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Livelihood Dynamics in Planned and Spontaneous Resettlement in Zimbabwe: Converging and Vulnerable

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Summary. — This paper compares the livelihood dynamics of planned and spontaneously resettled households in Hurungwe District, Zimbabwe, during 1980–2000. Initially, the state sponsored households significantly improved their condition but as the state withdrew support, they became vulnerable. The structure and outcomes of their livelihoods increasingly resemble those of spontaneous settlers on communal lands. The conclusions indicate the need for planners to use livelihood frameworks rather than small farm models and for policy to recognize rural settlement from a multiple actor perspective.

Key words — Zimbabwe, land reform, resettlement, livelihoods, poverty, rural development

1. INTRODUCTION

Redistributive land reform is a recurring theme of contemporary development discourse in southern Africa. In Namibia, South Africa, and (until recently) Zimbabwe highly unequal land distribution exists alongside growing poverty and land shortage. Unjust land distribution is a legacy of colonial "settler" policies that saw large-scale alienation of land and other natural resources from indigenous groups. At independence, these states inherited distorted rural space economies [1] in which a minority of white settler commercial farmers had, among other economic privileges, access to land of better agro-ecological potential while the majority (mainly black) smallholders had to make do with agriculturally marginal land (Palmer, 2003; Tshuma, 1997). The focus of land reforms has therefore been on redistributing land from mainly white commercial farmers to black "smallholders."

Redistribution has been justified, not only by considerations of social justice, but also by noting the inverse relationship between farm size and productivity (Ellis & Biggs, 2001). If smallholders are potentially more efficient producers then giving them more land can achieve both equity and efficiency goals (Deininger & May, 2000). In Zimbabwe and to an extent Namibia, land reform programs have involved the state in facilitating redistribution (Adams, Sibanda, & Turner, 2000) while in South Africa, redistribution has mainly been market assisted (Hall, Jacobs, & Lahiff, 2003). The argument for state involvement in acquiring and parceling out land has been that structural distortions inherited from colonial practices cannot be addressed through market forces alone (Deininger, 2003). In addition, as Hulme (1987) has argued, land reforms are of "supreme political rhetorical" value in that they allow populist

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politicians, bureaucrats, and donors to champion the causes of the landless and gain popularity by showing concern about poverty, equity, and justice. For populist post-settler regimes, land therefore is still important in "revolutionary politics" [2] and also offers opportunities for political patronage.

In Zimbabwe, 91,000 families were resettled by the state during 1980–2000 (Government of Zimbabwe, 2003). [3] However, it is often not recognized that many others were spontaneously resettling on state land in frontier districts (Brand, 2000; Chimhowu, 2002; Derman, 1997; Dzingirayi, 1998; Nyambara, 2002). In the absence of official statistics estimates based on an analysis of migration trends in frontier districts suggest that for every household resettled by the state at least two more resettled spontaneously (Chimhowu, 2003). As a strategy for rebuilding or improving livelihoods spontaneous movement is at least as important as planned resettlement. However, because state and donor resources are rarely committed to spontaneous settler households, little is known about the process and impacts of such migration.

In this paper, we compare the livelihoods of officially and spontaneously resettled households. The livelihoods approach [4] is used to investigate how households that resettled by different means in the same region and around the same time progressed. In the next section, we consider the use of livelihood approaches to investigate livelihoods of resettled households. In Section 3, we examine the macro-policy context in which resettlement has occurred in Zimbabwe showing key trigger mechanisms for migration to rural areas. Sections 4 and 5 offer a comparative analysis of livelihood composition and strategies among the resettled households. Section 6 considers the convergence of livelihoods over time while the concluding section draws out the policy implications.

2. LIVELIHOOD APPROACHES AND LAND RESETTLEMENT

A livelihood is often conceptualized as "incomes in cash and in kind: as well as the social institutions (kin, family, compound, village) gender relations, property rights required to support and sustain a given standard of living" (Ellis, 1998, p. 4). This includes the accessibility of, and benefits derived from, public services like education, health, roads, water, and related infrastructure. Livelihood approaches involve a conceptual shift from analyzing rural people as smallholder farmers to a much broader understanding (Murray, 2002).

Several frameworks have been proposed for the analysis of livelihoods. They include the Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF) (Carney, 1998, 1999; Scoones, 1998), the Framework for Thinking about Diverse Rural Livelihoods (Ellis, 2000), Bebbington's (1999) Capitals and Capabilities Framework, and the UNDP's (1999) Sustainable Livelihoods Diamond. These frameworks have different emphases rather than fundamental conceptual differences. They all attempt to integrate assets, constraints, and human capabilities in a logical and comprehensive manner to analyze the status, form, nature, and condition of livelihoods over space and time. Among these frameworks, the SLF has been the most popular partly because of its robust analytical ability and also because of its widespread promotion by donor agencies. The SLF (see Ellis, 2001) posits households make a living by using five types of assets (natural, physical, human, social, and financial) in an environment influenced by institutional and structural factors (Figure 1). It identifies vulnerability as a key factor that households seek to manage.

The framework has been criticized [5] but has five key features that make it especially relevant for studying resettlement. Firstly, it views resettled households as making a living in a variety of ways of which farming may be just one (Francis, 2001; Murray, 2002). This liberates us from the "smallholder farmer" straightjacket that dominates rural development discourse in Zimbabwe and much of Africa. Secondly, livelihood approaches emphasize the need to see land as just one among several different assets/capitals required to make a living to human, financial, physical economic infrastructure, and socio-political assets. Thirdly, livelihood approaches place the interaction of the various capitals within a broader policy environment. Fourthly, the framework allows us to investigate livelihood dynamics in a given geographical and historical context (Murray, 2002). Livelihoods are not static but change in response to various internal and external stimuli. This aspect is crucial in understanding livelihoods of resettled households as they move from vulnerable early days of settlement to secure livelihoods (Scudder, 1984). Fifthly, the focus on risk and vulnerability is



Figure 1. *A framework for livelihoods analysis.*

appropriate for resettled households in frontier regions, which face high levels of both idiosyncratic and covariant risks.

The main modification that we have made to the framework is to drop the concept of social capital because of its inadequacy and "baggage" (see Fine, 2000). During focus group sessions on how local people make a living and cope with adversity, it became clear that there was a local understanding of "livelihood networks" and "livelihood cells" in both Nyamakate and Rengwe. A livelihood network was defined as spatially extended social contacts that a household utilized to provide information, guidance, support, and material help in making a living or dealing with adversity. This included social contacts in public services, relatives in places of authority, or sources of knowledge about livelihood opportunities both within and outside of a household's immediate locale. Livelihood cells were more local in nature and both Nyamakate and Rengwe averaged between five and eight households that informally shared or pooled productive resources for mutual benefit of cell members. Cell members lived in close proximity to each other and often organized reciprocal labor pools during peak labor demand periods. They also often became the first circle of support in times of need. The livelihood cells were more crucial for day-to-day household survival on the frontier than wider networks but in times of generalized crises (such as drought), the networks often proved more effective.

