.

The Zimbabwean Diaspora must also continue to openly advocate and campaign for the best possible framework and environment prior to the referendum and the next elections that are due to be held in 2013.

The Zimbabwean Diaspora must also use the year ahead to continue to get more organised and networked so that it may continue to play an increasingly influential role in the national agenda beyond both the referendum and the elections. The role of the Diaspora as a key player in the national development agenda must be something we should always be prepared to fight for and defend continually. After all, Zimbabwe belongs to us too!

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President Mugabe Postures A Threat To The Constitution Making Process

Coordinator's Note 96



Dr. Phillan Zamchiya

At the second all stakeholders' constitutional conference, President Mugabe unequivocally stated his position that Principals must have the final say on the constitution. The President desperately argued that the Principals caused the Global Political Agreement (GPA) to happen hence they have an automatic right to tamper with the document. However, we take solace in that the Prime Minister was clear it is not his wish to tamper with the people's views. We revisit our arguments in light of this new development. The position should be clear that what President Mugabe is seeking to do is a clear abrogation of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) and an affront to Parliament and other stakeholders. Yes, the Principals signed the GPA but they did not sign an empty template, they signed to the content and process enshrined in the GPA.

It is that process that then should be binding on the Principals, all stakeholders and ordinary citizens. They signed for a parliamentary process and never for an executive process. Why then should President Mugabe want to execute an executive coup on the constitution making process by literally re-writing the constitution? Below is what they agreed should be the process as in Article 6 of the GPA.

- 1) the draft Constitution and the accompanying Report shall be tabled before Parliament within 1 month of the second all stakeholders conference;
- 2) the draft Constitution and the accompanying Report shall be debated in Parliament and the debate concluded within one month;
- 3) the draft Constitution emerging from Parliament shall be gazetted before the holding of a referendum;
- 4) a referendum on the



President Robert Mugabe

new draft Constitution shall be held within 3 months of the conclusion of the debate. The above procedure was ratified by the Principals and it is clear it gives no room for unilateral

astrous for the nation.

If there are matters of principle that either Principal is not happy with, which are against the values and aspirations of their political parties, they can use the Parlia-

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amendments by the same Principals.

Why then should the President seek to subvert this process? It is obvious President Robert Mugabe finds himself in a quandary, under fire from hardliners within his party after he connived with the Copac team to embrace reforms in the draft constitution. President Mugabe needs a gateway to amend the draft and factor in changes to appease his radical wing and manage factional politics in his party ahead of the crucial general election. Being the Machiavelli that he has always been, the President is masking dishonesty, trying to collectively and nicodemously lobby other Principals, that they will get an equal opportunity, as the executive, to revisit certain aspects that they might also not be happy with in the Copac draft. This might be tempting to other Principals but the consequences will be dis-

ment, where they have enough representation to push forward their positions. That will be more transparent, more democratic and in line with article 6 of the GPA. Anything threesome threatens the constitution.

It should be clear to President Mugabe that the constitution making process is a hot political potato and to get where it is; there has been a lot of compromise from various quarters. The Principals must therefore show collective leadership and wisdom in dealing with this very delicate process. President Mugabe's intentions to usurp the Copac process will threaten the constitution making process and erode its legitimacy to the marrow. The President must realise people have compromised to let Copac drive the process, albeit deep seated concerns and people have compromised to participate for the sake of taking the nation toward

the next step in the transition but that is not meant to signal people can be taken for granted. Any attempts by the Principals to take people for granted might be the final nail on the constitution making process. Civil society will be frustrated, SADC will frown and other political parties will charge on, setting the stage for the 'constitution waterloo battle'.

It is time for Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai to stick by his wise commitment to let the GPA process continue as enshrined in article 6 and approved by way of signatures to the GPA by the Principals.

