


Investing In People for Social and Economic



Report on the ZIMCodd CSO Consultative Meeting on the Implementation of the Paris Declaration (PD) and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) in Zimbabwe

Date: 23 February 2011

Venue: Bronte Hotel, Harare

Introduction

The Zimbabwe Coalition of Debt and Development (ZIMCodd), Poverty Reduction Forum (PRF) and Women's Action Group (WAG) with the support of Reality of Aid (RoA) convened a CSO Consultative Meeting on the Implementation of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (PD) and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) in Zimbabwe on 23 February 2011. The objective of the meeting was to identify Zimbabwean CSOs which are interested in Aid Effectiveness (hereafter AE) and the AAA and provide a platform for information sharing among them.

The meeting followed up on resolutions made by the three organisations at the Southern Africa CSO consultation workshop and multi stakeholders consultation on aid effectiveness held in Johannesburg from 21 – 23 September 2009. The Johannesburg workshop was conducted for selected CSOs in the Southern African region to lead and facilitate national-level consultation processes on the concerns of aid and development effectiveness. In these processes, it is expected that CSOs will be able to contribute in catalysing country level implementation of the AAA through CSO capacity building, multi-stakeholder dialogue and promotion of good practices.

“Welcome Remarks and Objectives”

By Mr. Dakarayi Matanga - ZIMCodd Executive Director

Mr. Matanga welcomed participants on behalf of the conveners. He thanked the RoA for supporting the meeting and also thanked all participants for their interest. He advised them that the objectives of the meeting were as follows:

- Mapping exercise to identify CSOs which may be interested on AE and AAA
- Information sharing and capacity building for CSOs
- Build consensus on possible action areas

He introduced the topic by citing the Kaufman definition of AE as “the effectiveness of development aid in achieving economic or human development (or development targets).” According to Kaufman, aid agencies are always looking for new ways to improve aid effectiveness, including conditionality, capacity building and support for improved governance.

He briefly chronicled the history of aid from the aftermath of WW II to the present day. He said that the contemporary discourse on AE started in 2000 with the adoption of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) followed by the 2003 Rome High Level Forum (HLF) on aid harmonization around delivering aid. This was also followed by the 2005 Paris meeting which led to the PD, and the 2008 AAA. The fourth HLF would be held in Busan, South Korea in November 2011. The meeting was advised that the Zimbabwean consultation takes place at an important juncture when a number of factors are considered.

Zimbabwe was looking forward to receiving external assistance from donors following a decade long political, social and economic crisis. It had put in place aid coordination structures and launched a policy to govern this in line with the 2005 Paris Declaration (PD) principles of

national ownership, alignment, harmonization, mutual accountability and managing for results. This was done despite the fact that Zimbabwe is not a signatory to the 2005 Paris Declaration (PD) on aid effectiveness.

Meanwhile signatories to the PD had committed themselves to achieving targets on aid delivery by 2010. The fourth high level forum is also being touted as the, “path to development effectiveness”¹ as the diversity of perspectives and the competing influence of multiple of stakeholders are forcing a refocus on development effectiveness as opposed to merely aid effectiveness.

He highlighted the fact that aid was an issue about which there was diversity in terms of perspectives. Whilst some stakeholders promoted the idea of aid as a path to development for the poorer Global South, others claim that it has not and will not make any impact. Others asserted that debt cancellation and cancellation of Third World debts are the prerequisites for development, not aid.

He concluded by drawing participants to prior inputs made by participants who could not make it. The Gender Alternatives Trust (GAT) had made a written submission which was circulated to all participants and taken as tabled (see annex I).

Expectations by Participants

Participants highlighted that they were expecting the following:

- To learn how CSOs will move on with aid effectiveness debate
- To come up with a clear road map of what we want as we move from aid effectiveness to development
- To understand the role of aid with regards to development and poverty reduction
- To ascertain where is this aid coming from
- To critically assess how effective is aid.
- To analyze the Aid coordination policy in Zimbabwe
- To understand the role of aid in human development
- To understand Aid effectiveness and new aid policy and how this affects gender
- Establishing engagement with the national government of Zimbabwe and donors

¹ The argument that effective development requires more than just effective institutional aid. Development effectiveness is about the impact of the actions of development actors, including international aid, on improving the lives of the poor and marginalized. It promotes sustainable change that addresses the root causes as well as the symptoms of poverty, inequality and marginalization. (<http://www.betteraid.org/en/glossary.html>)

“An Overview of Aid in the Developing World and Africa”

By Mr. Showers Mawowa - ZIMCODD Policy and Advocacy Economist

Mr. Mawowa started off by highlighting a number of harsh realities which illustrated Africa's underdevelopment. This was a necessary starting point in understanding the traditional justification behind channeling aid to developing countries.

He said that the continent is characterized by such issues as political conflict/instability, dependency on primary sectors and unsustainable public debt. Aid constitutes more than 50% of GDP in many countries, and most states are unable to mobilize enough revenue domestically. Africa had poor human development indicators and this included the fact that it was the epicenter of the HIV/AIDs scourge when statistics are considered (18 million related deaths recorded to date). It was also lagging behind in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Inequality was prevalent, with four of the world's top ten most unequal societies being African.

However, this pathetic picture was a paradox since Sub Saharan Africa in particular, has received more aid per capita than any region between 2000 and 2007. The continent has also not always been poor. In the 1950's Africa contributed a quarter of world GDP. Indicators of output were also generally good in the 1970s but these had plummeted to dismal levels at the present day. Africa was also well endowed with minerals and fertile soils.

