

Zimbabwe`s Unfinished Business: A report on the July 2013 Harmonized Elections

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Introduction

Zimbabwe's much vaunted elections have come and gone. With simmering questions about mass disenfranchisement and alleged fraud, it is no exaggeration to say that the elections, which were supposed to settle long standing political and electoral issues have left more questions than answers. Although many thought and hoped that the Global Political Agreement (GPA) signed in 2008, and which provided the framework for conducting the polls would solve Zimbabwe's political problems, the elections and the processes leading up to them have not created a permanent solution to the country's problems. When the GPA was signed the parties committed themselves to working together to create a genuine, viable, "permanent", sustainable and nationally acceptable solution to the Zimbabwean situation with the aim of "resolving **once and for all** the current (2008) political and economic situations and charting a new political direction for the country"¹. The preamble to the GPA also notes that the signatories were determined to build a society free of violence, fear and intimidation, hatred, patronage, corruption founded on justice, fairness, openness, tolerance, transparency, dignity and equality, respect for all persons and human rights. All these commitments were made against the background of years of political conflict where these values and principles had hardly been respected and where many people had lost their lives and livelihood.

Through implementing the GPA provisions, it was envisaged that there would be uncontested election outcome thereby settling the legitimacy of political and electoral processes in Zimbabwe. Yet not even the most optimistic observer of Zimbabwean politics would argue that the outcome and process are uncontested. Whilst progress was made in some areas, it is the view of the Election Resource Centre (ERC) that the 2013 elections have not settled all political questions in Zimbabwe. And that these uncompleted processes are likely to create similar problems as those which birthed the GPA. ***In fact, there is still unfinished business by Zimbabwe's political players in order to avoid a repeat of the situation leading up to the political impasse of 2008.***

The ERC observed all key electoral and political processes leading up to the poll and presents this report of its findings with a view to contributing to the conduct of credible and acceptable election in Zimbabwe. The ERC² pre-election statement opined that all pre-electoral processes were conducted in a manner that inevitably undermined the credibility of the poll.

Background

For more than two decades now, Zimbabwe's electoral processes have been contested and have been a subject of much debate and conflict. Initially, protest centred on the uneven playing and unfair competition. The unlevel playing field was characterized by unequal and partisan state media coverage, an inaccurate voter's roll and abuse of state resources by the incumbent. Political stakes heightened with the emergence of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in 2000 the political stakes were raised. It was during the 2000 Parliamentary

¹ Article 2 of the Global Political Agreement

² See ERC Pre-Election Statement 'Five reasons why ZEC should seek a postponement of the elections'

election campaign that election related violence became more entrenched and vicious. This violence continued to bedevil subsequent electoral processes, in 2002 and to a lesser extent 2005. During the campaign for the Presidential run-off election in 2008, Zimbabwe witnessed the worst election related violence which discredited the poll and led to global condemnation of the electoral outcome. In order to placate national, regional and international condemnation, ZANU-PF entered a power sharing agreement with the two MDC formations. The temporary power sharing agreement was supposed to end with the holding of elections eventually held on July 2013. This election was also supposed to bring stability and finality to some of the outstanding issues that were plaguing the Zimbabwean polity.

The business that the GPA was supposed to conduct focused on those aspects of the political process which needed redress which were, broadly, the following:³

- Ending polarisation, divisions, conflict and intolerance
- Respecting the Constitution and all national laws, the rule of law, freedoms of assembly and association
- Establishing a Select Committee of Parliament composed of representatives of the Parties to draft a new constitution with public input.
- Ensuring the political neutrality of traditional leaders
- Running the National Youth Training Programme in a non- partisan manner
- Promoting plurality in broadcasting by licensing broadcasters other than the public broadcasters
- Ensuring that the public media provides balanced and fair coverage to all political parties
- Holding free, fair and credible elections in a new legal and institutional dispensation

Although all parties in the government appeared committed to implementation of the GPA, the parties struggled to cooperate in full implementation of the agreement. In July 2011, the parties agreed to ‘narrow down’ some of the requirements in the GPA and focused on a few selected areas in order to expedite the process of implementation. This narrowed down selection, dubbed the Roadmap set the following as critical before holding the elections:

The Roadmap:

A. Ending Sanctions

B. Constitution

C. Media Reform

³ See the Global Political Agreement - 2008

D. Electoral Reform

E. Rule of Law

F. Freedom of Association and Assembly

G. Legislative Agenda and Commitments

H. Actual Election

The GPA was not just about the 2008 elections but sought to resolve a political crisis that had begun long before that. That is why the signatories, in Article 2 of the GPA, alluded to it being a 'permanent' solution.

Doubts about the credibility of Zimbabwe's electoral processes were expressed since the early 1990s. The lack of credibility of these elections centred mostly on suspected manipulation of the processes by the authorities including the government, the election management bodies and the abuse of incumbency through state media, related state institutions and or resources. However it was only in 2000 when the magnitude of violence became a disturbing feature of elections in Zimbabwe. This was precipitated by the emergence of the MDC, a political party which significantly challenged ZANU-PF since independence. Subsequent elections in 2002, 2005 and 2008 were all plagued by violence with 2008 records of violence being unparalleled.

The electoral crisis in Zimbabwe drew much international attention from the African continent as well as from beyond. On one hand, many countries in the West condemned elections in Zimbabwe and maintaining sanctions on leading members of the government and those affiliated to ZANU PF imposed between 2002 and 2003. On the other hand, regional bodies such as the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) took a more supportive approach and decided to assist Zimbabwe in resolving its political problems and in 2007 appointed then South African President Thabo Mbeki as a facilitator between the political parties in Zimbabwe. It was under the SADC facilitation that amendments to the Zimbabwean constitution in 2007 creating an electoral system for the presidential election and expanded national assembly were effected amongst other notable changes.⁴

Following the contested run-off elections in June 2008, it was also SADC which oversaw the drafting of the GPA and appointed a guarantor of the agreement. SADC appointed the South Africa President (then Thabo Mbeki) to act as the facilitator and to support the parties in the GPA implementation. The facilitator was also expected to mediate in any conflicts regarding implementation of the GPA.

From its inception the parties in Government of National Unity (GNU) struggled to work together. They failed to bury their animosity and constant disagreement about what should be done and how it should be done slowed down progress. For example the constitutional making process began late and took much longer than it was supposed to have done as the parties disagreed first about the composition of the teams to administer the process and later about the content of the draft.

⁴ See Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment No 18 of 2007.

The parties also disagreed strongly on reform areas, with ZANU-PF for example, questioning the need for any security sector reform whilst the MDCs were insistent on electoral and media reforms. Thus the GNU dragged on for four years with many areas unreformed. The adoption of a new constitution under the GNU witnessed some reciprocity from western countries with a few individuals and some commercial entities being removed from the sanctions lists. Media and security reforms were deadlocked. The ZANU PF of the GNU was totally disinterested in significant changes to these. The table below presents those areas that were supposed to be addressed during the life of the GNU, their status in 2008 when the GNU was signed and their status as at 31st July 2013 and prospects for reform and renewal.