As a way-forward Zimbabweans in solidarity with regional movements must collectively launch a 'STOP MUGABE CAMPAIGN' or 'SAVE THE CONSTITUTION CAMPAIGN' in order to reign in the President and alert him that the days of unilateral executive powers and authoritarian spasms are gone. Let us protect the GPA process from the jaws and snatch of dictatorship otherwise the gains made in the constitution making process by Zimbabweans and the region risk reversal.

By Phillan Zamchiya, Regional Coordinator, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition

Tanzania's Constitutional Review: A New Era for the Union?

Tanzania seems poised to transform its democracy into a constitutional democracy of the 21st Century. The issue of constitutional review has occupied political discourse in Tanzania since the 1990s and the incumbent President, Jakaya Kikwete, made a firm commitment to bring to fruition the issue of constitutional review when he was re-elected in 2010. In March 2011, parliament passed the Constitutional Review Act (CRA) No.8, amended in February 2012 by CRA No.2 aimed at regulating the constitutional review process. That process was finally set in motion in April 2012 following the appointment of the Constitutional Review Commission pursuant to the CRA 2011, ss 5 & 6 (as amended by CRA 2012, s.2). This marks a great step towards advancing and consolidating Tanzania's democracy, particularly given the orientation of the process towards broad popular participation through consultation and public debates. Before examining the mandate of the Commission and some of the salient issues for constitutional reform it may be useful to provide a very brief historical background.

Historical Synopsis

The United Republic of Tanzania, as it is known today, is a union of the former British Trust Territory of Tanganyika which became independent in 1961 and the neighbouring British Protectorate Island of Zanzibar which gained independence in 1963. Both territories merged in April 1964 under Acts of Union forming the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar and later in October the Union adopted the appellation United Republic of Tanzania. An interim constitution was adopted which in effect was an amended version of the 1962 constitution of the former Republic of Tanganyika (Acts of Union No. 22, s. 5). This was meant to govern the Union until a constituent Assembly was summoned with powers to ratify and adopt a new constitution for the Union (Acts of Union, s. 9(1)). A Constituent Assembly Act No. 18 of 1965 later provided, in s.2 that, the President was not under an obligation to appoint a constitutional review commission or to summon a constituent assembly for the purpose of drafting a new constitution within one year of the commencement of the Union. However, he could subsequently, after agreement with the vice-president, appoint such a commission or summon an assembly at an opportune time. It would appear that, that time never emerged and the interim constitution was in force until 1977 when a permanent constitution was adopted. The 1977 Constitution, with its subsequent amendments, is the current Constitution of Tanzania.

Under the 1977 Constitution, the Head of State and head of Government of Tanzania is the president (s. 33(1) (2)) assisted by a vice-president (s. 47(1)). There is a Prime Minister of the Republic appointed by the President (s. 51(1)) the former is leader of government business (s. 52(1) (2)). There is a National Assembly (Bunge) which enacts legislation for the entire Republic and mainland Tanzania (ss. 62(1) & 64(1)) and a Cabinet composed of the Vice-President, the Prime Minister, the President of Zanzibar and all ministers (s. 54(1)). While the government of Tanganyika was subsumed under the government of the Republic in 1964 (Acts of Union, s.7. cf s. 34(1) 1977 Constitution) Zanzibar maintained an

autonomous status, with its constitution, a House of Representative, a president, a revolutionary council and a judiciary (1977 Constitution, ss. 64(2), 102, 103, 105, 106 and Constitution of Zanzibar, ss. 26(1), 42(1), 43(1), 63(1) and 93(1)). Thus, Tanzania operates under two governments, the government of the United Republic and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar.

The Constitutional Review Commission and the Review Process under the CRA

The aims of the CRA are contained in s. 4 (a)-(i) which include the establishment of a Constitutional Review Commission and its Secretariat, prescribe their terms of reference, establish a mechanism for ensuring public participation in the review process, mechanism for scrutinising a draft bill, summoning a constituent assembly, organising a public referendum to adopt a draft bill.