3. METHODS AND TECHNIQUES USED TO INVESTIGATE LIVELIHOODS

Livelihoods studies are generally multi-disciplinary in nature and are best pursued using multiple and mixed methods (Ellis, 2000; Francis, 2001; Murray, 2002). In this study, livelihoods were investigated at a particular moment in time. The focus was on understanding the nature and composition of livelihoods at the time the fieldwork was carried out. The study adopted a multi-method approach at two levels. At the macro-level, we used policy archaeology to investigate those aspects of geography, agrarian change, and social transformation in Zimbabwe that help us understand contemporary livelihood struggles. At the micro-level we looked at how policies (or, in the case of spontaneous resettlement, their absence) play out at the household level by comparing case studies.

Two case study areas (Nyamakate and Rengwe) in Hurungwe District were selected for detailed analysis. In Rengwe, where households resettled spontaneously, three spatially indeterminate but functionally defined villages were selected for comparison with households from five formally planned villages in an adjacent state sponsored resettlement area at Nyamakate. The study investigated livelihood patterns through a small-scale survey and semi-structured interviews. The small-scale survey identified patterns of livelihood composition and provided an understanding of the socio-economic and demographic make up of the two areas. A questionnaire was administered to 80 households randomly selected from a list of 139 spontaneously resettled households in Rengwe. At Nyamakate, 55 households were randomly selected from a list of 92 officially resettled households. In both case study areas, questionnaire targeted the head of household.

Qualitative methods were used to probe issues related to human experiences, values, feelings, and beliefs. Participatory learning and action techniques, such as wealth ranking, and mapping, were used in both areas to examine factors like: (i) ownership of assets (particularly cattle), (ii) ability to earn income outside the family farm, (iii) size of the farm, (iv) being a registered producer of agricultural commodities (maize and cotton), and (v) how household food status influenced livelihood strategies and outcomes. Individual life histories complemented the small-scale survey. Through an analysis of a resettled household head's life experiences it was possible to identify the influence of macro-level policy changes on individuals and their households. Non-probability judgment sampling was used to select twelve households (six in each of the two areas) that were interviewed through guided discussions three times. In addition, 25 semi-structured interviews with policymakers, technocrats, and local traditional leaders gave a deeper understanding of the issues that emerged from focus group sessions and life histories. Aerial photographs for Rengwe (1982 and 1996) and Nyamakate (1981 and 1996) were used to complement and triangulate analysis of resource endowments and the effects of livelihood activities on natural capital. This allowed us to quantify the amount of land brought into cultivation and the spatial distribution of land uses.

4. RESETTLEMENT: PUBLIC POLICY AND HOUSEHOLD STRATEGIES

(a) *Macro-level context of land resettlement in Zimbabwe*

In this section, the key issues and policies that contextualize the case studies are outlined. [6] Palmer (1971) provides a detailed historical account of land alienation in what was then called Rhodesia showing how discriminatory laws led to the white minority owning most of the best land. By 1980 some 6,000 white commercial farmers owned almost 40% of prime agricultural land while seven million black smallholder farmers were confined to about 42% of mainly marginal land in tribal trusts (Makamure & Gutto, 1986). Although the tribal areas had capacity for only 275,000 "farming units," by 1980 they carried 675,000 (Riddell, 1980, p. 3). [7] At that time up to 60% of the white owned land was deemed underutilized (Riddell, 1980). This maldistribution of land, alongside with the abject poverty in tribal areas, explains the predominance of land as a central policy issue in Zimbabwe.

Post-independence reforms were meant to correct the inequality in land holding between racial groups. Planned and legally executed resettlement proceeded until February 2000 when the "*jambanja*" (violent seizure) phase began. [8] Prior to February 2000, land was purchased from white commercial farmers on a willing-buyer–willing-seller basis and was redistributed to selected poor households following established criteria. Initially displaced persons, returning refugees, and the landless were prioritized. From 1989 emphasis shifted to those with the skills and resources to engage in meaningful agricultural activities (Government of Zimbabwe, 1998).

Through this orderly phase (1980 to early 2000) some 91,000 households were officially resettled (District Development Fund, 2000). Around 63,380 of these households were resettled in model "A" schemes. [9] This model was popular with donors and beneficiaries because it was the most practical way of re-planning already "occupied farms." Resettlement in planned schemes was about creating new "farmers" rather than enterprising households that could pursue a variety of activities. [10] The goal was to "transform peasant agriculture, to remould society and discourage any attempts to revert back to traditional methods and systems of agriculture and administration" (Geza, 1986, p. 37). It was not envisaged that resettled households would engage in off-farm or non-farm activities. To enforce this thinking beneficiaries were encouraged to pursue predetermined livelihood routines based on farm project plans. These new settlements were seen as "special project areas that need intensive management if stated goals and objectives are to be attained" (Department for Rural Development, 1981, p. 9).

On arrival, settlers signed three permits, each with conditions that guided their livelihood activities. The permit to reside, for example, stated that "The holder shall not carry on or allow any other person to carry on any trading commercial or industrial operations on the site." [11] These conditions were meant to ensure that the settlers would not seek off-farm employment and would be available on the farm throughout the year. They were to be full time, small farmers. However, with three serious droughts during 1981–90, it became clear that farming alone left the settlers vulnerable. An informal relaxation of this rule (which in reality was regularizing what had been a practice since the 1980s) was effected from around 1990. Settlers could leave their farms as long as their land remained in production and they were not away for extended periods. Over time, the permit arrangement has become a key area of livelihoods insecurity for settlers. Permits offer a bundle of resource use rights that the state can withdraw at its pleasure. A state appointed commission of inquiry into tenure arrangements made the observation that tenure insecurity introduced uncertainty and risk that affected the livelihood gains that extra land provided (Government of Zimbabwe, 1994). [12]

Depending on the aspect of resettlement examined, the policy achieved mixed results. For example, while some studies show that land resettlement on underutilized commercial farmland resulted in positive economic returns in the short term (Government of Zimbabwe, 1991; ODA, 1988) and long term (Kinsey, 1999), others show this to be the case for only a few households and that generally the improvements reflected in technical economic measures have not necessarily translated into better livelihoods (Jacobs, 1987; Zinyama, Campbell, & Matiza, 1990). Kinsey (2004) has further shown how some of the initial gains have not been sustained owing to underinvestment in the reform program. Measuring success in income terms alone may not give us an accurate picture of livelihood strategies or how they are waged. Studies focused on achievement of stated objectives over the long term describe a program that had missed most of its targets (Government of Zimbabwe, 1992, 1994), was under funded (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 1990a), and heading for problems induced by declining productivity by the second generation (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 1990b).