Category	Sub-category	2008	2013	Areas of Reform and Improvement
Elections	Electoral system for the National Legislature	First past the post – Winner takes all, wasted votes and resulted in fewer parties in parliament. Contributed to electoral violence as winners take everything and losers are not accommodated	Mixture of First Past the post and Proportional representation. Introduction of reserved seats for women in the national assembly Senators elected by proportional representation More women in legislature but voters' choice for senators reduced.	Consider introduction of pure proportional representation for national assembly (or extend its application) to avoid wasting of votes.
Election	Voter registration	Continuous registration and targeted election related registration Those born in Zimbabwe but whose parents are not Zimbabwe were not allowed to vote. Prisoners were also not allowed to vote Dual citizenship was not allowed Citizens in diaspora were not permitted to vote, unless if they were diplomats or representing the country in an official capacity.	Continuous registration of voters was sustained. Two voter registration drives were conducted, but many people could not register due to the short time for registration because of insufficient funding to support the further decentralisation of the process to get closer to communities. Former aliens and those incarcerated on less than 6 months sentences were permitted to vote but arrangements could not be made in time due to rushed election date. Those holding dual citizenship were also allowed to vote. Registration and inspection of the voters roll conducted simultaneously during the intense mobile registration exercises.	Extension of voting rights to Citizens in the diaspora Ensure that mechanisms and arrangements are put in place so that all eligible voters, including prisoners can vote. Provide sufficient time and funding to allow voter registration by all prospective voters. Explore biometric and electronic voter registration which is quicker and less prone to mistakes than manual registration. Schedule registration and inspection to allow for exhaustive verification of voters in time and to avoid a huge number of people being turned away. Voters must inspect voters roll before elections. An audit of the voter's roll should be conducted prior to any election.

Category		2008	2013	Areas of Reform and Improvement
Elections	Voters' Roll	Ward based voters' roll was used. Difficult to access in electronic format were experienced. Political parties and civil society groups struggled to access the roll before the elections.	Ward based voters' roll- reduced opportunity for double voting. Electronic Final Voters roll used on election day was not provided to political parties before the voting began and up to three weeks after the poll.	Use of polling station based voters' roll to minimise double voting even though this has a down side to it given Zimbabwe's culture of election related intimidation and violence including retributive attacks after announcement of results. Introduction of a biometric voters roll could assist in securing the voters' roll and addressing other issues related to the same document. The Electoral Act to be amended to include a clear deadline within which political parties are to obtain voters rolls and not the current "reasonable period before polling"(s21(6)(a) of the Electoral Act.
Elections	Election Management	Delimitation Commission was a stand-alone institution that set out electoral boundaries. Registrar-General of Voters was autonomous from the	Registrar-General of Voters was responsible for registering voters under the supervision of the ZEC. Allegations of Militarisation of ZEC staff and partisanship of commissioners.	Put ZEC in charge of all aspects of elections. Depoliticisation of staff through independent public recruitment, vetting to instil confidence in the electorate and political parties.

		Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) in its election related activities		
Elections	Voter education and information	Conducted by the electoral commission	Conducted by the electoral commission in conjunction with a selected few civil society groups. Voter education for polling day was insufficient with ZEC only deploying 2 people per ward ahead of the election.	Earlier Accreditation of civil society groups for voter education More comprehensive voter education at election time Sustained voter education throughout the electoral cycle.

Category		2008	2013	Areas of Reform and Improvement
Elections	Results Management, Announcement and Acceptance	Results of First round of the Presidential election released six weeks after the poll.	Introduction of ward election centre as a part of results transmission system All results were announced within the five day deadline set by the electoral law. Whilst there were no apparent problems in the transmission and announcement of results, the results were rejected by some contestants. due to the pre-election and election day irregularities Results announced within 5 days did not include constituency, ward and polling station breakdowns of the presidential vote, polling station results for the House of Assembly election, spoilt ballots at the polling station and ward level and assisted voters at the polling station and ward levels and people turned away at the polling station and ward levels	Possible establishment of Ward election centres to deal with ALL voter enquiries on election day. All results including figures for spoilt and turned away should be released when results are announced. Final results for the presidential election should be disaggregated to polling station level including spoilt ballots. Consider electronic results transmission to make transmission of results faster and record keeping and retrieval of data easier.

Elections	Election Related Violence	Campaigning, especially for the Second Round of the Presidential Election, was very violent and damaged credibility of elections.	Political parties urged their supporters to avoid violence and the campaigning period and election day was largely peaceful.	Sustained civic education throughout the electoral cycle
Elections	Intimidation and harassment of voters	Intimidation and harassment of voters was rife particularly during the Second Round of the Presidential Vote. Many voters claimed that they were forced to vote for certain candidates against their will.	Incidences of intimidation and harassment of voters were also reported though at lower levels than in 2008. Particularly in rural communities, intimidation and harassment was said to have been perpetrated with the assistance of traditional leaders	More civic and voter education to encourage voters to vote freely. Protection and support for 'whistle-blowers' Criminalisation of active partisan politics by traditional leaders.
Category		2008	2013	Areas of Reform and Improvement
Media		Private and public media were largely partisan and very much polarised. Public media supported ZANU-PF whilst private media supported opposition parties especially the MDCs. State media did not give equitable election coverage to all political contestants focusing instead on ZANU-PF activities No privately owned national broadcasters were in place in 2008	Media bias continued from all sides of the media. State media coverage was heavily skewed towards ZANU-PF. Two licenced Private radio stations (ZiFM and Star FM) attempted to provide some balance in reporting on political campaigns. Foreign based Independent TV station (1st TV) began broadcasting into Zimbabwe but it was largely viewed as oppositional. Independent radio stations (Studio 7, SWRA and VOP) were largely seen as avenues for the MDCs. ZEC and the Zimbabwe Media Commission appeared politically and statutorily	More robust measures to sanction those media organisations which show partisanship. State broadcaster should be compelled to give equitable coverage to all political parties and candidates. More broadcasters to be licensed for radio and TV. Amendment of Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act.(AIPPA) to be consistent with the new Constitution. Popularization of the code of conduct of media houses towards and during elections.

			disempowered to sufficiently address complaints and partisan media.	
Traditional Leaders		Most traditional leaders, that is, headmen and chiefs, were allegedly openly partisan towards ZANU-PF	Allegations that most traditional leaders were partisan, campaigning for ZANU- PF were rampant and court petitions to this effect were made though unsuccessful	Traditional leaders should be compelled to be non-partisan. Amending of the Traditional Leaders Act to incorporate provisions of Chapter of the Constitution on Traditional Leaders.
External Interference		Sanctions were imposed on Zimbabwe by Western countries. SADC appointed mediator of the Zimbabwean crisis. Foreign based radio stations were broadcasting into Zimbabwe	Sanctions imposed by Western countries remained in place. Foreign radio stations were still broadcasting into the country. An Independent, foreign based TV station was broadcasting into Zimbabwe	Western countries should continue to review their sanctions and reward positive action from authorities.
Category		2008	2013	Areas of Reform and Improvement
Freedom of Assembly and Association		People were reportedly forced to attend political party meetings. Meetings of some political parties and civil society groups were allegedly not allowed to proceed.	This improved somewhat although people still were reportedly forced to attend meetings and some groups did not always receive permission for their meetings. In some areas, people were said to have been forced to buy political party cards.	Public Order and Security Act (POSA) has to be amended
Free Political Activity		In some communities, there were reports of people being afraid to associate with political parties of their choice and express their opinions.	All parties were largely free to campaign in virtually all parts of the country. In some communities however, people were allegedly still afraid to express their political allegiance and soon after elections,	There is need to create and secure an environment where people can express themselves politically and align with parties and candidates of their choice.