He said that aid evolved in the Post WWII period when America pumped the economies of Europe with a view to rebuild their war torn economies. The Bretton Woods and other development institutions were established at this time. There was also the introduction of global human rights conventions at this time. Many former colonies became independent, and they also received aid for development from their former colonisers. In the 1960's aid channeled to Africa increased with the emergence of Scandinavian donors. However, the most significant increase in volumes was linked to the politics of the Cold War.

The oil crisis in the 1970s spawned indebtedness by the Third World to the IFIs and other creditors leading up to the era of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the 1980s (Washington Consensus Period). In the Post Washington Consensus period (1990s), there was some disillusionment with, and revision of the predominant development thinking with the introduction of “country led/initiated” initiatives like the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) by IFIs and donors. This period marked the time when stakeholders began to talk about aid effectiveness (PD and AAA). The most important point in the evolution of aid is that there was now a move towards debates on ‘Development Effectiveness’ instead of AE.

As regards Zimbabwe, aid rose in the 1980s but declined after 2000 due to the country's internal problems. Current inflows mainly constituted humanitarian assistance. Meanwhile, the country needs \$45 billion to get the country back to its peak level of 1996-97. The country cannot generate these resources internally in the short to medium term.

The meeting was also advised to be conscious of the political economy of aid. One of the critiques of aid is that aid is unpredictable, making it difficult for governments to plan. We should therefore also focus on outflows of capital through debt service, and compare them

against inflows of aid. Stakeholders need to analyse various issues such as the intention of donors, profile of recipients, their consumption patterns, finance and administration patterns/costs, and contribution of aid to debt accumulation. Donor countries have failed to meet their own commitments to delivering aid espoused in various declarations. Ironically, more money had been mobilized to bail out failed banks during the recent global financial crisis, than channeled to poor countries over the same period. He concluded that aid has not worked because it has been based on the wrong premises. It targeted symptoms targeted instead of tackling core causes. Other problems linked to aid related to conditionality and volatility.

“Background on the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action”

Tirivangani Mutazu - AFRODAD

Mr. Mutazu said the PD was the outcome of a high-level forum held in February 2005 under the auspices of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD (OECD-DAC). At this forum, development ministers from developing and developed nations, and heads of bilateral and multilateral development institutions (including the UN and World Bank) resolved to adopt, “far reaching and monitorable actions to reform the ways in which [they] deliver and manage aid,” in view of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The AAA was the statement endorsed by representatives of developing and donor countries to accelerate the implementation of the PD, at the HLF held in Accra, Ghana in September 2008. Both the PD and AAA were preceded by the first HLF which took place in Rome in February 2003 on Harmonisation of Aid. The next HLF on aid effectiveness will take place in Busan, Korea 29 November-1 December 2011.

According to him, at the heart of the PD was the commitment to help developing-country governments formulate and implement their own national development plans, according to their own national priorities, using, wherever possible, their own planning and implementation systems. The emphasis was placed on the *process* of doing so, rather than its destination, with five reinforcing principles (**ownership, alignment, harmonization, managing for results, and mutual accountability**) to ensure uniform thought and practice on aid issues.

As regards ownership, developing countries must lead their own development policies and strategies, and manage their own development work on the ground. On alignment, donors must line up their aid firmly behind the priorities outlined in developing countries’ national development strategies. Wherever possible, they must use local institutions and procedures for managing aid in order to build sustainable structures. Donors must coordinate their development work better amongst themselves to avoid duplication and high transaction costs for poor countries, hence the notion of Harmonisation. Managing for results means that all parties in the aid relationship must place more focus on the end result of aid, the tangible difference it makes in poor people’s lives. Lastly, on Mutual Accountability, donors and developing countries must account more transparently to each other for their use of aid funds, and to their citizens and parliaments for the impact of their aid.

Each of the principles was accompanied by targets for both donor and partner countries and indicators in order to measure progress on the targets. For example, under ownership, partner countries commit to exercise leadership in developing and implementing their national

development strategies, and donors commit to respect partner countries' leadership and help strengthen their capacity to exercise it.

Attention in the AAA is focused on stepping up progress towards the commitments outlined in the PD by committing signatories to accelerating the pace of change by focusing on key areas that should enable them to meet the 2010 targets agreed in Paris. It asks the OECD's Working Party on Aid Effectiveness to continue monitoring progress on implementing the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action and to report back to the fourth HLF. The AAA identifies three main areas where progress towards reform is still too slow. These are **country ownership**, building more **effective and inclusive partnerships** and achieving development results and **openly accounting for them**.

On country ownership, the AAA says developing-country governments still need to take stronger leadership of their own development policies and engage further with their parliaments and citizens in shaping them. Under building partnerships, the AAA aims for all the providers of aid to use the same principles and procedures, so that all their efforts are coherent and have greater impact on reducing poverty. Lastly, on openly accounting for results, there is a strong focus on helping developing countries to produce stronger national statistical and information systems to help them better monitor and evaluate impact. Developing countries therefore commit to making their revenues, expenditures, budgets, procurements and audits public. Donors also commit to disclosing regular and timely information on their aid flows.

The Accra meeting was different from its predecessors in that developing countries played a more active role in the preparations and the agenda. Some 80 developing countries took part in the regional preparatory events. Fifty-four developing countries participated in the OECD's 2008 Survey of progress against targets set in the PD. Unlike the PD, the Accra HLF saw strong civil society involvement. This included the Advisory Group on Civil Society and Aid Effectiveness (created in January 2007, dissolved in October 2008). The second was the Parallel Process of the International CSO Steering Group (now called BetterAid Coordinating Group).²Globally, more than 300 CSOs including grassroots groups, were involved in consultations prior to the Accra meeting. The AAA itself speaks to the need to deepen engagement with civil society as development actors in their own right.

