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Voters Roll Audit

Preliminary roll - 2005 General Elections

Advance Copy

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Note

This is an interim report submitted in advance of the completed "Audit" so as the Electoral Supervisory Commission can commence corrective action.





1) Introduction

The roll being the cornerstone of the democratic "one person – one vote" system it is necessary for the roll to be accurate and up to date otherwise the democratic principal is negated from the very beginning of the electoral process. The results of the year 2000 General Elections and the year 2002 Presidential Elections indicated that there could be massive fraud and irregularities in the Zimbabwe Voters Roll which has prompted this investigative research and report. It must be made explicitly clear that from the onset the investigations have been extremely difficult to carryout because of obstruction and non cooperation from the Registrar General and his department who have custody of the nation's voters-roll and other population related data.

To do an effective analysis of the roll and electoral results it is necessary to have the data in electronic format (as is the form that the RG now keeps the data) so that computers can be programmed to eliminate the time consuming checks and crosschecks that are required in an analysis. With the RG's refusal to release the roll in such form and supported by obscure judgements² from the Supreme Court it became necessary for the digitisation of the roll by electronic means, but first the paper copy had to be obtained. It took nearly two years and countless requests to obtain a roll from the RG in spite of the fact that the Law is very specific in that the roll <u>must</u> be readily and freely available to <u>any person</u>.

This preliminary report reveals the initial findings that clearly indicate that the voters roll requires extensive repair prior to any democratic election at any level be undertaken and that it is the duty of the newly appointed Electoral Supervisory Commission to ensure that it is done.

2) Executive Summary

A copy of the roll was obtained in October 2004 from the Registrar General after the initial application had been made in April 2002. ³

A summary of the roll was done ⁴ that indicated incomprehensible voting registration patterns that are in direct conflict with the 2002 Census ⁵ and highlighted in a report ⁶ by F Matarise of the University of Zimbabwe.





Scanning and computer equipment was obtained and digitisation started in November 2004.

To date 7 constituencies have been digitised and 2 constituencies analysed. The "sample" analysed to date is considered statistically representative by international standards. It is through detailed data and statistical analysis of these rolls that the following key findings are presented based on extrapolation:

Over 2 million of the 5,6 million names registered as voters are suspect. Removing these from the roll results in the recently completed delimitation report being highly suspect.

Deceased persons remaining on the roll extrapolated to over 800 000. Over 300 000 duplicate names exist on the roll.

Over 900 000 names of people appearing on the roll where found to no longer reside at the registered address and as a consequence significantly effect the delimitation process.

The following table gives the extent of "damage" extrapolated from the sample analysed to date and that can be expected to be substantiated when the rest of the digitisation and analysis is completed.

Fact	Result / Damage – by Extrapolation
Voters roll NOT made public – contrary	A gross violation of electoral
to Zimbabwe Law and SADC standards.	procedures in ANY part of the world
	or SADC region.
Deceased voters still recorded as voters	800 000 deceased voters still on the
78% of returns received	roll thus inflating eligible voters and
	voter turnout
Duplicate Voters	300 000 duplicate voters on the roll.
Voters not known at this address –	900 000 voters Not known (NKATA)
(NKATA)	
Voters no longer at this address -	300 000 voters country wide
(NLATA)	extrapolated from sample
Total Damage	2 300 000 voters



3) *Methodology*

On receipt of the roll from the RG there was a requirement to the effect that no copying of the roll was allowed which is in direct contradiction of the Electoral Act which allows for any person to "make a copy" or "take extracts from", consequently this requirement has been ignored.

- A summary of the roll was made by counting the number of voters in each constituency and the results tabulated and compared with previous data from past elections.
- The roll as received was found to have been printed on plain white paper with very feint print (obviously the printer ribbons were not new) We believe this to be a deliberate ploy by the RG to make OCR difficult.
- The files received have been disassembled and the continuous computer paper "separated" and trimmed to fit the A3 size scanner.
- Files have been scanned into Adobe.pdf files for reference and into .tiff files for OCR.
- Scanning equipment consists of Nashua Afico 1022 Copier / Scanner
- An OCR (Optical Character Recognition) routine is then run on the scanned images using OmniPage Professional Ver 14.0 and the image converted into an Excel spreadsheet.
- Routines (macro) are then run within Excel to separate the Alpha Character from the ID No and then an ID No verification routine run to verify the validity of the ID.
- The spreadsheet is then cleaned and imported into a SQ database specially designed to interrogate the data.
- From the SQ database selected data is acquired and printed.
- The printed forms are then used by volunteers to go "door to door" to physically verify the information extracted from the voters roll.