		Many areas were closed off to certain political parties.	incidences of post-election retribution were reported.	Freedom of association still has to be secured and harsher measures should be taken against perpetrators of violence
Legislative Agenda		Elections were held under old Lancaster House Constitution. Repressive legislation such as AIPPA and POSA were in place.	A New Constitution was gazetted before the election. Electoral Act was also amended before the election	AIPPA and POSA should be repealed

Voter Registration

Due to the importance of voter registration in the conducting of elections, international and regional standards have been developed to guide and inform this process. The ERC have invoked these principles in assessing the voter registration in Zimbabwe. Below is an excerpt of those principles and subsequently an analysis of Zimbabwe's performance against these standards.

Guiding Principles for Voter Registration⁵

PRINCIPLE	EXPLANATION
Integrity	Voter registration framework and processes must be fair and honest, free from political and other manipulation or intimidation, allow all eligible person to register as voters and not allow ineligible persons to register as voters
Inclusiveness	Voter registration frameworks and processes should not contain measures that exclude persons from registration to serve political advantage. For example, there should be no: • criteria for eligibility to register; • differentiation in resources provided for registration processes; • differentiation in accessibility; • differentiation in assurances for security or safety; or • imposition of additional checks or administrative obstacles that may deny one the opportunity to register to vote, or make it more difficult to register to vote for persons assumed to have a certain political tendency.
Comprehensiveness	Voter registration exercises should aim at registering 100% of qualified persons, including those societal groups that may be less inclined to register to vote, such as women, youth and those to whom standard registration processes may be less accessible.
Accuracy	All voter registration information should be recorded accurately and maintained properly so that the voter lists used for elections are up to date. This may require implementing systems to check data validity and the accuracy of data recording, as well as proactive programmes to check that all data is up to date and to receive advice of and process any necessary amendments.
Accessibility	Voter registration processes should be physically and geographically accessible as well as readily understandable by all persons qualified to register. Any locations used for voter registration purposes and which require the public to attend to provide or check information should be: • physically accessible to all – including the elderly and disabled; • open at times that can service all employed, unemployed and rural farm populations; • readily accessible on foot or serviced by regular public transport, and located within reasonable distance of all eligible voters in its catchment area – using mobile locations in more sparsely populated areas may assist in this; and • At a place that does not intimidate potential voters. For example, locating voter registration centres near offices associated with the ruling

⁵ Refer to Voter Registration in Africa: A Comparative Analysis, edited by Astrid Evrensel

	party, or law enforcement/military agencies may in some instances deter people from attending.
An informed public	Voter registration processes should be clearly explained and widely publicised to all potential eligible voters as well as to all stakeholder organisations in the electoral process, such as political parties, the media and CSOs.
Transparency	Transparency in registering voters promotes public trust in the integrity of voter registration processes and products. Civil society, particularly through professional and impartial monitoring and reporting by CSOs, and fair investigation and reporting by the media can enhance the transparency of voter registration.
Security	Field registration staff and people registering to vote must be assured of their safety and security. Voters must be able to trust that registering to vote will not result in their being subjected to consequent discrimination, intimidation or violence. Registration staff must be supervised and protected against any action by outside persons so that they can conduct their work in an honest, professional and impartial manner. Voter registration information stored in both paper and electronic formats must be sufficiently secure to prevent unauthorised access, to protect against unauthorised alteration or disclosure and to ensure that any legal requirements for information privacy are met.
Information Privacy	In some countries information privacy is legislated and protected by law. If not, privacy rights should be included in the framework for voter registration. Information provided by people directly for the voter registration process should not be available to any government or private organisation that can use this information for purposes which could deter people from registering to vote. The purpose of voter registration is to allow citizens to exercise their basic political right to vote; it is not an information gathering exercise to be shared with other institutions, such as law enforcement authorities or for commercial interests.
Accountability	The institution(s) responsible for voter registration must be subject to accountability mechanisms which ensure that the objectives of voter registration are achieved and that the principles of voter registration have been applied. These mechanisms could be internal (such as internal reviews and audits of the voter registration system, process and data) or external. External accountability mechanisms for voter registration that could be applied include: • a process for public review of the voters' roll; • rights of the public in general and stakeholders in particular to lodge administrative challenges to errors, omissions and inclusions in the voters' roll; • independent external audits and evaluations; • rights of affected parties to lodge judicial appeals against decisions made by administrative bodies in relation to the voters' roll; • access for political party and independent observers to observe all voter registration processes, their right to lodge complaints about any irregularities and to have these resolved effectively; and • public reporting and reporting to parliament by the EMB on the extent to which it has met its voter registration objectives
Credibility	Political parties and the public need to believe that voter registration has been conducted with integrity, equity, accuracy and effectiveness.

	Transparency measures and the provision of regular and accurate information on voter registration can promote public credibility in a well-implemented registration process, and can also provide knowledge to improve less well-implemented processes.
Stakeholder Participation	Stakeholders must be informed regularly and their views considered both at the decision-making phase and during the conduct of a voter registration exercise. This will increase stakeholders' support and trust of the overall process and its product – the voters' roll. Primary stakeholders are directly affected by the voter registration process or its outcome. Included in this category are citizens who are eligible to register, the registration authority, political parties and candidates, executive government, legislatures, EMB staff, contractors, electoral dispute resolution and supervisory bodies, the media, observers and monitors, CSOs, donors and assistance agencies, and suppliers and vendors. Secondary stakeholders have an interest but are not directly affected by the exercise. Included in this category are the general public, academia, international or regional electoral networks and research institutes.

KEY FINDINGS

Based on the above principles, the ERC made an assessment of the two phases of the state supported mobile registration process. The key findings were as follows;

1. Late opening and commencement of registration

The general situation was that fewer registration teams were deployed during the first phase which ran between 29 April 2013 and 19 May 2013, while the new phase (10 June to 9 July 2013) witnessed a bigger team of registration officials and a related increase in registration centres. However in both phases the ERC received reports of registration centres opening late or even failing to open at all, thereby disenfranchising prospective voters.