In that respect, the Commission has been accorded broad powers to act independently (s.10) in the coordination of public awareness programmes on the existing Constitution, collection of public opinion, organisation of meetings, making of recommendations and submitting of reports to the relevant constitutional organs and to prepare a draft Constitution Bill (ss. 9(1) (a)-(c), 17(2) (a)-(f). A fundamental aspect which pervades the constitutional review process under the CRA is public participation. That can be perceived from the various provisions authorising the Commission to make the utmost use of its authority to collect and analyse public opinion. For instance, under s. 17(3) (a)-(b) the Commission may request municipal, local and traditional executive officers in the Mainland and Zanzibar to organise public meetings for the purpose of collecting public opinion. The public are further empowered to participate through meetings organised by interest groups, associations or institutions and views expressed by participants in such meetings are forwarded to the Commission (s. 17 (11), 18(6)). Opportunities for public participation are also enhanced through public fora for discussion of a draft Constitution. (s. 19 (3)-(5). The requirement for submitting a draft Constitution to a referendum (s. 26) is another step towards empowering the public to define the normative standards by which they desire to be governed. Hopefully, this process will accord Tanzanian's adequate opportunity to engage in the review process.

Some Key Subjects for Reform

Undoubtedly, a vast number of issues are likely to dominate debates on what exactly constitutes the subject of constitutional reform. Just a few will be highlighted here.

Perhaps one of the major aspects to require reconsideration will be the state of the Union. In particular, the reinstitution of the Government of Tanganyika so as to create a federation of three governments and enhance the status of the Mainland vis-à-vis Zanzibar which operates under an autonomous government. The need to re-

examine the state of the Union has been additionally fuelled by constitutional reforms in Zanzibar in 2010 through which Zanzibar has been described as a 'sovereign state' within the Union. In the light of those reforms, is the Union threatened by Zanzibar's status and does it affect the original purport of the Acts of Union? Will the creation of a Tanganyika government undermine the autonomy of Zanzibar or strengthen the Union? The CRA for one, enjoins the Commission to observe (amongst others) the sanctity and inviolability of the Union, the existence of the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar and national union, cohesion and peace (s. 9 (2) (a)(d) (e)).

Another major aspect to be discussed would possibly be the extent of presidential powers- limiting those powers and reconsidering the whole separation of powers system. This implies a consideration of the system of government and the way forward. Would it be a presidential system or parliamentary system? Presently, Tanzania operates a fascinating 'hybrid' system composed of elements of a parliamentary and presidential system and a peculiar Parliament consisting of 'two parts'- the National Assembly and the President (1977 Constitution, s. 62(1)). Given the nature of the separation of powers system, the president has been imbued with wide ranging powers which many see as an 'imperial presidency'. This obviously is fundamental to the democratic future of Tanzania. Yet, the CRA enjoins the Commission to observe the sanctity and inviolability of the executive, the legislature and judiciary and the presidency (s. 9 (2) (b) (c)).

A final issue to mention here relates to reform of the electoral system. In that respect, two aspects may be mentioned. The first is the possibility of a complete overhaul of the electoral system in view of the fact that the 1977 Constitution was adopted against the backdrop of a one-party system from which Tanzania has now moved away. Given that it is now a multi-party democracy there is perhaps need for a fresh start to construct a democratic system based on contemporary political practice in Tanzania. Secondly, under the current system special provisions are made to ensure that women are reserved seats in parliament to promote gender equality (1977 Constitution, ss. 66(1) (b), 78(1). It may be necessary to review that practice to ensure compatibility with the democratic principles by which Tanzania purports to be governed.

Perceived Difficulties

Despite the obvious commitment to ensure broad public participation, there is some reason to be apprehensive of a possible restriction on the scope for free public participation. Firstly, the CRA makes it incumbent on individuals or organisations wishing to organise sensitisation events to inform the relevant public authorities or the Commission and also disclose the source(s) of funding for their events (s. 17 (9) (a) (b)). In addition, the CRA provides that the Commission 'may' authorise such events (s.18 (6)) which implies there is a possibility for the Commission to refuse authorisation.

