

The Security-military Business Complex and the Transition in Zimbabwe

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Abstract

The military has over the last few years expanded and consolidated its position in both the politics and the economy of Zimbabwe. The Zimbabwe army now virtually controls the major institutions of the state and formal policy making structures and processes of the country. Through their role in the Joint Operations Command- a group of the Army, Police, Prisons and the Central Intelligence Organisation heads which meets regularly to coordinate military and security affairs, serving and retired military and other security officials have come to direct all key national and governance issues rather than the cabinet. On the economic front, the military has increasingly played an important role in both directing production and ownership of the means of production. The military has become a significant part of the domestic bourgeoisie class and many top commanders have teamed up with politicians and businessmen to form political and economic interest groups venturing into lucrative business ventures, such as platinum and gold mining.

The military is now deeply engrained in the in political and economical affairs of the country that whatever transitional deal has to be undertaken has to take into consideration the political and economic interests of this important constituency. The increased role of the army in politics since the late 1990s strongly suggests that the military leadership would be an important power broker whose opinion will have to be sought on any political deal to be concluded. Equally, all other parties would need to get the army to underwrite any agreement if it were to be effective and lasting. The most important challenge for Zimbabwe's transition is thus how it deals with the military in the whole quest for political and economic reforms and stabilisation.

Introduction

The military is one of the less talked about issues in many of the debates about the Zimbabwe crisis or attendant efforts to resolve it. Yet, the military has always been an important actor in conflict and transition zones around the world, such as Zimbabwe. Conflict and the resulting instability, even in non-warring zones as Zimbabwe, usually create opportunities for the military to occupy civilian space under the guise of restoring order and stability. In the case of contemporary Zimbabwe, the military has since the beginnings of the post-2000 crisis expanded and consolidated its position in both the politics and the economy of the country that it is now deeply engrained in the political and economical affairs of the country. The Zimbabwe military has over the last few years increasingly come to direct the affairs of both the state and the country without having to announce a coup. Since 2002, the military has consistently threatened to veto any poll result that goes against its preferred candidate-Mugabe, conveniently arguing that any other result will be a reversal of the gains of liberation. The military and government security cluster's centrality in the political and economic governance of Zimbabwe has even become more entrenched since the March 2008 election when political power evidently slipped from the hands of President Mugabe and his ZANU PF leaders. The government security cluster, involving the military, police and intelligence commanders, is reported to have taken over all the functions of government in what analysts and observers have described as a 'creeping coup'. The military is likely to continue playing an important role in the day to day running of the country in the near future. Any political transition in Zimbabwe needs to take this unique position of the Zimbabwe military into account.

Historical Context

In order to develop a more informed perspective about the role of the military in the transition and future of Zimbabwe, one needs to understand its place and role in both the immediate and contemporary history of the country.

Zimbabwe's transitional situation today has a lot of parallels with the Rhodesian government's predicament in the 1970s. Like Zimbabwe today, the Rhodesian military and securocrats had not only come to occupy a very important role in the day-to-day affairs of the country during the war of the 1970s but were also apprehensive about the political transition of 1979-1980. While a growing

number of whites in Rhodesia, especially members of the business community who were increasingly finding it difficult to operate under escalating war conditions, were prepared for an internationally-accepted political settlement which would lead to an end to the war and sanctions, many in the Rhodesian military and farming community were reluctant to accept a transition that could lead to a transfer of power to their ZANU PF and ZAPU nationalist opponents widely regarded as radical revolutionaries and terrorists by many in the Rhodesian establishment. Farmers were specifically concerned about the prospects of losing land to a nationalist government, given both ZANU and ZAPU's emphasis on the centrality of land in both their fight against Rhodesian government and their negotiations at the Lancaster conference.

Against this backdrop of white farmer and Rhodesian fighter's concerns about a political transition leading to the transfer of power to a radical ZANU PF or ZAPU government, it was important to have the military on board during the transition. The importance of the military in reaching an accepted political settlement between the conflicting parties in Rhodesia in the 1970s was underlined by the fact that all the warring parties brought their chief military and security personnel to the Lancaster peace talks. ZANU brought along its military supremo, the commander-in-chief of Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (Zanla) Josiah Tongora, ZAPU had both the head of its intelligence, Dumiso Dabengwa and the commander of Zimbabwe People's revolutionary Army (Zipra), Lookout Masuku, while the Rhodesians brought the commander of the army, General Peter Walls and the head of the Central Intelligence Organisation, Ken Flower. For both ZANU and ZAPU, bringing the military leadership to the talks was not simply essential for the discussion of security related issues, but also an important confidence building exercise for a nationalist movement which was riddled by divisions and suspicions between the politicians and the guerrilla fighters. Since the early 1970s, the relationship between the party and the military in both ZANU and ZAPU had been fractious, ambivalent and tenuous. The strains in the relationship between the nationalist politicians and their armies was evidenced through incidents like the Badza/Nhari rebellion of 1973, the Nikita Mangena-led ZIPRA uprising against the political leadership of ZAPU of 1977, the Vashandi crisis of 1977 which all revolved around issues of privileges by the political elites, hardships on the battlefield and tension between a radical and revolutionary guerrilla fighter's agenda and a moderate politicians' agenda which sought to negotiate reforms.¹

¹ D. Moore, 'The Zimbabwean 'organic intellectuals' in Transition', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 15, no. 98, pp.96-105; Norma Kriger, *Guerrilla Veterans in Post-war Zimbabwe: Symbolic and Violent Politics, 1980-1987* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 28; M. Sithole, *Zimbabwe:*

On the Rhodesian side, Peter Walls' involvement in the transitional talks was essential for a peaceful transition. As Godwin and Hancock have noted, Walls was needed to 'restrain the wild boys back in Salisbury whose persistent raids were doing more damage to Mozambique and Zambia than was necessary to keep the Patriotic Front at the negotiating table.'² The hawks in the Rhodesian establishment believed in a military solution to the Rhodesian problem. On 5 September 1979, five days before the Lancaster House Conference was due to start, the Rhodesian military launched *Operation Uric*- their biggest ever raid in Mozambique. This operation by the 'warriors in Salisbury', together with other operations carried against guerrillas in Zambia during the talks, was designed to ensure that ZAPU and ZANU walk out of the talks.³