(b) *Spontaneous land resettlement in Zimbabwe*

Households that failed to access official resettlement schemes often opted to resettle spontaneously on communal lands, particularly on the frontier districts that skirt the middle reaches of the Zambezi River (Chimhowu, 2002). Although there are no official national level statistics on the numbers that moved this way, indicative figures show a dramatic rise in the population well above the expected natural rates of increase. The flow of migrants from all parts of the country into the frontier districts bordering the middle reaches of the Zambezi River is well documented (see Brand, 2000; Derman, 1997; Dzingirayi, 1998; Hammer, 2001). Initially, the state responded with strategic silence as this form of migration into sparsely settled frontier districts helped to reduce the rising pressure for land. However, by the early 1990s, some rural district councils (RDCs), including Hurungwe began to discourage spontaneous resettlement preferring instead to set aside unsettled lands for wildlife management projects (Chimhowu, 2002; Hammer, 2001). In Rengwe, one of the study areas, population increased from 8,000 people in 1,300 households in 1982 to 25,000 people in 5,234 households by the year 2000 mostly through spontaneous resettlement (Chimhowu, 2002, p. 554). [13]

Officially resettlement areas were not spared from spontaneous settlement. By late 1998 some 6,847 families, or 70,000 people, had "illegally" self-allocated themselves plots of land in planned schemes. Spatial design of Model "A" schemes was seen as encouraging spontaneous resettlement as "to a desperate communal farmer, vacant land in the form of grazing areas in Model A is the answer to their problems" (District Development Fund, 1998, p. 3). The fear was that: "agricultural production in the schemes would be completely distorted. Schemes can actually be reduced to mere places of residence with little or no production and characterized by a high rate of land degradation" (District Development Fund, 1998, p. 7). The report also observed that the District Development Fund, the agency responsible for resettlement, lacked the legal authority to evict the "squatters" as the resettlement land fell under the Rural Land Act (1979) administered by another line ministry (Ministry of Lands and Agriculture).

Until the emergence of the *jambanja* phase in February 2000, there remained an unresolved tension in the post-colonial state's policy and attitude toward spontaneous resettlement. On one hand it was treated as an issue of trespass, while on the other, it was seen as a political expression of landlessness that could be used to exact support for land reform from donors. Public policy swung between the two extremes of either strengthening institutions and evicting squatters or passing legislation to protect them from eviction (Tshuma, 1997).

5. VULNERABILITY AND LIVELIHOOD STRUGGLES AMONG RESETTLED HOUSEHOLDS

(a) *Introduction to case study areas*

The study was carried out at Nyamakate and Rengwe, in the Hurungwe District of northern Zimbabwe (Map 1).

Nyamakate, a state planned resettlement area established in the early 1980s, is 240 km west of Harare the capital of Zimbabwe. Its population grew from about 2,500 people in 1980 (Department for Rural Development, 1981, p. 1) to an estimated 13,000 in 2000 (District Development Fund, 2000). It is broadly typical of the state sponsored settlement schemes established at this time. [14] The second case study area, Rengwe Communal lands, was established in the late 1940s and has seen its population increase from 2,400 people in 1958 to about 8,000 in 1982 and over 25,000 in 2000 mostly through spontaneous resettlement (Chimhowu, 2002).

Table 1 provides background information on households in the study areas. While there is only a small average age difference among the household heads, households in Nyamakate were generally larger than those in Rengwe. Two reasons explain the differences. First, households in Nyamakate attracted close family relations hoping to be resettled or to inherit the plot (Deininger, Hoogeveen, & Kinsey, 2004; District Development Fund, 1998). [15] Secondly, households in official resettlement areas tend to be larger because of the need for additional labor to work the land



Map 1. *Location of research sites in Hurungwe District, Zimbabwe.*

Table 1. *Age and sex profiles of household heads in Nyamakate and Rengwe*

	Nyamakate	Rengwe
Mean age of head	54 years	52 years
Mean household size	9 persons	7 persons
Minimum	3 people	2 people
Maximum	29 people	20 people
Male headed	67%	75%
Female headed	25%	5%
Female managed	8%	20%

Source: Survey data, 2000.

(Jacobs, 1987). Key informant interviews suggest that household heads were more inclined to take on an additional wife, for reasons of increased labor demand as a result of having more land. This is in addition to the fact that in some planned resettlement areas households were allocated an additional hectare of land for each additional wife up to a maximum of four wives. Although such a provision exists among spontaneously resettled households in Rengwe, increasing land scarcity and male bias meant that the number of sons rather than number of wives was the key factor in obtaining more land. Taking on additional wives in Rengwe often meant reallocating the land the household already had.

The number of female-headed and female-managed households also differed between the two areas. Female managed households are those where the female head runs the household while the husband works away from the family farm. Such households in rural Zimbabwe often delay important decisions until the husband visits or the surrogate male "head" has been consulted. There were more female-managed households in Rengwe. Evidence from the small-scale survey suggests that this was partly due to more male household heads in Rengwe having access to off-farm activities compared with those at Nyamakate. However, Nyamakate had more female-headed households than in Rengwe. Focus group evidence suggests this was in part a function of higher mortality rates among male heads (who in most cases in Zimbabwe are older than their female spouses). Further, the fact that women can inherit land in state resettlement schemes meant that they were more visible as household heads than in Rengwe where women could only inherit land from their deceased spouse via a surrogate male.

(b) *Contrasting profiles of risk and vulnerability in Nyamakate and Rengwe*

Households resettled for many reasons. Although officially resettlement was justified on the grounds of landlessness or displacement, evidence from this study suggests the impetus to resettle was often triggered by the gradual or sudden development of a shock to livelihoods. Respondents cited various reasons or combinations of reasons for the decision to resettle (Table 2).

"Hunger," [16] loss of employment and sociocultural factors emerged as the main factors that resulted in resettlement. Drought and loss of wage employment were important trigger mechanisms. There were, however, differences between Nyamakate and Rengwe. A significant majority in Nyamakate resettled due to loss of employment while in the case of Rengwe a small majority resettled on account of social changes in their lives. Households that spontaneously resettled did so because of rapid access to land, particularly for those that did not qualify for state sponsored schemes. This included recently married young men, retired former farm workers of foreign origin, and those fleeing from witchcraft or family feuds. Such groups found it easier to gain access to land

Table 2. *Main reasons for resettlement compared*

Main reason for migrating	Nyamakate (%) $n = 55$	Rengwe (%) $n = 80$	All (%) $n = 135$
Hunger (land and environment related)	33	36	35
Loss of employment	53	14	30
Social (marriage, divorce, witch-craft, feuds)	14	40	30
Lifestyle change (urban to rural)	0	6	3
Displaced by projects/political violence	0	4	3
Total	100	100	100

Source: Survey data, 2000.

through informal social networks in Rengwe than to apply for formal resettlement.