Secondly, under the CRA neither the conduct of the review process nor the constitutionality or legal propriety of

the Commission can be subject to judicial review (s.20 (1)). Any person contravening s. 20(1) shall be liable to a fine or imprisonment term (s. 20(3)). That is perhaps a novelty in criminal law as it in fact creates a crime for bringing an action which is inherently void. Moreover, any person who prevents, by conduct or omission, incites, obstructs, or hinders any member of the Commission or Secretariat from performing their duties commits a criminal offence (s. 20(2)). Although these provisions may be safeguards to allow for a smooth process of review, they can be restrictive to public participation if these offences are not clearly defined.

Another aspect which may adversely affect the review process is the vagueness as to the extent or scope of the reform. While it is generally accepted that the 1977 Constitution is the subject of reform, there is no clarity as to the scope of what is to be analysed for the purpose of reform. For instance, under s. 9(1)(b) the Commission is mandated to examine and analyse the consistency and compatibility of the constitutional provisions relating to the sovereignty of the people, political systems, democracy, the rule of law and good governance. Although the constitution in question may be axiomatic, that possibility is complicated by other provisions. In particular, the Commission is required to examine and analyse public opinion on all matters including the White Paper No. 1 of 1962 on the Establishment of the Republic of Tanganyika, the Constitutions of Zanzibar, 1979 and 1984, the Independence Constitution of Tanganyika, 1961, the Articles of Union and the 1977 Constitution (s. 18(2) (a)-(k)). Admittedly, these documents all have a fundamental connection to the constitutional structure of the country and their analysis may provide a more thoroughgoing review process. Nevertheless, there is a distinct possibility of engendering confusion in the population as to what is actually being reviewed and for what purpose. It creates a formidable responsibility on the Commission and those organising sensitisation campaigns to ensure a thorough education of the public to minimise ambiguity and confusion- circumstances which may pre-empt public support for and participation in the review process.

By and large, the constitutional review process envisaged under the CRA appears to provide some cautious optimism that it will lead to the drafting of a 'Tanzanian' constitution influenced by the peoples' aspirations as to the direction of their democracy. The process is intended to terminate in April 2014 with the adoption of a new constitution to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

A summary of a report by--Laura-stella Enonchong, University of Warwick, African Network of Constitutional Lawyers

REVISITING THE MILITARY WILD CARD IN ZIMBABWE'S TRANSITION

In the past week the military was back in the spot-light for the wrong reasons. The historically evil- spell of partisan politicking cast its shadow on our search for lasting democracy. This time it was Patrick Chinamasa, unfortunately one of the negotiators playing a key role in the on-going SADC negotiations on behalf of ZANU PF mimicking the ZANU PF military doctrine. Coinciding with Chinamasa's deliberately calculated and politically motivated comments were the same cowards, now ZANU PF political activists who defected from their noble call to save the national security of the country. The cheap acts of these political buffoons would be comical if they were not committing a serious crime of treason by threatening to violate the national constitution and undermine national security. In any democracy such crimes would warrant a death penalty. As we again ponder the role of the military in national politics and specifically in elections, have academics and civil society adequately interrogated the problematique with respect to the partisan military. Towards the fourth year into the Inclusive Government, has enough been done to deal with the military question? How can the civil society contribute in unlocking the military conundrum?