The hawkish elements in the Rhodesian establishment continued to attempt to attempt to scuttle efforts to secure a peaceful political transition even after the Lancaster agreement. For instance, the staff of Combined Operations (COMOPs) began planning an attack on guerrilla armies from the moment the idea of Assembly Points was mooted.⁴ Prior to the March 1980 election, when it became increasingly evident that the Patriotic Front would win the election, the hawks in the Rhodesian military prepared counter-offensive measures to prevent ZAPU and ZANU from winning the election. The counteraction included plans for a military coup, *Operation Quartz*- a plan envisaging placing Rhodesian troops at strategic points from which they could simultaneously kill the guerrillas at the Assembly Points and assassinate Mugabe and the other nationalist leaders.⁵ Alert to the prospect of an 'unacceptable result', several Security Force members were arguing for drastic preemptive action, including several assassination attempts on Mugabe who was viewed as the most radical and committed revolutionary Marxist.⁶

The attempts to sabotage the political transition did not come to fruition mainly because the leadership of the security establishment, including both Walls and Flower, had been committed to a political solution and did not cooperate with

Struggles Within the Struggle, Second Edition (Harare: Rujeko Publishers, 1999); Fay Chung, *Re-living the Second Chimurenga: Memories from Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle*. Harare: Weaver, 2005.

² Godwin and Hancock, *Rhodesians Never Die*, p.263.

³ Peter Godwin and Ian Hancock, *Rhodesians Never Die: The Impact of War and Political Change on Rhodesia c. 1970-1980* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 259 & 261.

⁴ Godwin and Hancock, *Rhodesians Never Die*, p.265.

⁵ R. Allport, 'Operation Quartz: Rhodesia 1980', <http://www.rhodesia.nl/quartz.htm>; Godwin and Hancock, *Rhodesians Never Die*, p.269-271; Barbara Cole, *The Elite: The Story of the Rhodesian Special Air Service* (South Africa: 3 Knights Publishing, 1985) pp 413ff.

⁶ Godwin and Hancock, *Rhodesians Never Die*, p.269.

the hawks in their destabilization plans. For instance, according to Godwin and Hancock, when on 3 March 1980 General Walls realised that Mugabe had won the election, he refused to countenance Operation Quartz because he realized that the political consequences for the Rhodesians would be disastrous.⁷ The military leadership had been convinced by assurances that the position of whites in Rhodesia would not be threatened by the transition. The Lancaster House constitution in fact went a long way to pacify sections of the Rhodesian white community, especially farmers who were the bedrock of Rhodesian colonialism. The Declaration of Rights specifically protected the private property of whites, especially land, from expropriation and guaranteed compensation where underutilized land was compulsorily occupied. White minority rights in the decision-making process were protected through separate white representation which guaranteed whites 20 seats in the 100- member House of Assembly. The Lancaster House constitution thus effectively safeguarded both the political and economic interests of minority whites against a black majority. Its guarantees were sufficient to persuade many sceptical whites to travel the journey from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe.⁸

The Rhodesian securocrats' buy-in of the 1979 settlement thus helped to usher in a new government in Zimbabwe in 1980. Both the commander of the army and the director of intelligence played critically important roles in keeping the hawks at bay and thwarting some of the attempts to scuttle the transition. Just days before the announcement of the 1980 election results, the Commander of the Rhodesian forces, Peter Walls and the director of intelligence, Ken Flower, had meetings with Mozambique's army commander, Sebastiao Mabote, and then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Joaquim Chisano, as part of an effort to ensure a smooth post-election transition in Zimbabwe.⁹

At the same time, the decision by the victorious ZANU PF government to adopt reconciliation policy and not to tinker with the leadership structures of the Rhodesian security establishment during the early years of its reign helped to stabilise the Rhodesian military and inspire confidence among those whites who

⁷ Godwin and Hancock, *Rhodesians Never Die*, p.270.

⁸ I. Mandaza, 'The state in the post-white settler colonial situation', in I. Mandaza, ed., *Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition, 1980-1986* (Dakar: Codesria, 1986), p. 2; Raftopoulos, 'Introduction: Unreconciled differences: The limits of reconciliation politics in Zimbabwe' in B. Raftopoulos and T. Savage, *Zimbabwe: Injustice and Political Reconciliation* (Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, 2004), p. 2; L. Tshuma, *A Matter of (In)justice. Law, State and the Agrarian Question in Zimbabwe* (Harare: Sapes, 1997).

⁹ Martyn Gregory 'The Zimbabwe Election: The Political and Military Implications', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 7 no 1, 1980.

remained sceptical about majority rule. The newly elected Prime Minister, Robert Mugabe, retained Walls as the head of the army, in charge of integrating ZIPRA, ZANLA, and the Rhodesian Army. Working with Rex Nhongo who had taken over as ZANLA commander after the death of Tongogora in December 1979, and the ZIPRA commander, Lookout Masuku, as his deputies, Walls eventually retired from the army in July 1980 following a breakdown of his relationship with the new ZANU government leadership for his public criticism of government.¹⁰ Mugabe also retained Ken Flower as the Director General of the CIO. Flower retired in 1987, after 7 years of being at the helm of Zimbabwe's post-independence intelligence. Aware of the prospects of causing panic in the white community, the post-independence government of ZANU PF did not interfere much with other crucial arms of government such as the judiciary. Many Rhodesian judges were retained until 2000, when ZANU PF began to replace them with loyalists expected to support the party's unilateral, controversial decision-making processes.

The Military in post-independence Zimbabwe

Although the Zimbabwe National Army has often been portrayed as professional and divorced from politics, this has never been the case. Since the 1970s war of liberation, the party-military nexus has always been strong in both ZAPU and ZANU PF and the military men have always had a significant say in party politics.¹¹

After independence, the new army formed from the integration of ZANLA, ZIPRA and Rhodesian army forces in many ways remained a revolutionary force, with a political ideal and loyalty. Many military commanders came from the two guerrilla armies, ZANLA and ZIPRA. There is not much doubt that at the most senior levels there remained strong support for the ruling party. Guaranteeing this is the fact that all command posts from the position of Colonel upwards remained political appointments-directly approved by the president.