Analysis of detailed life histories from both Rengwe and Nyamakate confirmed that the suddenness of a livelihood trauma significantly influenced how people resettled. When there was sufficient warning (as for retirement, gradual decline in soil fertility, and family life cycle changes), the household often tried to resettle through formal channels, if they had reasonable prospects of achieving this. When a livelihood shock was sudden (as in loss of means of livelihood due to retrenchment or repeated failed harvests due to drought, and displacement), and the household had some savings, they usually tried to resettle spontaneously using their social, kinship, and other networks.

When households resettled a major attraction was the availability of, and enhanced access to, various forms of capital to help reconstruct livelihoods. Frontier regions were particularly attractive because land was considered easily accessible. In northern Zimbabwe, the vernacular term for frontier settlements "*makombo*" (virgin land) describes not only fertile soils but also abundant land where one can "*tema madiro*" (clear as much land as one has the energy to). The latter description was a "unique selling point" for spontaneous resettlement as it suggested one could help oneself to land. However, this was misleading because, in practice, traditional institutions and the local authority maintained an interest in land allocation. Similarly, for the state resettlement areas the selling point was encapsulated in the vernacular term "*minda mirefu*" (long fields). This implied abundant land although in reality each household was only entitled to five hectares of arable land. At the time of the study this apparent abundance for both Rengwe and Nyamakate had dissipated as the second generation of beneficiaries (mostly born frees) had come on stream necessitating an informal sub-division of the land.

When the amount of land that the households had before resettlement is compared with the land they had at the time of the study, significant differences emerge between Rengwe and Nyamakate (Table 3).

Most of the respondents in Nyamakate had very little land before being resettled. Table 3 shows that resettlement increased their land holding almost 10-fold with all getting at least five hectares. In Rengwe, although most of the households had access to some land before resettling, they still doubled their land holdings.

Table 3. *Land holding before and after resettlement (hectares)*

	Rengwe ($n = 80$)		Nyamakate ($n = 55$)	
	Before	After	Before	After
Mean land holding	2.05	4.7	0.25	5
Median	0.24	3.2	0	5
Total	161	375	28	275

Source: Survey data, 2000.

Beneficiaries of the state sponsored resettlement clearly gained access to more land than those that resettled spontaneously. More crucially, there was more equality in land holding in Nyamakate where, apart from polygamous households, they all got similar amounts of land. Households also reported that the quality of their land improved through resettlement. In Rengwe, the majority of respondents (62%) felt this way. In Nyamakate, of the 13 households that had land before resettlement, 63% felt that the land they got through resettlement was better than that they had previously farmed. By resettling, households not only got more land but land of significantly better quality.

(c) *Livelihood networks, risk, and vulnerability in Nyamakate and Rengwe*

The World Bank defines risk as "uncertain events that can damage well being" and usefully distinguishes between idiosyncratic risks that affect individuals or households and risks which affect groups of households, an entire community or a whole country (World Bank, 2000, p. 137). Households with insufficient risk cover, or those with inadequate responses to known livelihood risks, are deemed vulnerable. In discussing risk and vulnerability in Nyamakate and Rengwe, this distinction was adopted to distinguish the different kinds of risks and identify those for which individual household responses were possible. [17]

Resettled households in both Rengwe and Nyamakate confronted similar idiosyncratic and common risks. Shacks that trigger major episodes of livelihood insecurity are those that hit arable agriculture, the key source of income for households in both areas. Agro-ecologically, both are dry land farming areas classified as areas of low to medium potential. Average annual rainfall varies from 754 mm in the south, rising to 890 mm further north. Rainfall also varies seasonally and periodic droughts are common. Since 1980 drought has occurred in this area during the 1981–82, 1982–83, 1983–84, 1986–87, 1991–92, 1994–95, and 1996–97 agricultural seasons. The 1991–92 drought was particularly severe and had a profound effect on livelihoods in both sites.

A further risk underlying farm based livelihoods in rural Zimbabwe generally, and specifically in both Nyamakate and Rengwe is tenure insecurity. While in Rengwe land is held under communal tenure that gives rights to use but not own land, in Nyamakate land is accessed on the basis of three permits that allow residence, cultivation, and grazing. Tenure insecurity was acknowledged by the Rukuni Commission of Inquiry as one of the factors constraining livelihoods in both communal and resettlement land areas of Zimbabwe (Government of Zimbabwe, 1994; Roth & Haase, 1998). In Rengwe, where some households spontaneously occupied communal land using traditional institutions, there is always a risk that the traditional leader might choose to repossess land or that the state might decide to evict them. [18] In Nyamakate, the state retained the right to revoke permits if settlers did not abide by the terms of resettlement. [19]

The extent to which insecure tenure is a risk that limits investment and ultimately productivity is often disguised by the fact that in both Rengwe and Nyamakate a minimum level of investment is needed to stake a claim to land. Clearing of land and evidence of recent use is a major way of claiming land in Rengwe. Households often construct wood fences and contour ridges to publicly show their claim. Focus group discussions held in Rengwe clearly showed that tenure insecurity altered settler investment behavior as they tended to invest in "liquid" assets like cattle, and movable household goods. Households often delayed construction of permanent structures fearing their destruction upon eviction. [20] An official commission of inquiry into land tenure observed that lack of secure tenure was a limiting factor for more long term investment in land among officially resettled households (see Government of Zimbabwe, 1994). Apart from tenure insecurity, health risks, related risks from malaria, sleeping sickness, and HIV/AIDS related illnesses combined with localized seasonal raids from wild animals and unpredictable markets also present major threats to livelihoods in both areas. Clearly, both areas had similar risk profiles. There were however, some differences in ex-ante (mitigation) and ex-post (coping) strategies between the Nyamakate and Rengwe residents.

The idea of state sponsored resettlement, from a risk perspective, assumes that the state underwrites the risks faced by the beneficiaries (at least initially). At Nyamakate, planners worked on the premise that the state would mitigate against known risks for up to three years after which each household was expected to have achieved a secure livelihood. This initial support was accessed through a resident resettlement officer. [21] Mutual benefit networks therefore did not fully develop in the early years of settlement since they were less needed. Withdrawal of the state resettlement officers from Nyamakate in the mid-1990s left the households exposed to unmitigated risks and poorly developed support networks. This increased their vulnerability, particularly their ability to cope with idiosyncratic risks. Once the state began to withdraw its presence, poor households sought to reduce their increased risk by diversifying their income sources. Vulnerable households developed strategies for coping with low agricultural incomes by becoming involved in a variety of activities on and off the family farm while non-poor households diversified within agriculture into high value crops and livestock activities. Although settlers periodically migrated, they always returned to their plot at some point.