2. Lack of publicity

The mobile registration process was lacking in awareness and publicity around when and where the registration process was to take place. Whilst there were reported cases of prior notification through selected traditional leaders, such voter awareness was often devoid of the intricate details relating to what type of services were being rendered by the mobile teams. This resulted in a number of potential voters being turned away because they could have visited the centres seeking to recover their lost birth certificates, a service which was not being offered by the mobile registration teams. The lack of sufficient information and publicity around the process meant that the exercise had the potential of being shadowy to potential voters intending to register as voters. Some potential registrants were not be able to register because of a lack of information on the whole process.

3. Inadequate time

Most centres were only opened for a short period of time thereby failing to meet demand of citizens visiting the centres. Due to mentioned lack of publicity, people took time to know of the presence of the mobile teams, by the time they got to know of their presence, the mobile

teams would have moved to another designated centre, a distance away. Some registration centres were serving more than 3 wards, which left the teams overwhelmed as they were unable to service all interested people intending to register as voters.

4. Non-Compliance

Some key government institutions, that were supposed to be complementing and aiding the mobile voter registration teams, seemed to be unaware of their responsibilities and roles. The ERC received reports that for instance, the police in some areas, for instance at Glen Norah Police Station, were not issuing out police reports (which were needed for replacement of lost IDs) to potential first time voter registrants that facilitated one to get an ID for free.

5. Lack of Full services

It was observed that the mobile voter registration teams were not providing some services which are important for one to register as a voter. For instance, reports from ERC observers indicated that the registration teams were not issuing out birth certificates which are a requisite for one to obtain an ID, itself a requirement for one to register as a voter. This chaos was acknowledged by the election commission.

Analysis of Registration Centres and Voter Population based on Census Results

On the 4th of May 2013, ZEC published a list of places, dates and areas to which the mobile registration teams would visit. Such publication was finally done about six days after the mobile registration exercise had started, which meant that the citizens were blacked out on such crucial information which could have prevented many people who wanted to register from doing the same.

The table below shows the province, number of constituencies in that province, and the number of centres established for mobile voter registration in the province. We also highlight the total population in each province as of August 18 2012 (Census Results) and the total voter population per province as of 2008.

PROVINCE	CONSTITUENCIES	CENTRES	Total 2012 Census Population	Total Voter Population (2010)
Harare	29	18	2 098 199 (16.2%)	770 080
Manicaland	26	49	1 755 000 (13.5%)	769 621
Mash Central	18	76	1 139 940 (8.8%)	552 211
Mash West	22	77	1 449 938 (11%)	610 703
Masvingo	26	43	1 486 604 (11%)	745 124
Mash East	22	100	1 337 059 (10.3%)	618 653
Bulawayo	12	12	655 675 (5%)	314 508
Mat North	13	89	743 871 (5.7%)	359 606
Mat South	13	85	685 046 (5.3%)	350 897
Midlands	28	74	1 622 476 (13.5%)	780646

Below is a comparison of registration centres between the first and second phase of the mobile voter registration process.

Province	1 st Phase Centres	2 nd Phase Centres	Increase	% Increase
Mash West	77	439	362	470 %
Mash East	100	362	262	262 %
Mash Central	76	382	306	403 %
Masvingo	43	259	216	502 %
Manicaland	49	298	249	508 %
Mat North	89	434	345	388 %
Mat South	85	340	255	300 %
Midlands	74	358	284	384 %
Harare	18	44	26	145 %
Bulawayo	12	36	24	200 %
TOTALS	623	2,952	2,329	339.2 % (average)

COMMENTS

- ✓ **Increase in number of registration centres** – Clearly the number of registration centres deployed increased across the board given the challenges noted in the first phase of the process.
- ✓ **Deployment of voter educators** – The election management body was able to accompany the second phase of the mobile voter registration process with two voter educators per ward to assist with voter education.
- ✓ **Civic Society conducting voter education** – At least twenty-five civic society organizations were allowed to conduct voter education during the last days of the second phase of the mobile voter registration process.
- ✓ **Disproportionate distribution of mobile registration teams** –Some provinces which according to the Census figures, have a high contribution to the national population, were allocated fewer mobile voter registration centres. In comparison, some provinces which have a low contribution to the national population had a high allocation of centres.
- ✓ **Urban Skirting**-Most urban areas like Mutare, Chipinge, Gwanda and Masvingo had no designated mobile voter registration centres.
- ✓ **Leave voting, go to school**-No registration centres were allocated in areas with a high concentration of youths like colleges and universities. This greatly affected areas like Mt Pleasant in Harare and Senga in Gweru.
- ✓ **Inaccurate and Deceptive locations**-Some centres were not opened as per published schedule

Indications

- ✓ Similar to the first phase, those provinces with a perceived ZANU PF hegemony were allocated more registration centres as compared to those under the perceived control of the MDCs.
- ✓ Provinces and constituencies in which the controlling party won by a slim margin in 2008 which can easily be tilted (also known as swing) received more registration centres compared to other constituencies

Special Voting

The ZEC conducted a chaotic special voting process, marred by late delivery of ballot envelopes, late opening of polling stations, alleged intimidation of junior police officers and a shortage of voting material such as indelible ink, approved voters roll and ballot boxes. The conduct by the ZEC was in contravention of Section 81E (1) of the Electoral Act, which states that ZEC has to set up special voting stations at the district centres, and that these stations must be ready for voting on the first day fixed for special voting. ZEC's failure to print and deliver only 80 000 ballots and to operate 260 polling stations created significant concerns on the ability of ZEC to successfully administer a nationwide election covering over 9000 polling stations with embedded streams.

Voting Process

The ERC received mixed reports on the voting process throughout the country. Voting was largely calm and characterized by few incidences of violence and intimidation of voters. Administratively the electoral commission managed to ensure most polling stations were opened as scheduled on polling day.

However, the ERC observed significant malpractices nationwide and as outlined below had the potential to discount the credibility of the entire electoral process;

- Some voters were coerced to cast their votes in a particular fashion.
- Cases of intimidation were reported at almost 30% of the polling station, with known individuals threatening suspected opposition supporters to "vote wisely" otherwise they risked plunging the country back into war.
- About 5% of the polling stations were reported by ERC observers to have opened late due to inadequate election materials.
- Observers in urban centres like Mbare, Mufakose and Highfield in Harare, reported slow pace of assisting prospective voters in some urban polling stations
- The voting process was characterized by unusually high numbers of assisted voters, a situation which compromised the voters' secrecy of the ballot. In some areas observers noted that some potential voters were denied to choose an assistant of their choice as prescribed by the

electoral law, instead known political activists cowed such voters to be accompanied by untrusted individuals.

- Shortage of ballot papers in some wards resulting in long periods of voting inactivity. Some ballot papers, for instance in Chimanimani were distributed to the wrong voting centres.
- Most prospective voters who registered during the state supported decentralization of voter registration had their names missing from the voters roll. This was compounded by missing ward details on such individual's voter registration certificates. Ultimately they failed to vote.

The aggregate effect of the foregoing resulted in a number of potential voters being disenfranchised of their right to vote or had their secrecy to the ballot compromised.