¹⁰ 'A soldier faces his critics', *Time*, 1 September 1980. www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,922125,00.html

¹¹ See Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 'Nationalist-Military Alliance and the Fate of Democracy in Zimbabwe', *African Journal on Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 6, no.1, 2006; Masiphula Sithole, *Struggles within a Struggle*.

The party–military nexus helped to stabilise the state and shield the government from any possible military takeover.¹²

Despite its close links to the ruling establishment, the military was not deeply entrenched in the day to day running of the country for the greater part of the first decades of independence. The expanding role of the military in Zimbabwe's political, economic and social life politics was achieved over the last few years, especially in the later 1990s when President Mugabe increasingly turned to the army for protection against the first indications of discontent from the masses and lieutenants inside his party. Through his patronage system, Mugabe managed to keep the army leadership close to him by making them beneficiaries of the lucrative mining contracts on offer in the DRC.¹³

After the referendum defeat in February 2000, Mugabe turned to the military to shield himself from attacks and to mobilise support around him. The army, alongside demobilised war veterans, organized the land invasions. The operation was directed by Air Marshal Perence Shiri who had been the commander of the Fifth Brigade at the time of the Matebeleland massacres. When it came to organising the crucial 2002 presidential elections, Mugabe again heavily relied on military personnel who were appointed to a number of key positions. Lawyer and former Colonel and head of military intelligence, Sobusa Gula-Ndebele, was appointed chair of the Electoral Supervisory Commission while Brigadier Douglas Nyikayaramba was appointed chief elections officer.¹⁴ The security dominated ESC was mandated to run the hotly contested presidential elections. The ESC was assisted by another security body, the National Command Centre (NCC), established shortly before the 2002 election. The NCC, headed by the ZNA's Brigadier Douglas Nyikayaramba with the assistance of the Airforce of Zimbabwe's Air Vice Marshall R Mhlanga, became the nerve-centre from which the 2002 election was run. Headquartered in Harare, the staff for the Centre was drawn exclusively from the Zimbabwe National Army, Air Force of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Republic Police and CIO Central Intelligence Organisation. It was responsible for collating the results from the various parts of the country.¹⁵

¹² Knox Chitiyo and Martin Rupiya, 'Tracking Zimbabwe's Political History: The Zimbabwe Defence Force from 1980-2005', in Rupiya, ed., *Evolutions and Revolutions: A contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa* (Pretoria, ISS, 2005)

¹³ See UN, *Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, 16 October 2002. Available at http://www.afrol.com/Countries/DRC/documents/un_resources_2002_govt_zim.htm.

¹⁴ 'Army Officers in Charge of Elections', *Zimbabwe Independent*, 3 January 2003.

¹⁵ 'How the army hijacked the Zimbabwe poll', *Telegraph*, 3 May 2003.

Since then, Mugabe's government has increasingly relied on the army to run the country and this has turned Zimbabwe into a militarised state. The government has deployed forces to supervise the import and distribution of the staple maize following widely reported corruption and mismanagement at the Grain Marketing Board that normally handles the matter. The army has been in control of food distribution for several years now, via control of Grain Marketing Board sales, the only source of affordable maize in rural areas. In November 2005, the Zimbabwe government began implementing "Operation Taguta/ Sisuthi or "Operation Eat Well".¹⁶ This Command Agriculture programme, conceived by the Joint Operations Command (JOC), consisting of the army, police, prisons, and the intelligence service, is aimed at placing the vital process of food production under the partial control of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces. Through this operation, the army has deployed soldiers to enforce the delivery of grain by newly resettled farmers to the Grain Marketing Board, reputed for paying below market prices for grain products and long delays in paying for grain delivered. The programme has been widely criticised for its commandist approach to agriculture which tries to enforce peasants to grow the staple maize crop at the expense of other crops.¹⁷

Command Agriculture signals the intensification of the militarization of Zimbabwe. Since 'Operation Maguta' came into force in December 2005, the army has usurped control of food production and has completely sidelined Agricultural and Research Extension (AREX) and Agricultural and Rural development Agency (ARDA) officials as local management committees in terms of management of agricultural and irrigation schemes. Some AREX officials have reported being treated aggressively by the army, who have accused them of causing famine in Zimbabwe.¹⁸ Part of the strategy of Command Agriculture has been to intensify seizures of farming equipment from commercial farms across the country. According to press reports at the end of 2005, "armed police, army personnel, prisons officials and war veterans uplifted billions of dollars worth of equipment from Masvingo, Chiredzi and Mwenezi."¹⁹ The seizure of

¹⁶ 'Army launches Operation Taguta', *Zimbabwe Independent*, November 18-24 2005.

¹⁷ 'Army launches Operation Taguta', *Zimbabwe Independent*, November 18-24 2005; "Farming for the military" *Zimbabwe Independent*, January 13, 2006; Solidarity Peace Trust, *Operation Taguta/Sisuthi-Command Agriculture in Zimbabwe: its impact on rural communities in Matabeleland*, April 2006. Available at www.solidaritypeacetrust.org/reports/operation_taguta.pdf.

¹⁸ Solidarity Peace Trust, *Command Agriculture in Zimbabwe*.

¹⁹ "Farming for the military", *Zimbabwe Independent*, January 13, 2006.

equipment was not done in accordance with the law, and no inventories of seized equipment were made.²⁰

The military has been involved in many other civilian programmes, including the disastrous “Operation Murambatsvina” which, according to a United Nations report, left more than 700,000 homeless or without an income, and “Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle/Live Well”.²¹ Both programmes were planned and undertaken by the security forces. The Joint Operations Command (JOC), comprising the police, the spy Central Intelligence Organisation and the army conceived and backed the demolitions, without consultation of Cabinet or the ZANU PF politburo.²² The army oversaw “Garikai” and soldiers were among the beneficiaries of the few houses built nationwide under the latter scheme, which has become part of the patronage system in Zimbabwe. Senior army commanders have been in charge of the building of houses across all provinces, and the overwhelming beneficiaries of ‘Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle’ have been the uniformed forces, senior government officials and their extended families.²³ As one observer noted about the 700 houses constructed in Cowdray Park in Bulawayo as part of Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle, “one could mistake the suburb for a military barracks, soldiers appear to be occupying so many of the houses.”²⁴

Serving or retired state security agents now control all key strategic government departments and state institutions.²⁵ These departments include transport, energy, tourism, finance, industry and trade, agriculture and justice, which has been filled with politically partisan judges or ex-soldiers. For instance, the crucial ministry of Energy has been headed by Lieutenant General Mike Nyambuya since 2005, while the ministry of Industry and International Trade is being

²⁰ Solidarity Peace Trust, *Command Agriculture in Zimbabwe*. ‘Top cop defies two court orders, Chihuri’ *Zimbabwe Standard*, 30 January 2006.