Mr. Mutazu mentioned a number of critiques of the AE agenda from Rome to Accra. For example, the aid effectiveness agenda is a highly technical process, focused mainly on procedures for aid management and delivery, with insufficient attention and resources to assess and monitor actual impact. Implementation of the PD at national level runs into problems because of different country contexts. The PD is gender-blind and mentions gender equality only as a remote objective, with very weak language. PD monitoring plans are very problematic. They rely on WB evaluation mechanisms and lack independent ways to measure the implementation of the PD principles. The PD also gives short shrift to democratic governance concerns and human rights, women's rights and economic, social and cultural rights. The AAA does not

² BetterAid unites over 700 development organisations from civil society, and has been working on development cooperation and challenging the aid effectiveness agenda since January 2007. BetterAid is leading many of the civil society activities including in-country consultations, studies and monitoring, in the lead up to the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4) in 2011.

recognize the need to redress the highly unequal power relationships between donors and developing countries.

He cited a number of CSO parallel activities and platforms on AE from PD to the present day. One is the platform on CSO Development Effectiveness which is organized under the Open Forum. The other platform is Reality of Aid network and also the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness. Regional and national consultations such as this meeting are also included here.

Discussion Points:

Deliberations after the two presentations focused on the following:

- The material presented was fairly understandable, but the deficiency is linkage of development aid to the level of development of the recipient country. Some aid was not contextually relevant to the recipients and inappropriate.
- A participant felt that discussions on effectiveness should be connected to the nature of governance. Aid will not benefit the recipients where there is opaque governance. A presenter acknowledged that governance was one of the common conditions for aid being given. Civil society was pushing for democratic ownership of development so that citizens would be involved in crafting policies and participating in the implementation of development processes
- A participant wanted to know why discussions on effectiveness of aid were not based on the opinions of the recipients, not donors and governments for objectivity. Presenters highlighted efforts made to make participation in the meeting as representative as possible for the grassroots opinions to come through. They also said many case studies had been done targeted at the recipients of aid
- The meeting wanted to know whether there is consensus and complementarity between the Open Forum, the Reality of Aid Network, and all the parallel CSO processes. Mr. Meja said BetterAid coordinated CSOs globally to influence the Open Forum. Reality of Aid, AFRODAD and other institutions were part of the BetterAid process. In the Open Forum Process, it was realized that CSOs were not signatory to the PD. The CSO Development Effectiveness framework was an attempt to focus on what can make CSOs effective when they deliver programmes.
- The meeting noted that multiple donors tended to concentrate on a few specific areas at the expense of others e.g. Tsholotsho. Identifying who had a say on programmes would help stakeholders to analyse effectiveness of aid. Mr. Mutazu identified this as one of the issues that the principle of Harmonisation was supposed to address. Mr. Mutasa said the continued presence of a few donors in concentrated areas showed that government policy was not addressing issues of poverty there, or there were perennial crises such as naturally occurring disasters. Ms. Kaulem advocated for the implementation of a basket funding approach to address this issue.

“Current Approaches to Aid Coordination in Zimbabwe: The Aid Coordination Policy Explained”

Mr. Zhuwarara, National Coordinator, Aid Effectiveness (MoF)

Mr. Matanga explained that the official from the Ministry of Finance (MoF) had indicated that morning that they could no longer present on this specific topic. The reason given was that the Aid Coordination Policy was administered from the Prime Minister’s office, not the MoF. ZIMCDD was advised that MoF could only address general issues relating to AE not the policy itself. ZIMCDD was however advised that they may expect to be invited by MoF to participate in the survey on implementation of PD.

“Opportunities and Challenges of the Implementation of the Paris Declaration (PD) and the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA): The Case in Zimbabwe”

By Mr. V. Meja (Reality of Aid Africa)

Mr. Meja introduced RoA Africa as a Pan African organization which facilitates CSO work on AE. RoA facilitates research on the impact of aid as well as examining the policy instruments of specific aid frameworks. They publish an annual global report focusing on specific themes on aid annually. In the context of this meeting, RoA was reviewing the impacts of PD on Africa prior to the fourth HLF in Busan based on country studies.

RoA had selected Zimbabwe as a focus of research even though the country is not a signatory to the PD.³ They believed that Zimbabwe’s experience in managing donors would be of interest to other African countries. They also wanted to analyse a situation where a country has to implement PD principles without much space to manoeuvre in negotiating with donors. The Zimbabwean study focused on two key aspects of PD implementation, Harmonization and Alignment. These two principles demand that government and donors must work together to realize them. His presentation focused on some of the findings of the Zimbabwe study, as well as relating them to some experiences in other African countries.

He said studies in Africa showed that PD and AAA are shaping the modus operandi of donors. Their country assistance strategies included elements of AE. Coordination structures had been established at national level to facilitate the AE agenda. There was also a shift towards budgetary support by donors. African countries had chosen to implement PD insofar as a political enabling environment exists. That is, the politics of the day seemed to determine whether PD will be implemented or not. In this view, there tended to be participation at international level but haphazard or poor implementation at local level. African countries were also found to be lacking nationally developed action plans to reform AE.

Donors were found to be mainly driven by their interests, which are often at variance with the development priorities of African countries. Harmonization and alignment therefore still remain a mirage, with donors still duplicating roles and competing. In seeking to harmonise donors had created sector wide approaches to planning. However not all of them accept one particular

³ The full research report is available directly from RoA Africa

donor to manage their pooled funds. Policies in some of the donor countries also did not allow this, although the EU specifically had made efforts to address this problem. The result was that the bureaucratic framework of the sponsoring donor was still required in the delivery of aid. These diverse and often conflicting policies of donor countries tended to put heavy compliance conditionalities on governments. In the end, it was found that some African countries maintained multiple dedicated desks to manage each donor, which is inefficient.