Turned Away Voters

During the 2013 Harmonized Elections in Zimbabwe, domestic and regional election observer missions noted a large number of voters were turned away from polling stations because their names were not found on the voters' lists. These same observers also noted a large numbers of voters required assistance to exercise their franchise. However, none of the observer missions collected this information in a standardized and unified format and the election commission did not provided details of these as well. As a result, the scale of this phenomenon could not be quantified.

According to the ZEC procedure, a person requesting assistance in casting a ballot must be recorded in the polling station's register. Furthermore, poll workers are also required to note when a person is turned away, which could be due to a number of reasons including not having the correct identification documents, their name not found on the ward-based voters' list, or they are under the prescribed voting age.

There were concerns that the ZEC had no plans of releasing the number of assisted voters and/or voters who were turned away on 31 July 2013. However, the MDC-T formally requested the release of those details in a letter to the ZEC, stating that if not released by 5 August 2013 would seek a court order to ZEC compelling the commission to release these. On 8 August 2013, the ZEC made this information available in the local press, although with a caveat that the data was provisional (see Table 1 for details).

Assisted and turned away voters reported by the ZEC (provisional numbers)

PROVINCE	VOTES CAST	ASSISTED VOTERS	%	TURNED AWAY	%
BULAWAYO	133,698	2,313	1.73	11,388	8.52
HARARE	449,305	4,089	0.91	64,483	14.35
MANICALAND	467,932	31,277	6.68	42,525	9.09
MASHONALAND CENTRAL	386,988	34,044	8.80	18,517	4.78
MASHONALAND EAST	426,853	27,974	6.55	20,464	4.79
MASHONALAND WEST	394,163	23,166	5.88	56,733	14.39
MASVINGO	415,770	34,950	8.41	29,292	7.05
MIDLANDS	441,583	25,312	5.73	35,543	8.05
MATABELELAND NORTH	203,682	14,314	7.03	14,424	7.08
MATABELELAND SOUTH	160,073	9,462	5.91	11,521	7.20
TOTAL	3,480,047	206,901	5.9%	304,890	8.7%

The ZEC gave several explanations as to why voters were turned away on election-day.⁶ Furthermore, ZEC also claimed that in most cases people overcame some of the noted obstacles and actually voted. The main arguments for ZEC's claim were:

Claim 1. Voters transferred to another ward, but went to polling stations in their old ward.

QUERY: The question that arises from this explanation is that, if a voter requested a transfer and successfully transferred, why would that person then travel back to her/his old ward to vote? This is not a plausible explanation. It is most likely that affected persons were missing from the ward voters' list due to actions (or inaction) by the Registrar-General of Voters.

Claim 2. Unregistered voters turned out to vote due to peer pressure.

QUERY: Zimbabwe has held regular elections and referendum since 1980 and there was no evidence presented in support of this argument. If in deed this happened, the numbers would have likely been insignificant to warrant the placing of such an argument on this important matter.

Claim 3. Voters turned away due to having the wrong documentation.

QUERY: Broadly speaking, the electorate was well aware of the type of acceptable identification documents to bring on Election Day. The very same identification requirements were in place for voters during the March referendum and for several previous elections before

then. Problems with voters bringing incorrect identity documents during the referendum were negligible and ZEC's argument is not substantiated.

Claim 4. Underage voters

QUERRY: The official voting age in Zimbabwe is 18 years. This age requirement has been in place since the very first election in 1980 and is, therefore, widely known across the country and its socio-economical segments. In addition, there were no problems with underage voters during the March 2013 referendum, as well. Thus, ZEC's argument is not sufficiently convincing.

Claim 5. People registered after 10 July 2013 tried to vote, but were not eligible.

QUERRY: Once the final 30-day registration drive came to an end, people could still continue to register at the RG's regular offices at Provincial, District and sub district levels. However, anyone registering after 10 July 2013 was not eligible to take part in the July election. The number of such people attempting to vote is insignificant, as it would require traveling to a district or provincial office (a not insignificant financial and/or time constraint). Moreover, ZEC's voter education campaign emphasized the end date of registration for these elections and RG's staff would have informed registrants to this effect at the time of registration in their offices. Hence, the number of people standing in line for hours in order to vote using an ineligible registration slip must therefore have been very few.

The ERC notes that ZEC failed to mention the main reason why people were *de facto* disenfranchised. Had the RG's office adhered to its legal requirement and shared a searchable electronic copy of the final voters' roll, then political parties, candidates, civil society and the ZEC could have established efficient services to direct voters to the correct polling stations via websites, SMS applications, call centers, media campaigns *inter alia*. In fact, had the voters' rolls been readily available in electronic format in a timely manner, voters would actually have known before Election Day, which polling station to visit and thereby preventing the problem from emerging in the first place. Instead, voters were told to approach ZEC's Constituency Command Centres to find their name in a different ward voters' roll. However, this was not a feasible solution, as in order to be successful a person would have had to:

1. Wait in line at a polling stations for hours before being told his/her name is missing from the ward-based voters roll in question;
2. Travel to the Constituency Command Centres, which could have been hours away;
3. Wait in line at the Constituency Command Centre to be serviced;
4. If successful at Constituency Command Centre, travel to the new ward in question, which could be hours away; and,
5. Hopefully arrive before 7PM at the polling station. If so, wait in line potentially for hours to vote.

Implications

Unfortunately, the data released by the ZEC was not reported by national assembly constituencies but instead reported by province. This complicated an analysis of the number of turned away voters vis-a-vis the results for the 210 National Assembly seats. With that said, though, nearly 1 out of 10 voters across the country were turned away and effectively disenfranchised. In some provinces, like Harare and Mashonaland West, the figure is closer to 1 in 6 voters being denied their right to vote. These are unacceptably high numbers.

Given these figures, it's highly plausible that the allocation of a large number of seats in the Senate and the National Assembly could have been affected by these potential instances of disenfranchisement. The new electoral system for allocation of 120 seats of the Lower House is a proportional system based on the number of votes that parties received for the National Assembly seats in the province in question. Thus, if a large number of people had been disenfranchised in certain constituencies, not only could that materially affect the result for that national assembly seat in question, but also have ripple effects for the allocation of Senatorial and women seats in Parliament.

Election Results

The ZEC was able to announce election results within the prescribed 5 days as follows;

These results were subsequently contested even before they were officially announced. The basis for the challenge is outlined elsewhere in this report. However it is essential to point out the following with respect to the results that were announced;

6. The presidential results that were announced were confined to the provincial level only and not broken down to the constituency, ward and polling station levels
7. The announced presidential results only contained rejected ballots at the provincial level and were not broken down to the constituency, ward and polling station levels
8. The parliamentary results announced did not have rejected ballots broken down to the ward and polling station levels.
9. The results announced did not breakdown turned away and assisted voters broken down to the constituency, ward and polling station levels.

The noted information should be considered as part of the election results and the fact that this was not provided raises some questions around the accuracy and verifiability of the July 1st 2013 election as defined by the Electoral Act.