²¹ UN, *Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina* (United Nations, 2005). www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/zimbabwe/zimbabwe_rpt.pdf.

²² New African (London), October 2005, reprinted in *The Herald* (Harare), 4 October 2005; *Zim Online* (South Africa) www.zimonline.co.za, 24 May 2005.

²³ “Chefs grab ‘Garikai’ houses”, *The Standard*, 5 February 2006; ‘Housing Scandal’, *Chronicle*, 3 March 2006; “Residents fume over allocation of houses”, *Sunday News*, 5 March 2006.

²⁴ Solidarity Peace Trust, *Command Agriculture in Zimbabwe*.

²⁵ See UPP position paper, “Preserving and Prospering the Nation of Zimbabwe”; ‘Soldiers take over State institutions’, *Zimbabwe Standard*, 28 March 2007; ‘Under military management’, *The Insider*, June 2006. <http://www.insiderzim.com/june06military.html>.

directed by Colonel Christian Katsande who is the permanent secretary. The ministry of agriculture's flagship parastatal- the Grain Marketing Board tasked to feed the nation- is directed by Colonel Samuel Muvuti. The Attorney General's office was headed by Gula Ndebele until his recent axing in May 2008 by Mugabe for supporting the Mujuru faction in the cut-throat ZANU PF succession politics.²⁶

Below is a table showing some of the government institutions under the control of the military establishment.

Fig 1: *Serving and Retired Military and other Security Personnel in Government Parastatals and Institutions*

NAME	INSTITUTION	POSITION
Lieutenant-General Mike Nyambuya	Ministry of Energy and Power Development.	Minister
Brigadier Ambrose Mutinhiri	Ministry of Youth Development and Employment Creation.	Minister
Saviour Kasukuwere (ex-CIO)	Ministry of Youth Development and Employment Creation.	Deputy Minister
Lt Colonel Hurbert Nyanhongo	Transport and Communication	Deputy Minister
Colonel Christian Katsande	Ministry of Industry and International Trade	Permanent Secretary
Justin Mupamhanga (Ex CIO)	Energy and Power Development	Permanent Secretary
Colonel Joseph Mhakayakora	Ministry of Construction	Director
Major Anywhere Mutambudzi	Department of Information	Under secretary
Brigadier General Elisha Muzonzini	Foreign Affairs	Ambassador, Kenya

²⁶ 'Mugabe fires Attorney General Gula-Ndebele', SW Radio, 16 May 2008; 'Police arrest Attorney General Gula-Ndebele', *Financial Gazette*, 8 November 2007.

Major General Edzai Chimonyo	Foreign Affairs	Ambassador, Tanzania
Brigadier Borniface Chidyausiku	Foreign Affairs	Ambassador, Zimbabwe Permanent Mission to UN in New York
Major Jevan Maseko	Foreign Affairs	Ambassador, Cuba
Major General Paradzai Zimondi	Prisons	Commissioner
Brigadier General Happyton Bonyongwe	Central Intelligence Organisation	Director
Brigadier Gilbert Mashingaidze	Sports and Recreation Commission	Chairman
Colonel Charles Nhemachena	Sports and Recreation Commission	CEO
Brigadier General Justin Mujaji	Sports and Recreation Commission	Commissioner
Air Commodore Mike Karakadzai	National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ)	General Manager
Brigadier Douglas Nyikayaramba (Commander 2 Brigade, Harare)	National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ)	Board Chairman
Colonel Levy Mayihlome	National Railway of Zimbabwe	Officer
Colonel Samuel Muvuti	Grain Marketing Board	Chief executive officer.
Major General Engelbert Rugeje	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings.	Board Member
Brigadier General Sibusiso Moyo	Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings.	Board Member
Colonel George Chiweshe	Zimbabwe Electoral Commission	Head
Major Utuile Silaigwana	Zimbabwe Electoral Commission	Spokesperson
Sobusa Gula-Ndebele (former director of military intelligence)	Attorney General	Attorney General

Colonel Karikoga Kaseke	Zimbabwe Tourism Authority	Chief Executive
Brigadier General Epmarcus Kananga	Parks and Wild Life.	Deputy Director General
Major Clive Manjengwa	Comptroller and Auditor General.	Officer
Col. Godfrey Nhemachena	Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe	General Manager
Colonel Ronnie Mutizhe	Operation Maguta/Sisuthi	Head
Lieutenant Colonel Arnold Hakata	Garikai/ Hlalani Kulhe	Head
Lieutenant Colonel Reuben Ngwayi	Potraz	Board Member
Wing Commander M Dengura.	Potraz	Board Member
Colonel Livingstone Chineka	Potraz	Board member
Brigadier Charles Wekwete	TelOne	Board Member
Wing Commander Kapondoro	TelOne	Board Member
General Vitalis Zvinavashe	Parliament of Zimbabwe	MP, Gutu (until March 2008)
Colonel Makova	Parliament of Zimbabwe	MP, Bikita East (until March 2008)
Tracy Mutinhiri	Parliament of Zimbabwe	Senator, Marondera Seke
Mendy Chimene (CIO)	Parliament of Zimbabwe	Senator, Mutasa-Mutare(until March 2008)
Lieutenant Colonel Kallisto Gwanetsa	Parliament of Zimbabwe	MP, Chiredzi South (until March 2008)
Vivian Mwashita (CIO)	Parliament of Zimbabwe	Senator, Mbare-Hatfield(until March 2008)
Colonel Livingstone Chineka	Parliament of Zimbabwe	Member of Parliament, Zaka East(until March 2008)