Justice Patrick Chinamasa and Rugare Gumbo's assertion that the military will not accept an MDC victory is a rant oft- repeated *ad nauseam* by ZANU PF activists in the military and mimicked by its politicians. But this is not just a rant, it is a party security policy rooted in the logic of regime consolidation, modelled along a localized shock and awe strategy whose masterminds are key actors within J.O.C. (key players from Central and Military Intelligence, the army and police). Academics applying historical and institutional analysis have failed to recognise that there is well coordinated power retention strategy operationalized through the involvement of deliberately selected categories of military men into the ZANU PF rank and file, embedded with its activists, foot soldiers and middle level leadership. In other words behind Chinamasa and Gumbo's views is a think-tank and strategy constituting the mainstay and cornerstone of the ZANU PF regime's survival.

It is not an accident that ZANU PF's retention of state control is a result of a bloodless coup in 2008. The party has since combined coercive repression and patronage to regain full control of the state. Without evident notable shift in the domestic power dynamics with respect to state control, the ZANU PF regime will not recant nor show any sign of such. And as long as there are no signs that there is a clear shift of power towards a democratic regime, the extremists within the state and the regime will be emboldened to resort to shock and awe strategies to secure their power rendering any top-down military reform strategy impossible. As long as there is convergence between the militants and political elites that the highest political costs lie with losing state control as any negotiated reform process and any process to extricate the military from politics will stagnate or be painstakingly gradualist. There are overlapping interests protected by the contemporary military architecture in the country. While illicit resource accumulation and patronage provides a uniting thread, mutual manipulation and exploitation has conflated politics with security (understood as actors and their self- interests), politicians with military man and militias.

Accordingly it is a fallacy that there is any single person who enjoys complete control of the military or that there is one single faction in and outside the state, that has sole leverage over the many actors and interest within the military. This position further complicates the efficacy of elite centred strategies in disentangling the military problematique.

President Mugabe lost total control of the military at the turn of the millennium in 2000. While he still harbours delusions of being in charge, evidence on the ground demonstrates that his authority as the Commander in Chief has been eroded over the years. It is important to note that before 2000, President Mugabe had run an informal militia parallel to the formal national security institutions and system, for example the so called fifth brigade accused of perpetrating grave human rights violations was solely composed of shock troops recruited from ZANU PF comrades during the liberation war, who were later integrated into the Zim-

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babwe National Army. Another example is the Para-military, armies trained at district levels or provinces nationally. Some of these indeed saved national duties including involvement in combat in Mozambique, but they were demobilized into the communities. War veterans have been co-opted into party shock troops since 2000 together with youths trained in the Border Gezi national service, in reality a coercive brainwashing of youth into militias. At a time when the world was ignoring the coercive excesses of the regime largely perpetrated by the military informal sector (5th brigade, paramilitaries and ZANU PF youth), the formal institutions or the military's professional side was drawing kudos from the world for their professional conduct, indeed they were branded as a model for Southern Africa.

The shifts in the patterns of political-military relations within the regime emanated from a providential need to provide new opportunities to military elites in order to keep them on the side of the regime in the face of waning legitimacy. No doubt such military elites had come to see and know that power opened doors to unlimited wealth and more power. It is these corrupted military officials who are the brains behind military-political shock therapy ideationally rooted in a notion of securitized law and order and underlined by doctrinaire military supremacy. Thus while the securitization of the state is not necessarily new, it is the belief propagated within the ZANU PF regime and widely etched in the national psyche and discourse that we are all subjects to our military liberators that is new and scary. Such a view withdraws our rights to citizenship while justifying all kinds of unaccountable authoritarian repressive practices. It is the same logic that ZANU PF inherently reverts to in browbeating the masses while criminalising dissent.

Actors within the military who now constitute the military-politico nucleus running ZANU PF and to a certain extent the state see their positions in terms of the power they wield and unlimited access to patronage, their source of immense wealth. Their focus is not just to secure such wealth but the power they wield. Their actions are based on their understanding of the instrumentality of power in patrimonial systems. It is this power which shields them from accounting for their impunity, opened doors in the scramble for state resources and positions of privilege including massive political leverage within the state and the ZANU PF regime. In other words militarists and their aligned factions within ZANU PF will not succumb, at list not at the moment, until they realise that the short and long term costs for their extremism may potentially come to hound them.