PROVINCE	LOCAL AUTHORITY	TOTAL WARDS	MDC-T	ZANU PF
Mash Central	Bindura municipality	12	2	10
	Bindura RDC	21	1	20
	Chaminuka RDC	29	0	29
	Guruve RDC	24	0	24
	Mazowe RDC	35	0	35
	Mbire RDC	17	0	17
	Muzarabani RDC	29	0	29
	Pfura RDC	40	2	37
	Rushinga RDC	25	0	25
	TOTALS	232	5	226

Final Election Results: Local Authority 2013 (Provincial Distribution of Councillors)

N.B. A ward Pfura RDC is yet to be determined as a by-election is pending

PROVINCE	LOCAL AUTHORITY	TOTAL WARDS	MDC-T	ZANU PF
Masvingo	Bikita RDC	32	5	25
	Chiredzi RDC	32	2	30
	Chiredzi Town council	8	2	5
	Chivi RDC	32	1	31
	Gutu RDC	41	1	40
	Masvingo Municipality	10	6	4
	Masvingo RDC	35	3	32
	Mwenezi RDC	18	0	18
	Zaka RDC	34	2	34
	TOTAL	242	22	220

PROVINCE	LOCAL AUTHORITY	TOTAL WARDS	MDC-T	ZANU PF	INDEPENDENT
Mash West	Chegutu Municipality	12	8	4	
	Chegutu RDC	29	2	27	
	Chinhoyi Municipality	15	3	12	
	Hurungwe RDC	26	1	25	
	Kadoma Municipality	17	9	8	
	Kariba Municipality	9	5	4	
	Karoi Town Council	10	3	7	
	Makonde RDC	19	0	19	
	Mhondoro-Ngezi RDC	16	0	16	
	Norton Town Council	13	9	4	
	Nyami Nyami RDC	12	0	11	1
	Sanyati RDC	18	0	18	
	Zvimba RDC	35	1	34	
	TOTAL	231	40	190	

PROVINCE	LOCAL AUTHORITY	TOTAL WARDS	MDC-T	ZANU PF
Mash East	Chikomba RDC	30	0	30
	Goromonzi RDC	25	1	24
	Manyame RDC	21	0	21
	Marondera Municipality	12	3	9
	Marondera RDC	23	0	23
	Mudzi RDC	18	0	18
	Murehwa RDC	30	0	30
	Mutoko RDC	29	0	29
	Ruwa Local Board	9	9	0
	Wedza RDC	15	0	15
	Zvataida RDC	17	0	17
	TOTAL	229	13	216

PROVINCE	LOCAL AUTHORITY	TOTAL WARDS	MDC-T	ZANU PF
Midlands	Gokwe North RDC	36	3	33
	Gokwe South RDC	33	1	31
	Gokwe Town Council	6	1	5
	Gweru Municipality	18	16	2
	Kwekwe Municipality	14	7	7
	Mberengwa RDC	37	1	36
	Redcliff	9	7	2
	Runde RDC	19	0	19
	Shurugwi Town Council	13	5	8
	Takawira RDC	25	0	25
	Tongogara	24	0	24
	Vungu RDC	19	5	14
	Zibagwe RDC	33	4	29
	Zvishavane Town Council	10	6	4
	TOTAL	296	56	239

N.B. There is a pending by-election to determine winner of a ward in Gokwe South

PROVINCE	LOCAL AUTHORITY	TOTAL WARDS	MDC-T	ZANU PF
Manicaland	Buhera RDC	33	3	30
	Chimanimani RDC	23	3	20
	Chipinge RDC	30	12	18
	Chipinge Town Council	8	1	7
	Makoni RDC	39	5	34
	Mutare Municipality	19	12	7
	Mutare RDC	36	1	35
	Mutasa RDC	31	13	18
	Nyanga RDC	31	5	26
	Rusape Town Council	10	5	5
	TOTAL	260	60	200

PROVINCE	LOCAL AUTHORITY	TOTAL WARDS	MDC-T	ZANU PF
Harare	Chitungwiza Municipality	25	15	10
	Epworth	7	0	7
	Harare Municipality	46	38	8
	TOTAL	78	53	25

PROVINCE	LOCAL AUTHORITY	TOTAL WARDS	MDC-T	ZANU PF	MDC-N
Mat South	Beitbridge RDC	15	0	15	
	Beitbridge Town Council	6	1	5	
	Bulilima RDC	22	6	15	1
	Gwanda Municipality	10	2	7	1
	Gwanda RDC	24	8	14	2
	Insiza RDC	23	1	21	1
	Mangwe RDC	17	7	9	1
	Matobo RDC	25	13	10	1
	Plumtree RDC	6	3	3	0
	Umzingwane RDC	20	6	13	1
	TOTAL	168	47	111	8

PROVINCE	LOCAL AUTHORITY	TOTAL WARDS	MDC-T	ZANU PF	MDC-N	INDEPENDENT
Mat North	Binga RDC	25	24	1		
	Bubi RDC	23	9	14		
	Hwange Local Board	15	14	1		
	Hwange RDC	20	8	11	1	
	Kusile RDC	28	11	17		
	Nkayi RDC	30	23	7		
	Tsholotsho RDC	21	9	11		1
	Umguza RDC	19	3	16		
	Vic. Falls Municipality	11	7	3		
	TOTAL	192	108	81	1	1

N.B. There is a pending by-election to determine winner of a ward in Victoria Falls Municipality

PROVINCE	LOCAL AUTHORITY	TOTAL WARDS	MDC-T	ZANU PF
Bulawayo	Bulawayo Municipality	29	29	0
	TOTAL	29	29	0

Presidential Results Summary 2013

PROVINCE	D. Dabengwa	RG Mugabe	K Mukwazhe	W. Ncube	M.Tsvangirai
Bulawayo	1926	31773	159	9356	89207
Harare	843	172163	361	7846	261925
Manicaland	3374	258026	1514	13433	180552
Mashonaland Central	2182	327455	615	3525	46533
Mashonaland East	2212	320719	795	6231	90165
Mashonaland West	2066	277312	883	5603	100616
Masvingo	3855	285806	1515	9878	104912
Matabeleland North	3034	81207	1352	13003	98596
Matabeleland South	2776	81180	1166	12726	58633
Midlands	3148	274793	1571	11036	141210
Total	25416	2110434	9931	92637	1172349

Parliamentary Results Summary 2013

Province	MDC-T	ZANU PF	MDC-N	Others	Total Voted
Bulawayo	82,790	35,617	21,687	10,496	150,590
Harare	207,754	162,462	21,330	6,725	398,271
Manicaland	168,601	269,080	15,558	8,978	462,217
Mashonaland Central	37,040	335,895	7,641	188	380,764
Mashonaland East	98,025	360,010	15,476	20,314	493,825
Mashonaland West	104,772	288,072	2,198	7,706	402,748
Masvingo	69,550	238,427	11,621	750	320,348
Matabeleland North	88,089	82,281	17,269	3,285	190,924
Matabeleland South	49,095	81,582	18,600	5,237	154,514
Midlands	116592	270266	15558	6170	408586
Total	1022308	2123692	146938	69849	3362787