Clearly, the military's role in Zimbabwe politics has become dominant. Serving and retired security chiefs- the *securocrats* have subordinated formal policy making actors, structures and processes. Through their role in the Joint Operations Command (JOC)- a group of the Army, Police, Prisons and the Central Intelligence Organisation heads which meets weekly to coordinate military and security affairs- securocrats now direct all key national and governance issues rather than the Cabinet.²⁷ Those who sit in JOC meetings include Mugabe himself as the Chief Commander of the armed forces, Defence Forces Commander – General Chiwenga, Army Commander – Lt. General Sibanda, the Air Force Commander, Air Marshall Perence Shiri, CIO Director-General Rtd. Brigadier Happyton Bonyongwe, the Commissioner of Prisons, Rtd. Major General Paradzai Zimondi, the Police Commissioner –Chihuri and the Deputy Police Commissioner Godwin Matanga. The Governor of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, Gideon Gono, has been co-opted to render advice on economic/financial matters, while the former minister of state security and ZANU PF secretary for legal affairs, Emmerson Mnangagwa, has since the March 2008 elections been brought into JOC.²⁸ Having supported Mugabe in the ZANU succession struggle in the period leading to the March 2008 elections, Mnangagwa is currently enjoying the backing of the military hardliners and is among the front-runners to succeed Mugabe.²⁹

With JOC taking centre stage in all decision-making processes, Cabinet, which is formally invested with executive power, has increasingly become a rubber stamping organ that endorses policies and policy ideas generated elsewhere. For instance, when the controversial 'Operation Murambatsvina' was launched in 2005, Cabinet ministers were not even aware of the programme. Cabinet ministers who were supposed to coordinate the programme, such as Ignatious Chombo (National Housing and Construction), Kembo Mohadi (Home Affairs) and Herbert Murerwa (Finance), were only updated about its progress and intentions when it was already underway.³⁰

²⁷ JOC is an old security structure first established under Ian Smith during the liberation struggle as a way of co-ordinating the operations of the strategic security/military units directly and continuously involved in the prosecution of the 1970s war. The post-independence did not dissolve JOC, but prior to 2000 the body was not actively involved in making decisions on the running of the country.

²⁸ 'Hawkish ally leads Mugabe fightback', *Zimonline*, 30 April 2008. <http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=3103>.

²⁹ 'GNU unavoidable', *Zimbabwe Standard* (Harare), 24 May 2008.

³⁰ 'Zimbabwe: Operation Restore Order', *New African* (London), no.442, July 2005.

In an implicit demonstration of the fact that the securocrats have now virtually taken over running the country, the government in 2005 established the National State Security Council to oversee the economy. The National Security Council, though chaired by President Mugabe himself and including his two vice-presidents, Reserve Bank Governor Gideon Gono, Defence Minister Sydney Sekeramayi, Home Affairs Minister Kembo Mohadi and State Security Minister Didymus Mutasa, is dominated by officers from the army, the air force, the police and the CIO. Alongside, JOC the Council has become the de facto cabinet. It has nine task forces/departments managing all economic sectors and it oversees foreign exchange and monetary policy.

The military's dominance in the governance structures is reflected in the shift in the government's governance discourse. Since 2000, there has been an increased move towards governing through decrees and the adoption of military-style programmes to restore order.³¹ Some of the military-style programmes carried out in the recent years include *Operation Murambatsvina* of mid 2005, which led to the destruction of house and other buildings deemed illegally constructed, a blitz on street vending and the closure of informal businesses by members of the army and the police, *Operation Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle*, launched five weeks after *Operation Murambatsvina* and described by the government as a programme to build houses for the victims of the earlier "slum clearance" operation, and *Operation Sunrise*, launched in August 2006 in a bid to curb Zimbabwe's hyperinflation and money laundering, and carried out by the police, the army and members of the Zanu-PF's youth militia.³² The list of other military-style government programmes involving the security structures of the country also include *Operation Maguta/Sisuthi* (2005), *Operation Chikorochoza Chapera/ Isitsheketsa Sesiphelile* (January 2007), designed to clampdown on informal mining and illegal export of minerals. During the programme's execution, police and members of the army mounted roadblocks on major highways to intercept suspected gold and diamond dealers, and arrested thousands of people in what a number of human rights organizations described as random raids and searches conducted in a way that violated individuals' basic rights.³³

³¹ See IRIN, 'Operation Glossary - a guide to Zimbabwe's internal campaigns', IRIN, 2 May 2008. <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=78003>.

³² Michael Bratton & Eldred Masunungure, 'Popular Reactions to State Repression: Operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe', *African Affairs*, 106 (422), 2007; 'It's always been the politics, Gono', *Zimbabwe Independent*, 2 February 2007; 'Who has Mugabe's ear...Gono or Murerwa', *Zimbabwe Independent*, 8 December 2006.

³³ 'Operation Chikorochoza violating human rights', *The Zimbabwe Independent* December 15, 2006; 'Zimbabwean police urged to be professional in operation against illegal mining', *People's Daily Online*, 28 January 2007. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200701/28/eng20070128_345438.html

In an attempt to control sky-rocketing food and other commodity prices as a result of Zimbabwe's hyperinflation, the JOC ordered an ill-advised clampdown business in July 2007 compelling businesses and manufacturers to slash the prices of goods by more than 50 percent. The clampdown, code-named *Operation Reduce Prices*, was overseen by a team of inspectors comprising the police, the army and the CIO, led to the arrest and imprisonment of directors of manufacturing companies, shop managers and widespread shortages of food and goods as shops failed to restock. More recently, the securocrats launched *Operation Mavhoterapapi* (Who did you vote for?) after the March 2008 elections, when it deployed the military, the CIO, war veterans and youth militias to intimidate people into voting for President Robert Mugabe in the second round of presidential elections. Since the beginning of Operation Mavhoterapapi in mid April, there has been widespread violence throughout the country and a number of lives have been lost, especially in rural areas.³⁴

The military has not only become deeply entrenched in politics and governance but also in the economy. Many leading figures in the military, often in partnership with ZANU PF political leaders, have been entrenching themselves into the economy through massive accumulation of wealth. During the DRC war, for instance, military commanders and leading politicians enriched themselves on proceeds from Congo's diamond and cobalt mining industries, and from trade in timber and transport. The Zimbabwe defence force took a business-like approach, creating joint-venture and front companies to cream off some of Congo's richest mines. Among the top brass, the army chief, General Vitalis Zvinavashe, was a major stakeholder in a company called Operation Sovereign Legitimacy which had lucrative mining contracts in Congo through a partnership with a firm owned by Congo's late president, Laurent Kabila. A United Nations report published at the end of 2002 singled out Mnangagwa and Zvinavashe, as having allegedly played a leading role in exploiting Congo's mineral wealth for personal benefit.³⁵ During the civil war in Mozambique, senior officers of the army were involved in Rhino poaching and contraband in Mozambique and in the Gonarezhou Game Reserve. Captain Edwin Nleya who

³⁴ 'Zanu-PF Launches 'Operation Mavhotera Papi' to Punish Opposition', SW Radio Africa (London), 14 April 2008; 'Torture and killings intensify in Zimbabwe', *Africa News*, 2 May 2008. http://www.africanews.com/site/list_messages/17932.