The goal of using country systems was also lagging behind. It was ironic that donors would champion the strengthening of systems but still not use them after they are institutionalised. GoZ had introduced reforms to public finance legislation but donors were citing various excuses for not using their systems. In Zambia donors withdrew funding after an audit report cited corruption in the use of HIV/AIDs funds. In Kenya, donors also threatened to withdraw support from a trust fund set up to support free primary education. In these cases, donors withdrew support instead of applauding that internal systems were working well. In his view, donors should use country systems for disbursements and wait for Treasury and Audit reports.

Mr. Meja said that the quality of CSO involvement in monitoring reforms on aid management in many African countries was poor. He cited the selective involvement of governments in CSO consultations as an example of this. Aid coordination structures also did not give CSOs a meaningful role. CSOs in Ghana and Cameroon have created platforms to monitor the implementation of PD and AAA, and this has seen the quality of dialogue improve considerably between the CSOs on aid effectiveness as well as the process of development of national aid policy. He said that CSOs should also consider creating national platforms of this nature where they don't exist. He also advocated for Parliaments in Africa to be given a strong role on issues of aid and public finance so that they can protect national interests.

Whilst Zimbabwe is not a signatory to the PD, it had taken steps to establish an aid coordination framework guided by PD Principles (see annex 2 on Aid Architecture in Zimbabwe). The country's national aid policy was developed with the assistance of the UNDP, the World Bank and other development partners. It had also started implementing some of the action plans agreed by participating stakeholders at the AAA. However, there will be no PD beyond 2011. The country therefore needed to get its act together quickly. Zimbabwe is also not under a binding obligation to monitor and report on progress with the PD and AAA. However, it was participating in surveys on the implementation of PD. He wondered what the OECD will do with a report from a non-signatory country.

Apart from the national Aid Coordination Policy structures, there are various other multiple and loosely coordinated aid structures involving multi-lateral and bilateral donors and development partners, who provide aid to the country through both official and non-governmental channels. These structures include the UN System, activities of the local representatives of the OECD (also referred to internationally as the 'Friends of Zimbabwe' and more locally as the Fishmongers Group), the European Commission (EC), World Bank, IMF and AfDB.

Mr. Meja noted that significant steps had been taken by GoZ and some development partners to uphold the principles of alignment in aid coordination. For example, the UN system had committed to align their assistance under the 5-Year plan to Zimbabwe (ZUNDAF) to country systems, institutions and development priorities. GoZ is also exercising leadership in developing and implementing poverty reduction strategies and development policies, in line with AAA's

goal of strengthening the country's capacity to lead and manage development. A major concern however that is there was no structured engagement of CSOs in the drafting of national development plans such as the Short Term Economic Stabilization and Recovery Programme (STERP) and its successor.

Challenges which Zimbabwe has faced in implementing AE include:

- Donors and development partners outside the UN Country Team (UNCT) in Zimbabwe are not actively involved in the mainstream national policy formulation and development.
- Failure to use country systems due to fundamental differences with GoZ on policy priorities and strategies, as well as lack of faith in the country's systems and institutions. This was more political than technical, and increased transaction costs
- Involvement of involvement of CSOs and parliament is non-existent
- Human and institutional capacity weaknesses still exist on the part of GoZ
- Gaps still exist the in alignment by donors and development partners in Zimbabwe

Mr. Meja concluded with the following recommendations:

- GoZ should consider adopting the Paris Declaration so that it does not continues to lose a number of benefits attendant to this arrangement (e.g. technical support and shared experiences), as long as it remains a non-signatory
- Both the GoZ and the Donors and other development partners should take concrete steps to fully engage in efforts towards recovery and adequate support to development efforts
- While the current effort to strengthen public finance management are commendable more support should be given to strengthen to the role of the MoF department which monitors use of public resources, as well as other ministries responsible for implementing, coordinating and monitoring aid flows
- The Aid Coordination Unit (ACU), currently located in the MoF, needs to be urgently capacitated, as it is central to the whole aid process
- There is need to set-up and establish a Donor Coordination Council, which will work with GoZ to streamline areas of interventions, reporting requirements and other conditionalities, with the aim of achieving harmony, synergy and simplicity in aid management
- Develop a national multi-stakeholder approach to national aid effectiveness with structures that clearly spell out the roles and responsibilities of civil society, parliament, women's groups and other key stakeholders
- Both government and donors should reach out to CSO to be part of the AE agenda or CSOs could demand to be included since it is a requirement from ACCRA
- CSOs must consider various models of engagement in the AE architecture to influence content and decision making processes

Discussion Points

- Participants said that it was important for the meeting to compare the relationship between donors and government on one hand with the relationship

between donors and CSOs over the last year. This would help stakeholders to understand the implementation of AE in Zimbabwe

- Mr. Matanga said the aid architecture and implementation of PD reflected the political economy of the ongoing transition. The lack of involvement of CSOs in the creation of the aid architecture mirrored the lack of meaningful involvement of civil society in the creation of the current transitional governing framework of the country. Secondly, he noted that GoZ had included the goal of eventually exiting from aid dependency in the policy, which was commendable. He also noted that the policy states that the major role of aid is to support investment. However he lamented that GoZ continued to scare away investors and present a poor image to donors through ambiguous legislation and threats on property rights. CSOs should therefore give GoZ an honest critique of how they are implementing AE. He also said that the public auditor must be included in the aid coordination architecture.
- Mr. Mawowa raised concern with the transaction costs of handling aid which are linked to the creation of an aid coordination structure. This was important to note considering the poor performance of the vote of credit in the budget. Secondly, he felt that CSO efforts must focus on donors at local level, as opposed to GoZ, because the latter is likely to give CSOs a poor response to engagements.
- Mr. Mutazu wanted to know whether the research illuminated the reasons why GoZ had not signed. Other participants noted that GoZ still signs other international protocols it still did not domesticate them so that they cannot be held accountable to these standards.
- A participant considered that it is a violation of human rights to create development plans without involving the citizens.