Proportional Representatives: Senate Assembly 2013

PROVINCE	Name	Party	Gender
Bulawayo	Agnes Sibanda	MDC-T	Female
	Matson M. Hlalo	MDC-T	Male
	Siphiwe Ncube	MDC-T	Female
	Angelina Masuku	Zanu PF	Female
	Michael Norman Carter	MDC-T	Male
	Dorothy Tholakele Khumalo	MDC	Female
Harare	Cleverai Chizema	Zanu PF	Female
	Charles Tewengwa	Zanu PF	Male
	Grace Tsitsi Jadagu	Zanu PF	Female
	Sekai Masikana Holland	MDC-T	Female
	James Makore	MDC-T	Male
	Rorana Muchihwa	MDC-T	Female
Manicaland	Monica Mutsvangwa	Zanu PF	Female
	Kumbirai Kangai	Zanu PF	Male

	Judith Mawire	Zanu PF	Female
	Michael R. Nyambuya	Zanu PF	Male
	Keresina Chabuka	MDC-T	Female
	Patrick Chitaka	MDC-T	Male
Mashonaland Central	Alice Chimbudzi	Zanu PF	Female
	Damian D. E. Mumvuri	Zanu PF	Male
	Jenia Manyeruke	Zanu PF	Female
	Chenhamo C. C. Chimutengwede	Zanu PF	Male
	Monicah Mavhunga	Zanu PF	Female
	Martha Muronzi	MDC-T	Female
Mashonaland East	Olivia N. Muchena	Zanu PF	Female
	Sydney T. Sekeramayi	Zanu PF	Male
	Rosemary Goto	Zanu PF	Female
	Pagwesse D. Parirenyatwa	Zanu PF	Male
	Address Matiirira	Zanu PF	Female
	Jane Chifamba	MDC-T	Female
Mashonaland West	Edina Madzongwe	Zanu PF	Female
	Tapera Machingaifa	Zanu PF	Male
	Virginia Muchenje	Zanu PF	Female
	Mike M. Byton	Zanu PF	Male
	Prisca Mupfumira	Zanu PF	Female
	Violet Moeketsi	MDC-T	Female
Masvingo	Muhlava Otilia Maluleke	Zanu PF	Female
	Dzikamai Calisto Mavhaire	Zanu PF	Male
	Shuvai Ben Mahofa	Zanu PF	Female
	Josaya D. Hungwe	Zanu PF	Male
	Farirai Ethel Mabhungu	MDC-T	Female
	Misheck Marava	MDC-T	Male
Matabeleland North	Alphina Juba	MDC-T	Female
	Herbert M. Sinampande	MDC-T	Male
	Rosemary Nyathi	MDC-T	Female
	Thokozile A. Mathuthu	Zanu PF	Female
	Cain G. Mathema	Zanu PF	Male
	Medelina Bhebhe	Zanu PF	Female
Matabeleland South	Tambudzai B. Mohadi	Zanu PF	Female
	Simon K. Moyo	Zanu PF	Male
	Alma Mkhwebu	Zanu PF	Female
	Sithembile Mlotshwa	MDC-T	Female
	Watchy Sibanda	MDC-T	Male
	Joyce Ndhlovu	MDC	Female
Midlands	Tsitsi V. Muzenda	Zanu PF	Female
	Simbanenduku S. Mumbengengwi	Zanu PF	Male
	Flora Buka	Zanu PF	Female
	Jaison Max Korera Machaya	Zanu PF	Male
	Lilian Timveos	MDC-T	Female

	Morgen Komichi	MDC-T	Male
Senators with disabilities	Annah Shiri		Female
	Nyamayabo Mashavakure		Male

National Assembly Proportional Representation

PROVINCE	Name	Party	Gender
Bulawayo	Thokozani Khupe	MDC-T	Female
	Jane Nicola Watson	MDC-T	Female
	Gladys Mathe	MDC-T	Female
	Dorothy M. Ndlovu	MDC-T	Female
	Eunice Nomthandazo Moyo	Zanu PF	Female
	Jasmine Toffa	MDC	Female
Harare	Sabbina Zvenhando Thembani	Zanu PF	Female
	Sabina Mangwende	Zanu PF	Female
	Miriam Chikukwa	Zanu PF	Female
	Evelyn Masaiti Muzungu	MDC-T	Female
	Josephine Value Chitembwe	MDC-T	Female
	Ronia Bunjira	MDC-T	Female
Manicaland	Oppah C. Z. Muchinguri	Zanu PF	Female
	Ester Chikuni	Zanu PF	Female
	Annastazia Nyahwo	Zanu PF	Female
	Lucia Chitura	Zanu PF	Female
	Fanny Chirisa	MDC-T	Female
	Joyce Makonya	MDC-T	Female
Mashonaland Central	Getrude Chibagu	Zanu PF	Female
	Dorothy A. Kadungure	Zanu PF	Female
	Elizabeth Shongedza	Zanu PF	Female
	Dorothy Mashonganyika	Zanu PF	Female
	Tsitsi Gezi	Zanu PF	Female
	Bacillia Majaya	MDC-T	Female
Mashonaland East	Marbel M. Nkatozo	Zanu PF	Female
	Getrude Hungwa	Zanu PF	Female
	Mabel Kaundikiza	Zanu PF	Female
	Lilian Zemura	Zanu PF	Female
	Roseline R. Makoni	Zanu PF	Female
	Spiwe Muchaneta Muchenje	MDC-T	Female
Mashonaland West	Goodluck Kwaramba	Zanu PF	Female