³⁵ UN, *Final report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, 16 October 2002. Available at http://www.afrol.com/Countries/DRC/documents/un_resources_2002_govt_zim.htm.

threatened to expose his commanders, who at the time include General Chiwenga who was commander of 1 Brigade and other senior officers of the brigade like Brigadier General Douglas Nyikayaramba who was then lieutenant colonel commanding 12 Infantry battalion, and their illegal activities was murdered in 1989 before he could spill out the beans.³⁶

Both Mnangagwa and Mujuru, the leading protagonists in the succession struggle, have actually become serious players in the economy- involved in ventures ranging from farming to mining, either as individuals or leaders of consortiums, and some of their clashes have been experienced on the economic rather than political front.³⁷ Mnangagwa has business interests in various sectors of the economy. As party secretary for finance, he spearheaded party business operations and developed a business network that includes business magnates like Billy Rautenbach and John Bredenkamp, former Finance Director of the Rhodesian Defence Force and now BAE Systems (British Aerospace) agent for Southern Africa.³⁸

The current commander of the army, General Constantine Chiwenga and his wife, Jocelyn Chiwenga, have now acquired vast business interests in agriculture, wildlife management and manufacturing. The Chiwengas have actually earned a reputation in their own right as leading business persons. In the manufacturing industry, they own Zimsafe, a company which makes and supplies reflectors and reflective jackets to several local companies, including the Zimbabwe National Army, and other regional and international destinations.³⁹ In 2002, the Chiwenga family were reported to be supplying vegetables to Sainsbury's supermarkets in the UK from Shepherd Hall farm, a farm just outside Harare which they got under the current land reform.⁴⁰

³⁶ 'Mugabe appoints former top military officers to run NRZ' *SW Radio Africa News*, 18 May 2006; 'Who Killed Captain Edwin Nleya?', <http://www.zimsecurityforces.com/?q=node/53>.

³⁷ A consortium led by retired army general Solomon Mujuru has been embroiled in an ownership wrangle over River Ranch Diamond Mine. See 'Mujuru group loses appeal', *Financial Gazette* (Zimbabwe), 24 February 2005.

³⁸ 'Gunning for Mnangagwa', *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 45 No 8, 2004.

³⁹ 'Chiwenga honoured with international award', *Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation*, 5 May 2003. <http://www.zbc.co.zw/news.cfm?id=9519&pubdate=2003%2D06%2D05>

⁴⁰ 'Sainsbury's supplied by Mugabe aide', *The Sunday Times* (UK), 20 October 2002.

Like many other leading figures in government and the military, the Chiwenga family also has business interests in wildlife management, which has remained one of the country's few thriving industries, bringing in as much as US\$30 million annually, and the lucrative horticulture which brings coveted foreign currency earnings. Since 2003, Chiwenga has reportedly been leasing a highly lucrative 585-square-kilometre wildlife farm located just outside Hwange National Park, owned by Zimbabwe's Parks and Wildlife Authority. The farm has been generating forex through professional hunting. A number of leading ZANU PF politicians and cabinet ministers, including minister of Policy Implementation, Webster Shamu, minister of the daughter of the late Vice President Joshua Nkomo, Thandiwe Nkomo and minister of Environment and Tourism, Francis Nhema, have been reportedly granted long leases on farms in hunting and photographic destinations in and around Dete, Gwayi Valley, Hwange, Binga and Victoria Falls.⁴¹

Since 2000, a number of military men, alongside leading politicians, have taken over most productive sectors of the economy in an accumulation process which amounts to 'asset stripping'. A number of government audits of Zimbabwe's fast-track land reform have found widespread evidence of corrupt allocations and looting of farm equipment by senior politicians and military officers. For instance, General Mike Nyambuya, alongside Transport and Communications minister Chris Mushowe and State Security minister Didymus Mutasa, Agriculture minister Joseph Made, Water Development minister Munacho Mutezo and Manicaland provincial governor Tinaye Chigudu, reportedly looted essential farm equipment at Kondozi horticultural Estate in Manicaland, which was one of the biggest agro-export industries in the region before its expropriation by the government.⁴² The looted equipment included tractors, trucks, crop seed, irrigation engines and pipes. Many other military officers and politically-aligned businesspeople have been engaging in impropriety by incorporating shelf companies to acquire land.⁴³

⁴¹ See 'Minister named in scam', *Financial Gazette* (ZW), 12 February 2004; Joshua Hammer, 'The hidden links between American hunters and Zimbabwe's dictatorship', *Newsweek* (US) 13-January 2006.

⁴² See 'Ministers, party officials accused of looting Kondozi equipment', *Zimbabwe Independent*, 13 April 2006; 'Probe into looting of farm equipment waits for Mugabe's nod', *Zim Online*, 26 May 2006.

⁴³ See 'This land is our land', *Africa Confidential*, 21 February 2003; 'Nkomo orders Made, Moyo, Chinamasa to hand over farms', *Newzimbabwe.com*, 15 April 2005; 'Mutasa blasts top politicians', *Daily Mirror*, 16 February 2006.