4) Capabilities

The SQ bataBase that has been developed specifically for the Zimbabwe situation is capable of quickly and effectively searching and reporting on 25 million records each with 50 fields (the same information as given in the voters roll in addition to another 40 fields set aside for date of birth etc).

Once the voters roll is digitised it is then possible to :-

- Search for names, ID No's, etc and give list.
- ♥ Identify duplicate ID No's across any specified roll.
- ☼ Track migration of voters between different published rolls ie between the Presidential voters Roll and the roll supplied in October 2004.





- List "new voters" ie those who were not registered in a previous published roll
- ♦ Sort ID No's by registration centre (Prefix) and (Prefix)

5) Findings

Constituencies digitised OCR'ed = 7 Constituencies analysed = Harare North and UMP

Analysis - Audited Voters Roll Harare North – appendices

	May 2000	March 2002	Oct 2004	Delim 2004	
Total Voters HN	46852	52178	48149	43064	
Voters moved OUT of HN			9983 ⁸		
Numbers OUT of HN by Prefix			9983 ⁹		
Numbers OUT of HN by Suffix			9983 ¹⁰		
New voters by Suffix			436211		
List of NEW voters by Ethnic / Rural group with % from area. 12					
Random check indicated case of DUPLICATE identification number with different name and constituency ¹³					
List of names sorted into Rural home of New voters – ie not registered in March 2002 ¹⁴					
List of NEW voters in the Harare North constituency since the presidential elections. 15					
List of voters moved OUT of Harare North sorted into Suffix – Rural home. ¹⁶					
List of voters from "door to door" survey with an anomaly of some sort. ¹⁷					

Details of "Door to door" survey.

Area / Block / Ward	Total	Errors	% Error
	Checked		
Inst Agricultural Engineering - part of Block 60409	462	82	17.7%
Pomona Stone Quarry Block 110709	52	43	82.7%
Hatcliffe Extension Block 80409	2612	1773	67.9%
Hatcliffe One Block 20409	210	144	68.6%
Emerald Hill Block 110609	74	9	12.2%
Avonlea Block 80609	112	50	44.6%
Tynwald Westlea Block 11009	95	11	11.6%
Mabelreign Block 20509	71	11	15.5%
Marlborough Block 50609	180	18	10.0%
Mt Pleasant Block 80709	670	97	14.5%
Total - Door to door survey	4538	2238	49.3%



Note

49,3% of the persons registered as voters on the Harare North roll are NOT known at the address indicated.

UMP Constituency

The door to door exercise in the constituency of UMP has been considerably more difficult than Harare.

However from the printed sheets the team has managed to establish significant anomalies in the roll.

Analysis - Audit Voters Roll for UMP – appendices

	May 2000	March 2002	Oct 2004	Delim 2004
Total Voters UMP	44077	56734	58070	55249
Voters migrated INTO UMP			3459^{18}	
List OUT of UMP by name			101 ¹⁹	
New voters by name			9648 ²⁰	
List of voters (723) with 00 Suffix – incorrectly classified. ²¹				
Random checks indicated case of DUPLICATE identification number with different name				

Random checks indicated case of DUPLICATE identification number with different name and constituency ²²

From the door to door survey the following has been established.

One name appears 4 times in the UMP Voters Roll, and has 4 different identification numbers, two of European origin, yet the actual person is unknown to the Chipika family, in the Manyika Village and in the UMP Constituency

Name	ID No	Address
Chipika Maggie	15 82 424 N- 00	Manyika Village, Chief-Nyajina Murehwa
Chipika Maggie	47- 020483-V-47	Village Manyika, 2. Headman-Muskwe,
		Chief- Nyajina U
Chipika Maggie	47-056184-A-47	Manyika 2, Headman, Muskwe, Chief-
		Nyajina
Chipika Maggie	15 –082424- N-00	Manyika Village, Chief- Nyajima Murehwa



One name appears twice with two different identification numbers, one identification is of European origin, the address for the two identification numbers are from the same village, and yet the person is unknown in that village.