It is my view that if not in an explicit way, we are all culpable of unwittingly propagating notion of military suprem-

diversionary or intimidatory military-security propaganda. They fail to realise that at the core of such well-choreographed propaganda are intentions to manipulate the political playing field by throwing the nation into extreme fear and anxiety, leaders of the democratic movement into doubt, despondence and to unhinge their campaigns for democracy. A pattern can be discerned by simply reflecting on the modus operandi of this strategy, that is the legal and physical harassment of key leaders through arrests for concocted crimes, extreme bashing of activists, abductions and disappearances. Clearly such actions, as with Chinamasa, Gumbo and the military-ZANU PF activists' views are calculated to keep an illegitimate regime in power by default. Yet social commentators spread fear by uncritically regurgitating the same views into the public arena.

Current debates about reforming the security sector have been advanced in the semantics of security sector reform (SSR). There is no doubt that although critically desirable, there is limited hope that it can happen in the shortest time before national elections. This brings us to the question of what civil society should be doing. Indeed, the challenge with civil society is first its elitist nature, hence it advances democratic models gleaned from the same templates as the partners in the Inclusive Government. Secondly, the country remain captive to the psychology of fear, that is key players would rather not touch the security sector issues not only because of a perception of its sensitive nature but also a result of fear of what might befall them. This has ultimately muzzled conversation about reforming security sector, thus confining it to technocratic mumblings. Yet the military remains a huge challenge to the democratization process. Civil society should lead a conversation on citizenship and security issues. Indeed the context of the social form of family set-ups provides opportunities for social groups albeit ignored as lacking technocratic knowhow to participate in this critical conversation.

We all come from families and communities that hold dear and share important values that define our well-being. It is such values that should be brought into our conversations about democracy in general and key institutions in particular. There is no doubt members of the military belong to the same families with all of us, the good and bad they do, their institutional excesses equally touch and bind such families and communities. One aspect that has been ignored by all commentators on the security sector is the nature of internal violence directed at fellow officials within the army, the police and intelligence sectors. I am raising this point to illustrate the point that there are many victims as are perpetrators within and outside the security institutions. In opening a broad multi-faceted dialogue on this critical question, civil society can empower ordinary Zimbabweans by giving them opportunities to interrogate and provide solutions at the level of the community. This can also deepen communities' understanding and practice of democracy, what we call democratic consolidation.

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acy in our politics. To revisit the major arguments that have been advanced to explain the politicization of the military, social commentators, academics and journalists have referred to the coercive institutional legacy of both patterns of organization, mobilization and military training within the liberation movement and its opposite, the Rhodesian Front. President Mugabe referred to the same view in his discussions with the UN Human Rights Commissioner Navi Pillay arguing that violence is a feature of a national historical institutional legacy. Others have been shocked by how the post liberation professionalized military regime which became a model for other countries in Southern Africa could stoop far below the minimal normative expectation of military prestige, almost a cannon within the military, to contemptuously flounder their partisan involvement in politics.

The military institution anywhere in the world evinces the highest threshold of national pride and sacrifice in any nation, yet those who plunge themselves into partisan politics fall into the basal if not contemptuous categories of national service. In the strict logic of the military service party politics is seen as a theatre of contempt where selfish agendas and mean egos thrive. Unfortunately the descriptive narratives advanced in contemporary social commentaries have played into the hands of the regime. In subtle ways they fail to challenge the regime orthodoxy, in fact reinforce it, and therefore unwittingly spread fear amongst the public.

The public discourse is manipulated by the regime aligned sections of the military and intelligence to centrally spread fear and intimidation within the country thereby emasculating the public. Key players who should be contesting ZANU PF authoritarian narratives, mainly the logic of the supremacy of the military in our politics, reinforce fear by parroting well calculated