Many top commanders have teamed up with politicians and businessmen to form political and economic interest groups venturing into lucrative business ventures, such as platinum and gold mining.⁴⁴ Former CIO operatives like Ray Kaukonde (current Governor of Mashonaland East) and Deputy Youth minister Saviour Kasukuwere, for instance, are both front persons sitting at the centre of an economic web involving powerful politicians and military commanders. Active movers on the economic scene and the most vociferous defenders of the political status quo, such as Kasukuwere and his political and military associates, have vast business interests in the lucrative petroleum industry which has seen many businessmen make obscene profits selling fuel on the black market. His group in 2006 acquired the lucrative Cornucopia Farm Orchard, with prime assets valued at over \$108 billion plus earnings running into several billions of dollars and constituting 19 percent of Mazoe Citrus Estate (MCE)'s citrus plantations.⁴⁵

Kaukonde, on the other hand, is a director of several companies, including Amalgamated Motor Corporation, National Foods Limited, Innscor Africa Limited and Mercantile Asset Management. He also operates a farm near the eastern border town of Mudzi in Mashonaland East. At the beginning of 2003, Kaukonde, together with former State Security minister Nicholas Goche, Youth, Gender and Employment Creation minister Elliot Manyika, businessmen Anthony Mandiwanza and Kenneth Musanhi, formed a consortium, Takepart Investments, to acquire stakes in large agro-processing firms. The firms targeted were Natfoods, the country's largest agro-processor of consumer foods and stock feeds which is also involved in bulk supplies of raw materials to livestock and poultry producers, bakers, brewers, fish farms and other food manufacturers, and Innscor, the holding company for a consumer-focused group of businesses operating in the food, entertainment, adventure tourism and distribution sectors.⁴⁶

Viewed from the above context, the military has taken over the reigns of government and has become important role players in the economy. The military is ruling in partnership with Mugabe. Having lost his past political influence, Mugabe is now increasingly relying on the securocrats and military for his own

⁴⁴ 'More eyebrows raised over Zimplats' empowerment partner', *Zimbabwe Standard*, 4 July 2005; 'Funding frustrates Zimplats' partners', *Financial Gazette*, 31 December 2004.

⁴⁵ See 'Kasukuwere Lambasts IMF', *Daily Mirror*, 15 March 2006; 'Kasukuwere Grabs Interfresh Farm', *Financial Gazette*, 9 March 2006.

⁴⁶ 'Ministers muscle in on Natfoods/innscor', *Zimbabwe Independent*, 4 July 2003.

political survival and continued control of both the party and government. The cabinet's authority has been superseded by that of the JOC which, according to a 2007 International Crisis Group report, also oversees the government's strategy regarding regional attempts to mediate between the ruling party, ZANU-PF, and Zimbabwe's opposition.⁴⁷

Conclusion and Recommendations

The Zimbabwe military is now deeply engrained in the in political and economical affairs of the country that whatever political deal has to be undertaken to move the country out of its current quagmire has to take into consideration the political and economic interests of this important constituency. The military has now become the domestic anchor class for President Mugabe's rule and thus holds the key to any future transition. It has become the vital source of his political support and also the domestic bourgeoisie upon which the government has come to rely on for economic survival. The military's control of both the party and state has been bolstered since the March 2008 election when it became apparent that ZANU PF has significantly lost its mass support. With the aid of a few political leaders, the military is now involved in the day-to-day running of the country rather than cabinet. What we have is an unofficial coup, where soldiers have taken over without announcing it. Mugabe continues to provide the military with the legitimacy it needs to continue ruling without causing much domestic and international outcry.

The securocrats and military hardliners are at the moment not ready to give over power to a civilian government, especially one led by the current MDC leadership. Defence forces Chief General Chiwenga, police commissioner, Commissioner-General Chihuri and prisons commissioner Major General Zimondi have all signalled their readiness to set aside the Constitution should Robert Mugabe be defeated at the polls. They have all described Tsvangirai as an agent of the West and have vowed to order their troops not to take orders from him.⁴⁸ More recently, the army chief of staff, Major General Martin Chedondo told troops at a target shooting competition to leave the military if they did not support Mugabe.⁴⁹ These statements echo similar declarations made by the

⁴⁷ ICG, 'Zimbabwe: A Regional Solution?', *Africa Report* No. 132, 18 September 2007; S. Hanson, 'Zimbabwe's Security Sector', *Council on Foreign Relations*, 24 March 2008. http://www.cfr.org/publication/15793/zimbabwes_security_sector.html.

⁴⁸ 'Chiwenga threatens coup if Mugabe loses election', *SW Radio Africa*, 10 March 2008.

⁴⁹ 'Troops must back Mugabe or quit', *BBC News*, 31 May 2008.

military top brass before the 2002 election, when all the service chiefs, including retired army general Vitalis Zvinavashe, came together at a press conference where they vowed they would not salute Tsvangirai if the MDC leader was elected president. They reflect a widely shared view among the hardliners. As Mugabe's wife, Grace, recently told ZANU PF supporters, the ZANU PF leadership will not concede power to the MDC even if the MDC wins the poll. 'Even if people vote for the MDC, Morgan Tsvangirai will never step foot inside State House', she remarked at the end of May, 'Even if Baba (Mugabe) loses, he will only leave State House to make way for someone from Zanu PF.'⁵⁰

The mentality that the MDC is a proxy of the Western powers seems to be entrenched within hardliners within the military top brass who have a different understanding of the causes of the contemporary crisis in Zimbabwe and how it can be resolved.⁵¹ Many Zimbabweans understand that the current crisis is a result of misgovernance, economic mismanagement, controversial elections and the international isolation resulting from the country's pariah status. But the hardliners among the securocrats and military generals have a different understanding of the situation. Their understanding of the crisis is that it is exclusively a result of 'Zimbabwe's siege from Britain and its allies.' As former cabinet minister Jonathan Moyo explains, in the views of the military hardliners, 'Mugabe is a victim of Tony Blair and now Gordon Brown, George Bush and the European Union that conspired behind former Rhodesians who had their farms repossessed'.⁵²

Ideologically, the hardliners have projected themselves as 'custodians of the revolution' and the country's 'national sovereignty'. They favour disengagement from the international community and international institutions and have denounced all those willing to reform and normalize Zimbabwe's relations with the international community as 'sell-outs'.⁵³ On a more practical level, the hardliners, like Mugabe, are more concerned about their fate after the transition. They are worried about what happens to them and their accumulated wealth and privileges under a new political leadership which they cannot control or

⁵⁰ 'Tsvangirai will never rule-Grace Mugabe', *Zimbabwe Independent*, 29 May 2008

⁵¹ M. Rupiya, 'When the Generals Say No', *Mail and Guardian*, 19 March 2008; 'Mbeki may yet be Zimbabwe's Saviour', *City Press*, 29 April 2008

⁵² 'Mbeki may yet be Zimbabwe's Saviour', *City Press*, 29 April 2008.