While settlers in Nyamakate faced exposure to unmitigated common and idiosyncratic risks only after 1994 when the resettlement officer left, those at Rengwe had to rely on personal savings and livelihood networks as soon as they resettled. Spontaneous settlers always knew someone who had resettled "successfully" before migrating. Livelihood networks facilitated resettlement by providing information, character references, and an initial base. They also facilitated livelihoods learning activities through induction and support. Once established, households settled into smaller but much more closely knit livelihood cells that played a crucial role in both risk management and coping. Livelihood cells only provided partial cover and still left households vulnerable to common risks like drought. This is because such generalized livelihood traumas tend to exhaust and erode the resources available to cells and at times even the extended networks. The scourge of HIV/AIDS, drought, and poor commodity prices were identified as traumas that could undermine the ability of livelihood cells to provide either mitigation or coping mechanisms.

6. COMPARATIVE LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES IN NYAMAKATE AND RENGWE

(a) *Income sources and composition*

An important indicator of a livelihood system's status is its ability to provide individual households with enough income to meet their basic needs. Comparing income levels [22] and sources gives an insight into the ability of the state sponsored and spontaneous resettlement to provide secure livelihoods (Table 4).

Households in Nyamakate had marginally higher incomes than those of Rengwe (an average per capita annual income of Z$7,543 against Z$7,320). Both Nyamakate and Rengwe had average per capita incomes above the food poverty line but below the total consumption poverty line for households in rural Hurungwe for the year 2000. [23] So although households had enough income to purchase basic food, they could not afford other crucial services like health and education. [24] This result corroborates findings of the wealth ranking activities done in both areas. These showed that the largest groups consisted of those that had fewer assets in both Nyamakate and Rengwe.

There are however significant differences in the levels of incomes within the various subgroups. [25] This was more pronounced in Rengwe where 67% of the households accounted for only 22% of total income while the top 12% accounted for 50%. Table 4 further shows that households classified as non-poor in Nyamakate had an income nearly twice that of the very poor. In Rengwe, those classified as non-poor had three times the income of very poor households. Income inequality was therefore greater among those who resettled spontaneously than among those resettled by the state. These results corroborate findings from wealth ranking exercises supported by life history interviews suggesting that this is a function differential access to remittance and related off farm income opportunities typical in most communal areas of Zimbabwe (see Jackson & Collier, 1991).

(b) *Livelihood diversity in Nyamakate and Rengwe*

The level and nature of diversification is a crucial element of any discussion on livelihoods (Ellis, 2001; Murray, 2002). In rural Zimbabwe, this takes many forms. Jackson and Collier (1991) observed that rural Zimbabweans often decide to change their crop mix or alter the balance between crop and livestock activities to spread the risk of income failure. Additionally, households in southern Africa are increasingly recognized as multiple livelihood seekers who pursue opportunities in and outside agriculture whenever and wherever these arise (Bryceson, 2002; Murray, 2002).

Field evidence from Rengwe and Nyamakate shows variations in the levels of diversification between the two areas and also among the different income and wealth groups in each area. Eighty-eight percent of household income in Nyamakate was crop related compared with 68% in Rengwe. Non-farm activities contributed three times more income in Rengwe than in Nyamakate. Similarly, agriculture related but off-farm activities (like repair of farm equipment and trading) contributed four times as much income in Rengwe than in Nyamakate. This tended to reduce the dominance of crop income at household level in Rengwe where non-poor households managed risks by pursuing a

Table 4. *Income composition among households in Nyamakate and Rengwe*

	Very poor		Poor households		Non-poor		All	
Area	Nyamakate	Rengwe	Nyamakate	Rengwe	Nyamakate	Rengwe	Nyamakate	Rengwe
Household %	(40%)	(68%)	(29%)	(18%)	(31%)	(15%)	$N = 55$	$N = 80$
Mean income/capita	Z$3,022	Z$2,020	Z$6,345	Z$5,869	Z$13,262	Z$14,071	Z$7,543	Z$7,320
Crop	77%	74%	84%	80%	88%	56%	88%	68%
Livestock	6%	12%	4%	14%	7%	8%	6%	11%
Off-farm	7%	4%	5%	2%	3%	17%	2%	8%
Non-farm	10%	11%	7%	4%	2%	19%	4%	13%
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: Survey data, 2000.
Note: US$1 was equivalent to Z$48 officially and Z$120 on the parallel market.

range of income activities. This often meant "briefcase farming" [26] while engaged in retail trade or working a full time job. Households classified as poor and very poor households in Rengwe chose strategies that guaranteed food supply with possibilities for consumption and income smoothing. Evidence from semi-structured interviews suggests that if all these failed then abandoning the settlement was more likely among the poor in Rengwe than in Nyamakate. Farm related earnings provided most household income in Nyamakate because the terms under which land was accessed in Nyamakate required that the land be utilized for crop production. Diversification within agriculture was more evident in Nyamakate where non-poor farmers had begun to venture into high return and high-risk crops like tobacco and high value industrial beans.

Although all official resettlement households (except the polygamous ones) received five hectares of land, their ability to derive an income from this varied significantly. Non-poor households in Nyamakate diversified mostly within agriculture by changing their crop mix and engaging in off-farm activities that did not take them away from the resettlement areas. Investment in retail trade, services, and the transport sector was common among those venturing outside agriculture in Nyamakate. However, they remained heavily reliant on crop income (Table 4). This better off minority group reflected the income composition envisaged in the original plans. As far as the state planners were concerned, all the project beneficiaries should have been following this strategy.

Households classified as "very poor and poor" (69% of households in Nyamakate) diversified differently from those in the non-poor group. Although crop income still dominated, significant contributions came from off-farm and non-farm activities. Households classified as very poor displayed a higher level of diversity of income sources compared with the non-poor. Crop income was the single most important source of income constituting 77% of total income for the poor compared with 88% for those classified as non-poor. Poor households in Nyamakate had diversified in response to failing livelihoods rather than to seize opportunities. Lack of inputs, poor commodity prices, and frequent droughts combined to force households to look for a diverse range of activities.

The results for Rengwe are significantly different. Households classified as non-poor had more diverse income sources compared with Nyamakate. They earned only 56% of their income from crops compared to the 74% earned by the very poor. Significantly, non-farm activities contributed 19% of income for non-poor households compared with 11% for the very poor. Earlier this low level of earnings from non-farm income sources was explained by the barriers to entry into these kind of activities in Rengwe and the limited opportunities available in a remote frontier region where the twin hurdles of marginality and remoteness, which is compounded by a general lack of essential infrastructure (social and physical) (Bird, Hulme, Moore, & Shepherd, 2002).

In Rengwe, both economic and environmental marginality limited the scope for pursuing off farm activities for poor and very poor households. A lack of savings and formal and informal financial institutions curtailed participation by the poor in non-farm and off farm activities such as informal retailing, trade in second hand clothes, crop trading, and, local trade in *kapenta* (fish). The crucial start up capital was unavailable. In contrast, non-poor households took advantage of these opportunities to diversify out of agriculture. The situation in Rengwe was different from Nyamakate where local NGOs set up semi-formal micro-finance institutions supporting non-farm income activities among the poor households.