Name	ID	Address
Kabudura Moses	47- 51705- G-00	Manyika School
Kabudura Moses	63-309467-M-47	Manyika 2 Village, Muswe, Headman-
		Nyajina-Chief-UMP

Names of two deceased persons appear in the UMP Voters Roll, each with two different identification numbers.

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Name	ID	Address	
Sasa Monica	47-028852-R-00	Rukariro School UMP	
Sasa Monica	47-027 645 –E-47	Village Takawira, Headman Chimhaga,	
		Chief-Nyajina	
Kadzinga Usayi	47-053162-Q-00	Kraal Nyamhuru, Chief- Nyajina UMP	
Kadzinga Usayi	47 –53 162 Q 00	Kraal Nyamhuru, Chief- Nyajina UMP	

Names with identification numbers, yet persons of these names are unknown in the Constituency. (*Some of these people are supposed to have transferred into UMP, yet, they are unknown in the constituency.*)

Name	ID	Address
Kativhu Chabvuta	47-7830 R 00	Kraal Kagwidzi, Chief Nyajina. Headman
Titus		Chimhaga, UMP
Mudzinganyma	47-89769 F 00	Rukariro School UMP
Cephas		
Nyamhuru Eunah	47-100959 T 00	Village-Nyamhuru, Mom Chimhaga Chief
		Nyajina UMP
Chari Alice	47- 558 M 00	Borera School PA Mutawatawa UMP
Chiunye Manatsi	5-10971 G 00	Tsiga Kraal, Chief-Chirinda Murehwa
Marange Medium	61-56073 W 00	Kraal Chiuzingo, Chief Nyajina Murehwa
Burire Grace	5-14702	Chief –Nyajina, Kraal-Dumbura UMP
Chaburuka Faith	75 331532 Z 75	Village- Chimugonono, Headman-Chiunze,
		Chief- Chitsungo
Mashonganyika	47-19936 A 00	Kraal- Kanotangudza, Chief- Nyajina
Nyamauya		Murewa
Musanhi Jannet	68-4423 A 00	Nyamhuru Village, Nyajina Chief

Note

There are 723 voters with 00 as a suffix in their ID No within UMP – this does NOT conform to the requirements of the registration Districts.





6) Conclusion

From the forgoing it is obvious that there are chronic errors and the roll is overstated by unrealistic proportions that cannot be ignored.

The Electoral Supervisory Commission under the chairmanship of Justice Chiweshe and members Sarah Kachingwe, Rev Jonathan, Vivian Ncube and Professor George Kahari are challenged to remedy the situation and call for a multi-party investigation into the state of the roll and to ensure that the roll in digital electronic format is released to ALL interested parties so that meaningful contributions can be submitted.

R W { *Topper* } Whitehead Sunday, January 23rd 2005

To substantiate this report 2 Volumes of appendixes - totalling over 1800 pages - containing the research data is to be read in conjunction.



¹ Letters written to the Registrar general asking for access to the Voters Roll

² Report on the Supreme Court Judgement by an Independent observer.

³ Applications for the roll

⁴ Summary of registered voters by Constituency

⁵ Census 2002 – Preliminary report

⁶ Report on the Age Distribution of Zimbabwe's population

⁷ October 2004 roll summary.

⁸ Voters no longer in the constituency since PVR

⁹ Number of voters moved out of the constituence sorted by Prefix – ie Registration center

¹⁰ Number of voters moved out of the constituence sorted by Prefix – ie Registration center

¹¹ Voters not registered in March 2002 now in the Harare North Constituency – Sorted by Suffix

¹² Ethnic / Rural grouping of NEW voters in Harare North

¹³ Same ID different name

¹⁴ List of names sorted into Rural home of New voters – ie not registered in March 2002

¹⁵ List of NEW voters in the Harare North constituency since the presidential elections.

¹⁶ List of voters moved OUT of Harare North sorted into Suffix – Rural home

¹⁷ List of voters from "Door to door" survey.

¹⁸ Migrated into UMP

¹⁹ List OUT of UMP by name

²⁰ New voters in UMP since presidential by name

²¹ List of NEW voters with 00 Suffix – incorrectly classified.

²² Random checks indicated case of DUPLICATE identification number with different name and constituency