⁵³ 'Kasukuwere lambasts IMF', *Daily Mirror*, 15 March 2006; 'Mugabe battles Mujuru faction', *Zimbabwe Independent*, 28 September 2007; 'Mugabe: The final showdown looms', *Sunday Times (SA)*, 25 March 2007; 'ZANU PF old guard want Makoni out', *Zimbabwe Standard*, 15 July 2007; 'Makoni, Manyika clash over prices', *Zimbabwe Independent*, 3 August 2007.

trust. Theirs, as military historian Martin Rupiya has correctly noted, 'is a battle for survival, by fair means or foul'⁵⁴

The military and securocrats' plan to hold on to power by keeping Mugabe in office is thus part of a self-preservation strategy.⁵⁵ The securocrats are aware that the international community, especially their political foes in the US and the UK, is most likely going to push for Mugabe's prosecution for human rights violation when he leaves office and are opposed to see their hero go through such an indignity. They are aware of the vindictive trial and humiliation Saddam Hussein went through after his overthrow by the US. Closer home, they are aware of what happened to Charles Taylor when a Nigerian brokered arrangement with Africa Union support for Taylor's immunity collapsed. Also disconcerting to the hardliners are examples of developments in neighbouring Zambia, where Fredrick Chiluba is currently being prosecuted by his anointed successor, Levy Mwanawasa, and Malawi where President Banda was brought to the courts by the succeeding Bakili Muluzi and Muluzi was in turn prosecuted by his immediate successor and incumbent leader, Bingu wa Mutharika. The military hardliners are aware that many of them, especially some of those involved in the Gukurahundi massacres and serious human rights violations of the post-2000 period, will be forced to stand in the same dock with Mugabe if he is prosecuted after his exit from power. It is partly for this reason that the military hardliners are afraid of 'uncertain change'.

Given the above background, the daunting challenge for Zimbabwe at the moment is not just about how to retire President Mugabe from politics but also how to get the military to respect the country's constitutional provisions and political outcomes emanating from these constitutional provisions. Put differently, the fundamental challenge is how to get the military to underwrite electoral outcomes or whatever political settlement is made by politicians, including a post-retirement package for Mugabe. As in the case of the transition from Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, the security sector can help usher in a new government in Zimbabwe, and ensure its stability. At the same time, it also has the capacity to spoil the transition if not handled carefully because the military has become so entrenched in the state.

The onus for change lies in reassuring the military hardliners that they have nothing to fear from a post-Mugabe government. The peaceful transfer of power

⁵⁴ M. Rupiya, 'When the Generals Say No', *Mail and Guardian*, 19 March 2008.

⁵⁵ J. Moyo, 'Let's reject Mugabe's ploy to rule forever', *Zimbabwe Independent*, 9 February 2007.

through an election is going to be difficult when there is institutional resistance within the top brass of the army, the police, the airforce and the intelligence services. As in the transition of 1980, what is needed is to find a way of engaging these pockets of resistance and giving them reassurances about the security of their future and that of their leader, Mugabe. Just like in the 1980 transition, the transitional plan must include key legal, institutional guarantees for heads of some of these institutions who right now fear that an electoral hand over will result in retribution against them or loss of some of the important material benefits they have acquired over the years. The guarantees will allow all the concerned parties, including the hundreds of thousands of peasants resettled on the government-confiscated farms who continue to support Mugabe because of fears of losing their allocated pieces of land to an incoming government, to come to terms with change. Right now, such legal and institutional guarantees have not been forthcoming and this has continued to be a major source of concern for the hardliners and many other supporters of ZANU PF. What we have are occasional press statements by the political leadership in the opposition ranks about the need for political reconciliation and guarantees about Mugabe and his lieutenants.

However, these public statements are not reassuring to both Mugabe and his lieutenants, especially the hardliners in the military top brass, because they are not backed up by constitutional guarantees as was the case in the 1979-1980 transitional. According to the Institute for War and Peace report, a member of the ZANU PF politburo conceded that

ZANU-PF did not trust Tsvangirai, not least because they feared he would take away the farms awarded to many regime insiders by Mugabe's 2000 land reform [but because] Tsvangirai might also sanction the prosecution of Mugabe and others named as culpable in the *Gukurahundi* killings of the 1980s, in which Mugabe's military stand accused of murdering large numbers of civilians in a bid to eliminate political opposition in the Matabeleland and Midland regions... no matter what Tsvangirai says about guaranteeing President Mugabe's safety, we just cannot trust the man.⁵⁶

The MDC and its leadership have indeed given public assurances about the security guarantees for Mugabe and his lieutenants in the past. The public reassurances are, however, not convincing because there is no consistency in the message coming from the opposition leadership. At one point, Mugabe and his

⁵⁶ M. Ndodana, 'Zimbabwe Election Violence Predicted for Second Round', IWPR, 8 April 2008.

hardliners are told that there will be no retribution.⁵⁷ At another moment, as recently expressed by the MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai at the funeral of the MDC youth activist, they are told that the MDC will 'punish all those responsible for the murder of its activists and supporters, once in power'.⁵⁸

For the political transition to occur in Zimbabwe, first the military needs to be brought on board in all the political negotiations leading to political change. Second, it needs to be reassured, along with Mugabe, in concrete terms that it will not be subjected to retributive justice and that its members' economic gains made under its current partnership with Mugabe will not be seriously undermined when it cedes power to a civilian government, especially to an MDC government which it believes has strong ties to international capital. Once political change has been achieved, the military, especially the top brass enmeshed in current politics, will need to be persuaded either to go back to the barracks or move into civilian life through carefully crafted retirement packages and negotiations. These security guarantees will have to balance both the country's need for political and economic stability with the imperatives for justice and security sector reform. But the security sector reforms should not appear to be guided by vengeful politics.

⁵⁷ 'A tale of two countries', *Time Business*, 18 February 2002; 'Tsvangirai fears assassination', *Africa News*, 16 April 2008 http://www.africanews.com/site/list_messages/17498. 'MDC's dynamic second in command', *The Sunday Independent*, 1 June 2008.

⁵⁸ 'MDC vows to punish murderers', *Zimbabwe Standard*, 31 May 2008.