Provincial Councils

PROVINCE	Name		Party	Gender
Manicaland	Nomsa Jennifer			
	Mhlanga	Zanu PF	Female	
	Charity Muzanga	Zanu PF	Female	Female
	Christina Nyere	Zanu PF	Female	
	Paul Kadzima	Zanu PF	Male	Male
	Constance Tsomondo	Zanu PF	Female	
	Hilda Sarireni	Zanu PF	Female	Female
	Joan Tsogorani	Zanu PF	Female	
	John Chirinda	Zanu PF	Male	Male
Masvingo	Consilia Chinazvavana	MDC-T	Female	
	Lucia Marapira		Female	Female
	Johnson Mudzimiriri	Zanu PF	Male	Male
	Amah Rungani	Zanu PF	Female	
	Thokozeni Dote	MDC-T	Female	Female
	Anna Simbanegavi	Zanu PF	Female	
	Manasa Bera	MDC-T	Male	Male
	Monica Chigudu	Zanu PF	Female	
	Constance Chipfufu	MDC-T	Female	Female
Mashonaland Central	Angeline Chipato	Zanu PF	Female	
	Lloyd Mwaizwa	MDC-T	Male	Male
	Memory			
	Runochinzwa	MDC-T	Female	
	Judith Mazhavazhe	MDC-T	Female	
	Alice Muropa	Zanu PF		Female
	Itai Dickson Mafiosi		Zanu PF	Male
	Mayidayi Maswi		Zanu PF	Female
	Sibusisiwe Budha	MDC-T	Female	
Matabeleland North	Oberl Mutasa	Zanu PF	Male	Male
	Maroko Ruth Labode	MDC-T	Female	
	Constance Masanzu	Zanu PF	Female	Female
	Lwazi Sibanda	MDC-T	Female	
	Canisio Dengu	Zanu PF	Male	Male
	Sikhanyisiwe Mpofu	Zanu PF	Female	
	Stella Muchapondwa	Zanu PF	Female	Female
	Mail Nkomo	Zanu PF	Female	
	Weston Mudere	Zanu PF	Male	Male
Matabeleland South	Molly Mkhandla	Zanu PF	Female	
	Margrate Zinyemba	Zanu PF	Female	Female
	Sekesai Nyamukanga		MDC-T	Female
	Sopambekile Abigail			
	E. Damasame	Zanu PF	Female	
	Alice Ndhlovu	Zanu PF	Female	
	Phoebe Vharetu	Zanu PF	Female	Female
	Rosy Yipofu	Zanu PF	Female	
	Stephen Musekiwa Chiurayi	Zanu PF	Male	Male
Mashonaland East	Nomathemba Ndlovu	MDC-T	Female	
	Rebecca Msonza	Zanu PF	Female	Female
	Sipho Dube	MDC-T	Female	
	Conrad Jericho Gotoru	Zanu PF	Male	Male
	Priscilla Mushonga			Female
	Concilia Mujachani		Zanu PF	Female
	Misihai Rambo	MDC	Female	
	Munyaradzi Tobias Kashambe	Zanu PF	Male	Male
	Vaida Garakasha		Zanu PF	Female
Midlands	Arnestancia Ndhlovu	Zanu PF	Female	
	Taufayi Pasifayi	Zanu PF	Male	Male
	Tarvo Mungwende	Zanu PF	Female	
	Kineri Murumbi		MDC-T	Female
	Philliva Zhou	Zanu PF	Female	
	Tapfumaneni Wunganayi		MDC-T	Male
	Rionel Melody Dziva	Zanu PF	Female	
	Emma Shanziwe			
Mashonaland West	Muzondiwa	MDC-T	Female	
	Chipo Gift Chakweza	Zanu PF	Female	Female
	Teti Banda	MDC-T	Female	
	Nimrod Willard Chiminya	Zanu PF	Male	Male
	Sofia Taziva		Zanu PF	Female
	Simon Chigweddu		Zanu PF	Male
	Junior Muvi		Zanu PF	Female
	Lanelot Karonga		Zanu PF	Male
	Chisangasiyeni Gambanga		Zanu PF	Female
Masvingo	Loasious Takarisikirwa		Zanu PF	Male
	Chivimbo Edeline Huchu	MDC-T	Female	
	Jefat karemba	MDC-T	Male	Male
	Enita Mazirire		Zanu PF	Female
	Benny Baloyi		Zanu PF	Male
	Benadett Chipembere		Zanu PF	Female
	Pupurai Togarepi		Zanu PF	Male
	Alfonsina Vhoronga		Zanu PF	Female
	Phainos Makwarimba		Zanu PF	Male
	Joyce Mashiri		Zanu PF	Female
	Ndaizevei Kasonzo		MDC-T	Female
	Jefferson Chitando		MDC-T	Male
	Chiedza Mukomondo		MDC	Female


Matabeleland North	Getrude Sibanda	MDC-T	Female
	Sengezwa Tshabangu	MDC-T	Male
	Esther Nyelekwa	MDC-T	Female
	Sithembinkosi Sibindi	MDC-T	Male
	Carolyn Ndhlovu	MDC-T	Female
	Sithembiso Dube	Zanu PF	Female
	Mwabayezwe Maphosa	Zanu PF	Male
	Rebecca Dokotela	Zanu PF	Female
	Alfred Kembo	Zanu PF	Male
	Theresa Kabondo	MDC	Female
Matabeleland South	Moddie Mbasera	Zanu PF	Female
	Richard Ndlovu	Zanu PF	Male
	Jane Phuti	Zanu PF	Female
	Jubulani Sibanda	Zanu PF	Male
	Elizabeth Ndiweni	Zanu PF	Female
	Washington Nkomo	Zanu PF	Male
	Mendy Ncube	MDC-T	Female
	Jerow Mtsabo Habvane	MDC-T	Male
	Lindiwe Maphosa	MDC-T	Female
	Mpumelelo Nkomo	MDC	Male
Midlands	Mary Moyo	Zanu PF	Female
	Timothy Mhuri	Zanu PF	Male
	Sophili Zhou	Zanu PF	Female
	Douglas Tapfuma	Zanu PF	Male
	Vairet Nhari	Zanu PF	Female
	Jephias Mavokorasha	Zanu PF	Male
	Darcus Maposhere	Zanu PF	Female
	Memory Mbondiah	MDC-T	Female
	Willard Somerai	MDC-T	Male
	Cathline Gozho	MDC-T	Female

Chiefs in

PROVINCE	Name
Manicaland	Chief Chiduku
	Chief Gwenzi
Mashonaland Central	Chief Nembire
	Chief Chisunga
Mashonaland East	Chief Musarurwa
	Chief Nyamukoho
Mashonaland West	Chief Dandawa
	Chief Nebiri
Masvingo	Chief Chitanga
	Chief Marozva
Matabeleland North	Chief Gampu
	Chief Siansali
Matabeleland South	Chief Nyangazonke
	Chief Masendu
Midlands	Chief Ngungumbane
	Chief Ntabeni

Senate

Map illustrating political parties vote share in 2013



Conclusion

Questions still remain about the conduct and outcome of the July 31st Zimbabwe Harmonised Elections. On 22 August 2013 Robert Mugabe was inaugurated as President of Zimbabwe. SADC and AU congratulated the people of Zimbabwe for holding a peaceful poll and for the successful implementation of the GPA despite protests from other parties that contested in the elections that the electoral process should be rejected.

It is indisputable that full implementation of the GPA was intended to provide permanent solutions to Zimbabwe's electoral and political crises. The ERC notes positive changes that have taken place since 2008.

However it is the ERC's view that the measures taken during the life of the GNU may not be sufficient to provide a permanent solution to Zimbabwe's problems. More could have been done to extend the right to vote to more people and to protect their right to vote. In addition to this, the unreformed media laws and laws on assembly and association mean that there are still gaps in the electoral regulatory framework which militate against the conduct of credible free and fair elections in the future.

The credibility of the electoral process in July 2013 has been undermined and given the fractious political environment there is potential to create further political uncertainty in the short to medium term. And whilst Zimbabwean political stakeholders may choose to accept the election outcome, it is still necessary to complete the reforms that commenced during the life of the GNU. Unless and until these reforms are completed, questions will continue to linger

over Zimbabwe's electoral processes and Zimbabwe will be unable to hold truly credible elections. //Ends

Contact//

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