Mr. Meja agreed that the auditor must have a well defined role in monitoring of externally generated resources. Timely reports on aid flows would help in management of aid. He also said that whilst GoZ had problems with donors at the signing of the PD, it was trying to be proactive and put in place the appropriate framework for engagement at the present moment. He cautioned CSOs to also recognize that problems in implementing AE were also to be found with donors, not just governments. They must also be targeted by CSOs because they have profound impact on national development plans. He said that if CSOs start demanding accountability from donors the relationship could also change between the two.

“Recognition of the roles and voice of CSOs as development actors, challenges for aid effectiveness.”

Sanderson Abel, NANGO

Mr. Abel started by urging the meeting to analyse the political context to explain why Zimbabwe is not a signatory to PD. He reminded them that when the PD was signed, a number of Zimbabwean politicians were under targeted sanctions from the EU. It is plausible that this influenced their perspectives on the notion of AE at that time. Furthermore, in 2005 relations

were better between donors and civil society (inclusive of NGOs) as compared to the donor relations with the Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ).

The political context was therefore important in assessing whether CSOs had a voice, and defining their roles as development actors. Secondly, one needed to analyse the shift from aid effectiveness to development effectiveness. In his view it was an 'egg and chicken' situation.

He observed that the country did not have a coherent national development plan. The introduction of cash budgeting in the last fiscal year showed that GoZ knew that no funding would come from donors. STERP was wrongly premised on the notion that Zimbabwe would receive significant amounts of aid from donors in the political transition. Only half a billion US dollars had come into the country in 2009 instead of the \$10 billion envisaged in STERP.

Mr. Abel said that donors have their own way of identifying the right custodians for aid. A comparative analysis of relations between donors-CSO relations and donor government relations would reveal interesting results. He asserted that CSOs have a better platform to deliver and monitor aid than government because their existence is premised on solidarity with beneficiaries. CSOs are therefore better in delivering aid and monitoring. NGOs target the needy whilst government tends to channel its assistance in a partisan manner. The counter-argument is that the political leadership of the country believes donors are trying to influence citizens using aid.

When it comes to delivering services, CSOs are well placed to deal with marginalised communities and demonstrate democratic accountability. He also asserted that although CSOs are fragmented, they have tried to give citizens civic education on various aspects of development. Legislators cannot match that capacity. CSOs are also good at constructing coalitions for greater CSO coordination and impact. In his view, this meeting, which included different sectors, was testimony of that.

According to him, monitoring government policies is also an important aspect to consider when assessing whether CSOs had a voice or a role on the issue of AE. He noted that CSOs met challenges in monitoring the actions of GoZ because the latter would use repressive public order laws, and restrictive and ambiguous legal instruments to circumscribe CSO activities. In addition to poor government-CSO relations, he noted that GoZ was only willing to give CSOs a token consultative role. For instance, GoZ gave NANGO only a few days to respond the voluminous draft of the successor document to STERP (the Medium Term Plan). The apex organization needed time to consult CSOs countrywide and give them a meaningful role in the process. Crafting development frameworks without meaningful consultation with citizens demonstrated autocratic, not democratic governance.

Another important issue to be considered was the basis for CSO legitimacy in the development process. A study by the Overseas Development Institute showed that CSOs reach 20% of the World's poor, hence their legitimacy. CSOs also represented diverse groups, giving them legitimacy. This legitimacy was linked to the right of citizens to organize, which is enshrined in universal human rights declarations. Mr. Abel also cautioned that CSOs need to balance their analysis of the role of government in constraining the development process with continuous introspection over their own operations. Sound internal governance within CSOs would also enhance the effectiveness of aid.

He concluded with a number of recommendations on the topic. He said that the best practice for a people driven mechanism for aid requires democratic ownership and participation, beyond a small cluster of government officials. Secondly, CSOs, ministries and Parliament should be given a collective role in the delivery and monitoring of aid.

“Aid Effectiveness and Gender”

Charles Mutasa, Christian Aid

Mr. Mutasa defined gender as a social construction and codification of the differences between the sexes and social relationship between women and men. He said that gender issues relate to all aspects of women’s and men’s lives, their different opportunities, access to resources and needs. He said that aid reform must be able to help society meet commitments to gender empowerment, and equality through its financial mechanisms and architecture. He briefly, summarised the perspectives on gender as follows:

- Women in Development (WID), *examines the unequal relationships between women and men. Entrapment in African patriarchy and under-development. .*
- Women and Development (WAD) *Integrated yes, but women are overburdened and undervalued because of inaccurate assumptions about women and structures that perpetuate gender inequality and women discrimination.*
- Gender and Development (GAD) *illuminates the processes by which gender relations are negotiated and re-negotiated examines the unequal relationships between women and men. Transformation call of relationships and structures. Gender mainstreaming (addressing women’s concerns more holistically and effectively)*

He also advised the meeting to recognize various instruments that supported gender at national, regional and global level. These included the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action of 1995, the Millennium Declaration (2000), AU Solemn Declaration for Gender Equality, African Protocol on People’s Rights and the Rights of Women and the SADC’s Declaration on Gender and Development.

He said that most gender related problems in Africa are embedded in customary law, judicial issues, land rights/use, recognition of informal sectors, representation in formal employment/decision making, education opportunities (boys vs. girls), access to financial resources and markets (women vs. men).

As regards linking the AAA to gender, he said the Accra declaration was primarily about reinforcing the idea of behavior change between donors and partners and delivering on aid. Key discussion points from Accra related to predictability of aid, use of country systems by donors, conditionality and the untying of aid. Problems linked to with AAA were weak language on tied aid, real change on conditionalities and weak language on the issue of gender.