Non-farm and off-farm income activities therefore emerged as important differentiating factors among the households in Rengwe and Nyamakate. This was confirmed by the results of the wealth ranking exercise for villages in both areas (see Chimhowu, 2003). Apart from such assets as land and cattle, a key criterion for distinguishing the poor households from those of average wealth was the availability of non-farm and off-farm income receipts. This finding confirms research elsewhere in Zimbabwe showing that access to these is a differentiating factor among rural households in communal areas (see Berkvens, 1997; Jackson & Collier, 1991; Kinsey, 1999).

The state planned Nyamakate as a dry-land farming settlement. Diversification would only be tolerated within agriculture, not across sectors. These restrictions initially constrained diversification and may have restricted the development of alternative income sources. In Rengwe, there were no restrictions on how households could construct their livelihoods. This freedom is reflected in the diversity of livelihoods in Rengwe. Evidence from life history discussions, corroborated by key informant interviews, suggest that questions about the legality of spontaneously resettling in Rengwe, coupled with its remote and marginal location made the quest for a livelihood an uncertain affair. The diversity reflected in the income sources was therefore in part a way of spreading the risk of impoverishment and destitution in this uncertain environment.

(c) *Assets, accumulation, and land resettlement*

Physical assets are a partial indicator of the extent to which livelihood strategies have enabled a household to accumulate. In remote rural areas like Nyamakate and Rengwe with poorly developed formal credit and insurance, the limited and often selective focus of formal savings and investment institutions means that investment in liquid assets is central to household risk management. Households tend to self-insure through the accumulation of liquid assets during good times and asset depletion during bad times (Deaton, 1992; Fafchamps, 1999). In addition to acting as a buffer against common and idiosyncratic risks, assets are an accepted form of collateral security for informal credit in both Rengwe and Nyamakate. In both areas membership of the elite "master farmer" clubs or access to credit for crop production, especially cotton and tobacco, depended on the possession or ability to access key productive assets. In rural Zimbabwe, in general, and Hurungwe District in particular, a household's *chimiro* (social status) in the community is closely linked to the physical stock of assets. Households that posses key productive assets are held in high esteem and often get appointed to key leadership positions locally. Assets also extend and strengthen livelihood cells whose membership is in part dependent on ownership of productive assets. In Rengwe and Nyamakate therefore, this combination of the benefits deriving from accumulation elevates the role of assets in underpinning household welfare. An indication of the extent to which resettlement has enhanced their livelihoods can be discerned from the level of asset accumulation that has taken place. [27] Table 5 shows respective mean values of assets by type for Nyamakate and Rengwe at the time households resettled and at the time of fieldwork in October 2000.

Households resettling spontaneously in Rengwe arrived with significantly more assets especially cattle and farming related assets, than did those in Nyamakate. Most households in Nyamakate resettled without cattle but were later able to purchase cattle and start building a herd. The lack of assets of the Nyamakate settlers at the time of migration indicates that state sponsored resettlement was successful in targeting the poor. The mean value of assets per household increased by 253% for Nyamakate but only by 58% for Rengwe, excluding land. At resettlement, the mean value of assets for Nyamakate was about a sixth of the mean asset value of Rengwe households. By 2000, Rengwe households still had more than double the value of assets in Nyamakate. Clearly, the initial advantage held by households resettling in Rengwe had an enduring effect on their ability to accumulate more assets.

The most significant change has been in cattle ownership. In addition to their use as draft power, transport, manure and, as a source of milk and meat protein, cattle are a form of investment (Barret, 1991). These multiple uses make them easily tradable and hence desirable as household assets. Cattle contributed the largest share of the average value of household assets in Rengwe and Nyamakate both before and after resettling (Table 5). Cattle contributed 50% of the total value of household assets in Nyamakate, up from 19% at resettlement. The number of households without cattle has fallen from 95% to 56% over 16 years of settlement. More than half the households still did not have any cattle, a factor that often led to low levels of utilization of land.

In Rengwe cattle represented some 70% of the total value of household assets up from 63% at the time of resettlement. Households in Rengwe continued to accumulate cattle after resettling and by the time of the survey, the average number of seven cattle was close to three times the mean for Nyamakate. The number without cattle declined from 61% at the time of resettlement to 6% at the time of the study. By investing in cattle, the households were taking a risk as the area harbors tsetse fly carrying *trypanosomiasis*. In the case of Rengwe, the risk was even higher as limited veterinary extension services and infrastructure made other livestock diseases like anthrax and heart water fever a lingering danger to livestock. The combined effect of this together with the threat from marauding wild animals, make investment in cattle seem very risky.

Key informant interviews suggest that this behavior is part of risk management among the resettled households. Cattle have the

Table 5. *Mean value of assets per household by type in Nyamakate and Rengwe*

Asset type	Nyamakate at resettlement (Z$)	Nyamakate in 2000 (Z$)	Rengwe at resettlement (Z$)	Rengwe in 2000 (Z$)
Cattle	1,075	9,600	19,200	33,600
Goats	500	2,000	1,500	3,500
Ox-Cart	540	1,860	2,400	3,000
Plough	759	1,633	1,449	1,817
W/Barrow	450	900	1,020	1,740
Water-Well	490	910	1,400	1,120
Bicycle	432	946	652	792
Solar cells	490	294	980	784
Planter	150	210	420	300
Television	250	650	650	550
Harrow	308	420	560	476
Radio	192	460	328	464
Total	5,636	19,883	30,559	48,143

Source: Own survey data, 2000.
Notes: Nyamakate $n = 55$, Rengwe $n = 80$. In 2000, US$1 was equivalent to Z$48 officially and about Z$120 on the parallel market. This table does not include the value of land.

advantage that they provide draught power and can be sold off in times of need. Further, cattle were an important part of household consumption and income smoothing strategies providing cash when sold or leased in addition to the meat and milk proteins. During cultural events like *lobola* (bride wealth payment) cattle are exchanged, while at funerals and related socio-cultural events they are the choice beast for slaughter in libation rituals. It is for such reasons that households were prepared to take on the risk of investing in cattle.

Analyzing assets at only two points in time does not provide a conclusive picture of the dynamics of asset accumulation in the two areas. A look at some of the life history evidence suggests that there were periods of asset attrition punctuating periods of asset gain. In all 12 life histories, tragic personal events, like death of a spouse or sudden illness, resulted in households selling assets. Death of a spouse, drought, and extended periods of illness were always associated with asset attrition. These specific cases showed how even with the land gained from resettlement, livelihood trajectories were characterized by these ups and downs. In good times (particularly good harvests and years of good commodity prices), households were able to accumulate assets especially cattle and other small ruminants. In bad years (drought, personal misfortune, or death of a spouse), they often had to be sold for both income and consumption smoothing. Deaton (1992) and Fafchamps (1999) have shown that the frequency and duration of these cycles of accumulation and disaccumulation and the level of assets in a household usually determines whether the households get sucked into a poverty trap or merely suffer a temporary set back.