In Accra the commitments on gender were a step in the right direction but too modest. Only 3 out of 32 paragraphs in AAA speak about gender and women empowerment. This raises concern

whether it was priority in AAA. There were no precise indicators in Accra unlike the PD. No actual resource commitments were made to address aid effectiveness concerns, particularly allocation of money for CSOs to participate. One cannot engage government without resources. There were no independent monitoring mechanisms apart from the OECD surveys. The OECD surveys were also problematic because in essence the OECD was reviewing itself, which lacks objectivity. There was no political will to engage CSOs on national development plans. CSOs instead have to claim space aggressively. The notion of national ownership was also put under scrutiny because PRSPs and national development plans tended to be donor driven and controlled.

Mr. Mutasa said that case studies from Zambia, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal and Burundi were useful for other countries to analyse the drive towards aid effectiveness and linkages with gender, because they have participated fully in processes linked to PD and AAA. Briefly, the lessons are as follows:

- Aid reform needs to be grounded in PRSPs and national development plans. CSOs needed to influence these frameworks if they are to influence aid reform
- The example of Zambia shows that a country needs an integrated institutional framework for gender mainstreaming covering all levels (i.e. a dedicated Ministry on Gender, as well as focal points in other ministries and at district levels)
- Gender needs to be mainstreamed in all sectors, apart from looking at it as a separate sector. This would enable a focus on results and targets to be set
- There is need for a donor selected UN coordinating agency for financial support. In Ghana, a specific UN agency supports engagements with donor agencies

Mr. Mutasa said that Zimbabwe is not a signatory to the PD/AAA and under sanctions efforts are being made to re-engage. The country is considered a fragile state by other donors while the country has made tremendous progress on gender equality and women empowerment. DFID, UNIFEM (now UN Women) are working closely with the Women's Coalition for a cohesive, co-ordinated agenda for gender equality. He said that the gender scoping study; established donor co-ordination mechanisms. The fact that Zimbabwe features under the category of fragile and conflict-ridden states is attracting less help for recovery. He said that real ownership and participation has been time-consuming for most NGOs with the inability to foster a more integrated approach and wide-spread inclusive structures

Mr. Mutasa concluded with a number of recommendations as follows:

- There must be improved relations between government and CSOs
- Zimbabwe must Learn from regional experiences
- CSOs need to advocate for gender-responsive budgeting for aid to be effective
- Demonstrate the value addition of CSOs
- Use of Gender Equality Assessment and Accountability Framework (GEAF) and other frameworks to assess progress on gender
- Have gender focal persons in government departments
- Introduce regular gender audits
- Donor role shaping civil society through funding and engagement
- Laws and policies that promote gender equality

- Zimbabwe seems to have a ‘good’ gender policy developed over time though with questionable participation, the ordinary women and men in the rural areas do not have ownership of that policy document, they have not seen it, they are not acquainted with it, yet they need it most. Translating it into vernacular and distributing it to the literate and explaining it will be the first step to make it known by the ordinary people.
- Rolling out a gender implementation strategy is essential
- Zimbabwe has potential to scale up its gender equality work by tapping into the existing PD/AAA reforms and resources; it takes political will and cooperation between government and the NGOs concerned.
- More needs to be done in terms of constitutional reforms and creating more gender equality structures; having gender responsive budgets.

Discussion Points

- A participant raised concern with the recommendation of a consultative framework which gives donors (i.e. a donor-determined UN agency) a leading coordination role in consultations on AE. They felt that donors would continue to set the pace of consultations and dictate roles for CSOs. This would also affect the movement from aid to development effectiveness. The answer given is that the real problem in empowering CSOs to contribute meaningfully is the lack of financial resources for mobilization of their constituencies, information sharing and establishment of tracking mechanisms.
- A participant raised skepticism with regards to the notion of institutionalizing of gender focal points. This compartmentalization of gender would slow down the general appreciation of gender beyond an issue addressing women’s issues. The answer given was that when structures are created, stakeholders need to breathe life into them and monitor them for effectiveness. Focal points may have not made impact in the past because they were adopted from other countries as a ‘cut and paste’ without evaluation mechanisms. Furthermore, the politics of the day has spoilt a lot of good initiatives
- Mr. Mutazu reminded the meeting that PD and AAA are negotiated documents. If sectors are not strong enough they will be left out. He also enquired whether the PD has affected the operations of international NGOs. Mr. Mutasa confirmed that there have been significant effects on the operations have been affected in a number of ways.
- Ms. Nyamutswa highlighted the need for CSOs to reflect on their role in making aid ineffective. It was observed that CSOs are also duplicating roles and carrying out activities which had no impact. Mr. Mutasa highlighted that trends showed that aid amounts are declining, and it is harder to justify funding from donors.

“Making Harmonisation, Alignment and Co-ordination Work for Africa”

Vitalice Meja - Reality of Aid Africa Network

In the first part of his presentation, Mr. Meja led a discussion on how Zimbabwean CSOs could engage with process on AE and create structures that deliver on this goal. This was important, noting the lack of participation by CSOs, and appropriate structures for them to engage governments and donors on AE. Some African countries (e.g. Ghana and Cameroon) had successfully launched processes enabling CSOs to initiate sector consultations and policy

dialogues with government on AE. He advised the meeting to identify an institution to lead the process and mobilise resources for this to take place in Zimbabwe. He recommended two structures to launch this process in Zimbabwe which the meeting could discuss to take the process forward:

- The creation of a facility to identify key members that participate in specific thematic groups, and give feedback to government on behalf of those CSOs
- The creation of a facility based in one lead organisation to facilitate CSOs on AE across various themes and input into govt processes. This implied that this organisation would be engaging at sector level on one end whilst also engaging at political level on the other. In his view, experience showed that it was better to engage at both ends

Discussion Points:

- The meeting noted the lack of a CSO platform on AE and agreed that a central coordination point was needed. ZIMCDD highlighted that it a member of the Aid Coordinating Group (BACG) Communication Cluster. This gave it some technical capacity to an extent. The African Forum and Network on Debt and Development (AFRODAD) was also part of existing CSO coordinating structures and regional and global level.
- The meeting noted that whilst some technical capacity existed, a national platform was needed. It was ideal to have a consultative structure to give political leadership to any technical focal points.
- Ms. Kaulem of Poverty Reduction Forum Trust (PRFT) sought clarity on the financial implications for starting something new, instead of strengthening what an organisation is already doing. Mr. Meja recommended that it was more resource efficient to host this facility in an existing institution in the short term, instead of creating a new entity. Resources would be easy to raise after consultative structures are created.
- Mr. Mutasa encouraged CSOs to create this platform despite the existing local challenges presently associated with Zimbabwe, because civil society was the missing link which was noted in PD and AAA. He said there was a clear opportunity for local CSOs to claim their space and present their national issues at OECD level despite the governance of the country being in limbo at present.
- ZIMCDD subsequently offered to host the technical structure whilst a consultative forum is built. AFRODAD and other similar institutions would be requested to give the initiative ongoing technical support
- Ms. Kaulem highlighted the fact that, ZIMCDD, PRFT and WAG had been involved collectively in preparing this dialogue. This could be a starting point on building an appropriate consultative platform.
- Mr. Meja encouraged this group to convene a meeting to agree on priority areas as soon as possible and translate the commitment shown in the meeting into action. He said roles, responsibilities and methodologies needed to be clarified soon for everyone to know. They were also encouraged to get in touch with GoZ and express the desire to engage with the process.

In the second part of his presentation on the run up to Busan, Mr. Meja reiterated that GoZ is participating in the survey on the implementation of PD even though it is not a signatory to the PD. Mr. Meja recommended that local CSOs must acquaint themselves with the various indices

relating to this, and use this as an opportunity to engage with the process. However, he warned that after the surveys are done, there is no further process of validating the surveys at national level before Busan. He said that RoA-Africa is proposing national multi-stakeholder consultation across Africa where governments, CSOs, Parliaments and donors deliberate and agree on key messages in Busan. Furthermore, the country outreach process must be used for advocacy strategies on raising public awareness on PD and focusing on issues of reform on AE. At sub regional level, there would be meetings to consolidate key messages after the national awareness campaigns and stakeholder consultations. This would help in coming up with genuine Pan African positions on AE. RoA-Africa would assist in facilitating such a process.

Discussion Points

- Mr. Dube raised scepticism with the notion of AE because of the experiences of the disabilities sector. He said that opportunities are generally limited for the disabilities sector due to weak policies. This meant that the disabled had limited access to aid. Mr. Matanga conceded that development issues must be discussed holistically, acknowledging that different sectors in society were affected differently. This was clearly articulated in the submission by the Gender Alternatives Trust. A mitigation plan would be to use a 'community voices' approach on the run up to Busan, so that specific communities can be heard at the top level. Furthermore, the disabilities sector and other special needs (i.e. indigenous language groups) must be catered for in the dissemination of information on PD. Mr. Meja said that such cynicism lies at the bottom of the review of AE, and introduction of the notion of development effectiveness. Ms. Maglahus said that in Cameroon, one of the active participants in the Aidnet Group is a representative of the disabilities sector.
- A participant sought clarification on the position of civil society on the fact that there were more capital outflows from Africa than aid inflows. Mr. Meja said that it is ideal for Africa to factor in a mechanism of exiting from Aid dependency and also build capacity for domestic resource mobilisation. It also meant that African countries must deal permanently with indebtedness.
- Mr. Mawowa asked who will convene the multi-stakeholder processes in problematic contexts such as Zimbabwe, where government departments were reluctant to participate in CSO led processes. Mr. Meja said that the national CSO platform must make an effort to start this process. At a regional level, AFRODAD and RoA would share responsibilities for the Pan African process.
- Participants were worried about the limited time for local and regional consultations to take place prior to Busan. Mr. Meja said that the Pan African conference would take place in September in Busan. He encouraged local CSOs to conclude national consultations by June.
- Another participant was also concerned with how conveners of national processes should deal with diversity of perspectives in civil society. There was also the concern with synchronising multiple parallel processes on AE. Mr. Meja said it should not be a problem to convene a meeting of likeminded organisation.

Conclusion

To conclude the meeting, Mr. Matanga said that the meeting had met the objectives in identifying the main areas of interest for local CSOs. He said the agenda in Busan could not be

exhausted in this meeting, and would be the subject of follow ups for the newly created platform. He expressed his satisfaction that this process had finally taken place since the conveners had made plans in 2009. He encouraged participants to have a thirst for knowledge and make themselves experts on issues of aid and development. He drew their attention to the information packs which included booklets such as the IBON Primer on Aid Effectiveness which was particularly good for those who are new to the concepts. He said that the ZIMCodd Secretariat available to answer any follow up questions by participants, as well as providing them with more materials on the subject. He thanked all participants for their interest.