7. COMPARATIVE LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES IN NYAMAKATE AND RENGWE

Apart from understanding the livelihood composition, it is vital to understand how people actually make a living. This study used wealth ranking to generate village level livelihood profiles in both Rengwe and Nyamakate. Five groups emerged and became the basis for further analysis of livelihood strategies. Table 6 summarizes the key characteristic strategies followed by the different wealth groups.

Livelihood strategies for Rengwe are typical of communal lands livelihoods strategies in Zimbabwe (see Berkvens, 1997; Jackson & Collier, 1991) while the strategies for Nyamakate suggest a quite different trajectory from what plans envisaged. If planners had succeeded, a majority of households in Nyamakate would be on the "Accumulation Type 1 strategy," running a family farm without needing to pursue non-farm activities. While a larger part of mean household income in Nyamakate comes from crop and livestock, households have quite different strategies. We can also see the extent to which the strategy types are similar between

Table 6. *Livelihood strategies in Rengwe and Nyamakate*

Strategy	Nyamakate	Rengwe
Backfoot	Strategy revolved around production of food crops and a limited amount of cash crops. Surplus produce was usually sold informally to cotton or grain barons or to formal agencies through neighbors. Income and consumption smoothing was achieved through deployment of household members to low-skill–low-income activities jobs or periodic transfers from the state or NGOs. Households were vulnerable even in good seasons	Strategy revolved around production of often inadequate food crops. Erratic and limited cash crop cotton. Limited or no sources of off-farm and non-farm incomes. Income smoothing achieved through livelihood cells, borrowing, sharing, gifts, and labor transfers. Poorly diversified income sources due to limited options at the frontier and entry barriers. Households vulnerable even in good seasons. Candidates for the exit option
Crisis	Semi-subsistence farming strategy. Strategy revolved around food production and cash crops. Income and consumption smoothing achieved through savings, liquidating assets, and some occasional off-farm work when possible. Some transfers from state programs also helped in income smoothing. Mostly the casualties of AIDS and retrenchments from farms and mines	Semi-subsistence strategy centered on production of food crops and selling the surplus locally. Income and consumption smoothing were achieved through savings, livelihood cell activities, borrowing, sharing, and selling assets. Breaking up of household into survival units. Casualties of the AIDS pandemic and abandoning the frontier settlement
Minimax: maximum livelihood risks	Default strategy centered on producing food crops for own consumption. Households also produced cash crops (especially cotton) for sale. Reinvestment of earnings into farm venture and some liquid assets. Usually had regular but low income transfers from non-farm sources. Households could break even in good years but became "vulnerable" when either farm income or external receipts decline. Aimed to minimize maximum risks to farm production and non-farm activities. Strategy aimed at an even spread of risk across several low-income activities. It was a default strategy devised by farmers as they deviated from the resettlement livelihoods blueprint	Worker-farmer strategy typical of communal lands. Involved confinement to family farm production work for some members, and a selection of off-farm activities that did not interfere with household farm labor demands. Surplus produce was sold on the formal market. In the dry season or at any time during the year household members could leave the family farm to pursue some low paying non-farm activities. A significant portion of the non-farm income was derived from remittance income like pensions or "parcels" from grown-up children. Could leave for extended periods if need be. Strategy aimed to manage risk and vulnerability by maintaining a balance of activities spread across space and time

(*continued next page*)

Table 6—*continued*

Strategy	Nyamakate	Rengwe
Accumulation Type 1: *Hurudza* (master farmers)	The plan strategy. All resettled households should have been on this strategy if resettlement blueprints had been realized. Was characterized by modern, high input and high productivity farm production. Household derives its livelihood from farming. Some household members may leave to pursue other activities outside the family farm but most members engage in farm production most of the time. This is a high-risk high-earnings strategy that often leaves the household vulnerable to the vagaries of the climate and the agricultural markets. Households attempt to manage the risks by diversifying within agriculture and changing their crop mix periodically	The strategy revolves around the commercial production of cotton and maize. A large part of household income therefore derives from farm production, and household members will spend most of the time working on the family farm. There is however usually heavy reliance on external receipts for inputs into agriculture and most of their earnings may be invested in agriculture related assets like cattle
Accumulation Type 2: Village entrepreneur	This strategy involved not only using the family farm to produce crops for sale and for own household consumption but also taking advantage of other non-farm and off-farm income generating activities to reinvest the earnings. They may open up a retailing unit, grinding mill, or transport business to reinvest their crop income. It is an attempt to diversify from risk prone agriculture and safe guard household welfare	This strategy involves taking advantage of the liberalized trade in cotton and maize. While involved in full time employment and engaging in crop farming for the market, cotton, and grain barons (derived mostly from among civil servants, politicians, and local retailers) will often informally purchase cotton and maize from households desperate for cash. This is then marketed at a higher price to earn profits. They will also engage in other local trade activities to diversify

the two areas particularly: "Crisis," "Minimax," and "Accumulation Type 1" strategy types. These strategy types and evidence from life histories in both areas suggests that livelihoods at Nyamakate have converged with those of Rengwe. As levels of state support at Nyamakate have been reduced since the mid-1990s, the livelihoods of the people have begun to resemble those of spontaneous settlers at Rengwe. In the next section we take a closer look at this convergence in livelihoods.

8. CONVERGING LIVELIHOODS IN RENGWE AND NYAMAKATE

In Section 3, it was argued that the post-colonial state viewed resettlement schemes as showcases for successful rural development. The aim was to create a new class of progressive smallholder farmers producing for the market (Geza, 1986). Resettlement schemes were seen as replacements for communal lands that were "poverty traps" created under the settler colonial state (Riddell, 1980). While communal lands represented "colonial policy," the resettlement areas were supposed to show the success of independent agrarian policy.

Planners projected that incomes in the resettlement schemes would be double those in communal lands (Kinsey, 1983). It was not envisaged that beneficiaries would engage in activities other than agriculture until they had substantial farm earnings (Department for Rural Development, 1981; Kinsey, 1983). There was initially a specific commitment to discourage the circular migrant labor system common in communal areas. It was argued this had reduced communal areas to labor reservoirs for the urban areas, mines, and commercial farms and could not be allowed in the new settlement schemes (Geza, 1986; Kinsey, 1983). Also, the schemes were to avoid the "entrenched resistance" to "modern" methods of farming typical of communal lands dwellers (Geza, 1986). In effect, the state was against the practice of multiple livelihoods that characterized communal lands. It sought to promote specialization on new settlements. Attempts were even made to effect a physical separation between communal lands and settlements. [28]

A key question is whether this desire to effect a conceptual and physical distinction between the respective "space economies" endured the passage of time in Nyamakate, Rengwe, and other areas of Zimbabwe. The earlier evidence, corroborated by interviews with professionals working on resettlement schemes at national level, points to a convergence of livelihoods in state resettlement schemes and communal areas despite it having been standard practice in resettlement discourse in Zimbabwe to show how the livelihoods of resettlement schemes differ from those of communal areas. In this section, we argue that livelihoods in both Nyamakate resettlement scheme and other "older" resettlement schemes have begun to mirror those of communal lands. Potentially this leads to the conclusion that in some cases state-sponsored resettlement has merely been an expensive way of reproducing the livelihoods of communal lands.