Annex 1

Submission from the Gender Alternatives Trust (GAT)⁴ 22 February 2011

Key issues for consideration

- Understanding the aid effectiveness agenda and linking it to the gender equality is not something that many women's rights activists have been appreciating for some time
- How much of this aid is directed towards gender equality?
- How has the financial crisis of 2008 affected the inflow of aid towards gender equality in Zimbabwe and the rest of the African region?
- The impact of the financial crisis has led to most women's rights NGOs closing down- especially for those who have been existing for more than 10 years(e.g. most women's rights NGOs in Zimbabwe are operating on a thin budget line and some have had their contracts not renewed, whilst others come to work once /twice a week)
- We need to understand the power and gender dynamics at the negotiating table when aid is being allocated. Who makes the key decisions on how much aid should go to where?
- We need to also appreciate the key champions of gender equality who have been continuously been supporting gender equality work in spite of the financial crisis and other global priorities. These include countries such as Sweden, Netherlands, Norway, Germany, Denmark, UK, USA, Canada etc (to some extent).
- The amount of aid that the above countries have allocated to gender equality depends on whether those in power in those countries are either democratic or conservative.
- Current research by some key women's rights NGOs such as AWID have conducted a number of research on the amount of aid that has been given to gender equality work over the years(2006), and a campaign had been launched known as the 'Where is the Money for Women's Rights'?
- Regional and international foundations have also contributed towards financially supporting the gender equality agenda.

⁴ Tafadzwa Muropa is the Co-coordinator of Gender Alternatives Trust (GAT) is a non profit institution that promotes equal participation of women and men in the formulation of laws and policies. It works with like minded institutions in the field of socio-economic rights.

- ActionAid International has also embarked on a similar campaign –but targeting on funding for women’s rights, violence against women (VAW) and HIV & AIDS-‘Where is the money for VAW and HIV & AIDS?’


Impact of decline of aid on women and girls

- The decline of aid worsens the status of women and girls in the society. It means that more women will not be empowered and not be able to address their fundamental rights such as the right to food, water, health, education , work etc
- It also means that funding for interventions such as addressing violence against women will not be enough and more women will die in their homes ,whilst there could have been an option of addressing their plight
- This also means that poverty among women and girls will be on the increase, coupled with unwanted pregnancies, etc.
- Decline in aid is a reversal of the gains that the international community had made in ensuring that women's rights are put at the centre of all developmental and democratic processes(reference to the CEDAW, Nairobi 1985 UN Women's Conference, Beijing Declaration-1995,ICPD(Cairo Conference on Population and Development),SADC Protocol on Gender and Development, Protocol to the Rights of Women in Africa(AU), AU Maputo Protocol etc

Opportunities

- UN Women is now a standalone UN agency, thus it means that more funding for women's rights work will be increasing, as the agency will now have a position for soliciting funding for gender equality, unlike when it used to be known as UNIFEM under UNDP
- More women's rights NGOs should be capacitated on alternative fundraising mechanisms and look within their own environment for funding ,in the event that aid might no longer be available for gender equality work
- Linkages and network alliances between the Global North and Global South should be strengthened in order to come up with a global voice on advocating for more aid flows
- More advocacy at national and regional level around accessing resources for gender equality through the proceeds of the sale of natural resources(diamonds, oil, gold etc)-gender sensitive budgeting should be strengthened
- More spaces for the participation of women's rights activists should be opened for national and regional consultation towards Busan
- Capacity strengthening around aid effectiveness and its link to gender equality

Government-Donor Aid Coordination Structure



Annex 3 Participants List

NAME	GENDER	ORGANISATION	SECTOR	PHONE/EMAIL ADDRESS
Tiri Mutazu	M	AFRODAD	NGO	tirim@afrodad.co.zw
Benjamin Gwembe	M	Churches	Churches	+263 775939643/ bgwembe@breakthru.com
Jacob Nyamadzawo	M	ZEPARU	Econ R/S	jecobn@zeparu.co.zw
Rev. Maengamhuri	M	ZIMRIGHTS	Governance	+263 776 329959/ nmaenga@yahoo.com
Tendayi Bobo	F	ZELA	Environment	tendie@zela.org
Patricia Kasiamhuru	F	ZIMCODD	Debt & Trade	sapsn@zimcodd.co.zw
Showers Mawowa	M	ZIMCODD	Debt & Trade	showers@zimcodd.co.zw
Darlington Musarurwa	M	Sunday Mail	Media	darlington.musarurwa@zimpapers.co.zw
Sanderson Abel	M	NANGO	NGO Apex	sanderson@nango.org.zw
Charles Mutasa	M	Christian Aid	INGO	cmutasa@gmail.com
Nixon Nyikadzino	M	CIZC	Governance	peoplearise4ever@gmail.com
Masimba Kuchera	M	SST	Youth	
Busie Moyo	F	SAPST		+263 772 937547/ busiego@sapst.org
Doreen Sisya	F	ZCTU	Labour	+263 772 803605
Thando Sibindi	F	NYDT	Youth	+263 777 023309/ sibindit@gmail.com
Chamunorwa Dube	M	NCDPZ	Disability	+263 772 893477/ chamunorwadube@yahoo.com
Simbisai Maungande	F	Women's Coalition	Gender	+263 772 116265/ simbi2204@yahoo.com
Muneyi Muchanyuka	M	UZ	Student	+263 772 893483/ mneyi@yahoo.com
Nkosenhle Sibanda	M	Childline		+263 733 478988
Grace Chikodzi	F	ZIMCODD	Debt & Trade	gchikodzi@zimcodd.co.zw
Janet Mudzviti	F	ZIMCODD	Debt & Trade	jmudzviti@gmail.com
Sharlene Nyamutswa	F	ZIMCODD	Debt & Trade	sharlenenvy@gmail.com
Judith Kaulam	F	PRFT	Research	jkaulem@yahoo.com
Nicole Manjeya	F	NANGO	NGO	nicomanieya@gmail.com
Vitalice Meja	M	ROA		roafrica-secretariat@realityaid.org
Dakarayi Matanga	M	ZIMCODD	Debt & Trade	dakarayi@zimcodd.co.zw
Myrna Maglahus	F	IBON		mmaglahus@realityofaid.org