State planners envisaged Nyamakate as an enclave where beneficiaries would make a living from farming (Section 2). Initially this looked likely as beneficiaries made rapid gains and accumulated assets by taking advantage of having more land and a support infrastructure underwritten by the state (Cusworth, 2000; Kinsey, 1999). Livelihood trajectories constructed from life histories from Nyamakate show that this led to a rapid transformation of livelihoods, particularly income from crops (ODA, 1988). From the late 1980s the cumulative effects of three drought spells in rapid succession, declining state and other institutional support, indebtedness, restrictive conditions of resettlement, an unfavorable macro-economic environment (in particular liberalization of agricultural commodity and labor markets), and increasing mortality among first generation settlers as well as more squatting, led to a stagnation and subsequent decline in productivity and incomes at Nyamakate and in other resettlement areas (Cusworth, 2000; District Development Fund, 1998; Government of Zimbabwe, 1994). Evidence from this study shows that the initial differences between Nyamakate and Rengwe were disappearing as the livelihood strategies and outcomes in the former began to mirror those of the latter.

Analysis of livelihood outcomes (Table 4) showed that in 2000 a significant majority of Nyamakate residents (69%) were living below the total consumption poverty line. Similarly, mean per capita incomes in Nyamakate were nowhere near twice those of communal lands as had been planned. Instead "master farmers" in Nyamakate households were spread across five livelihood strategies that broadly mirrored the situation in Rengwe. Only a fraction of households were on the "master farmer" strategy showing that secure agriculture-only livelihoods in Nyamakate had not materialized. The withdrawal of state support before households could fully establish themselves or strengthen alternative livelihood networks coupled with an unstable macro-economic environment was bringing in a rapid decline in farm based livelihood. Kinsey (2004) has argued that this problem has afflicted the entire resettlement program.

Communal lands in Zimbabwe are often despised for the land pressure created as family farms are subdivided to accommodate adult sons. The official resettlement areas not meant to be subdivided and planning often took no account of the need for land to accommodate "the born frees." [29] The assumption was that the second generation would not need to pursue farm livelihoods but would move away from settlements. Evidence from focus group discussions revealed that most settlers hoped that through successful farming they would be able to pay for their children to get a good education and then jobs in urban areas. The fact that 28 out of 55 respondent households in Nyamakate had already informally subdivided their plots to accommodate their kith and kin suggests that by 2000 there was already a growing problem of land pressure. Changing livelihood strategies had produced a vernacular re-design of the formal state settlement. With the withdrawal of the resettlement project officers from the schemes, rigid enforcement of land use rules have gradually given way to household level planning. Apart from this internal subdivision of arable land to accommodate the "born frees" spontaneous occupation of grazing lands by land hungry villagers from surrounding communal areas has curbed the notion of land abundance (*minda mirefu*) at Nyamakate and households have begun to consider off farm options (District Development Fund, 1998). Livelihoods in Rengwe have similarly undergone significant changes. The illusory abundance of virgin land (*makombo*) that lured households to the frontier has disappeared and livelihoods are on a downward spiral with some households already leaving the area. Without further state intervention, livelihoods in Nyamakate will converge with those in Rengwe. The state project to create model agricultural settlements had turned into a project that replicated the livelihood strategies and outcomes of the despised communal lands at great expense.

9. CONCLUSIONS

Three main conclusions emerge from this research.

(a) *Comparing the outcomes of spontaneous and planned resettlement*

These two different modes of resettlement attracted different types of households and, in the 1980s and early 1990s, produced different outcomes. Over the mid to late 1990s however, the livelihoods of both spontaneous and planned settlers increasingly converged in terms of structure and income. State sponsored resettlement generally provided households with more and better quality land than did spontaneous resettlement. Different types of household were resettled through these two processes. Spontaneous migration attracted vulnerable, non-poor households encountering a livelihood crisis. On average, such households were better educated and smaller than those resettled officially. They therefore had the means to resettle without state support. This contrasted with the Nyamakate beneficiaries who in the main were poorly educated, had few assets and savings, and needed state assistance to make a start.

Officially and spontaneously resettled households faced similar profiles of vulnerability but dealt with risk differently. In Nyamakate the state provided protection against both idiosyncratic and co-variant risk. As a result, initial "drop out" rates were low. In Rengwe households relied on informal social support provided first by livelihood networks and, later, by livelihood cells. This permitted them to cope with idiosyncratic risk but left them vulnerable to generalized risks. As a consequence when drought hit Rengwe, "drop out" rates were significant. However, the initial security of Nyamakate households weakened in the 1990s as the state withdrew its support. With poorly developed informal livelihood cells and limited livelihood networks, the capacity of these households to cope with shocks reduced considerably.

The livelihoods of official settlers were less diversified than those of spontaneous settlers as they had been encouraged to specialize in crop production. This worked well in the good seasons but left them increasingly vulnerable to the "once every five years" drought and changes in input and crop prices. While this specialization strategy meant that in 1999–2000 season settlers in Nyamakate had higher incomes than in Rengwe, the greater diversification of economic activities at Rengwe provided spontaneous settlers with more opportunities to manage risk.

Despite these initial differences, the livelihoods of spontaneous and official settlers show a path of convergence as Nyamakate begins to resemble communal lands in strategy and form. With the decline in state services and a growing population, the livelihoods of those on state sponsored schemes like Nyamakate increasingly resemble those of communal lands. Although allowing households to accumulate assets, intensive state support in the 1980s and early 1990s has not given the official settlers secure, sustainable livelihoods. The policy goal of creating a new breed of progressive commercial smallholder farmer has not gone according to plan and, arguably, state sponsored resettlement has been an expensive way of extending communal land livelihood strategies.

(b) *Using livelihood frameworks for analysis and planning*

The study illustrates the advantages of using livelihoods approaches to analyze resettlement, rather than the small farmer models that have previously dominated. Examining the "five capitals" rather than just natural capital and agriculture allows a fuller understanding of household strategies and trajectories and of issues of power, access, and control. Recognizing the importance of risk, vulnerability and mitigation strategies moves analyses beyond the narrow and unrealistic focus on average increases in agricultural productivity that has dominated resettlement planning.

However, livelihood frameworks are not unproblematic. In particular, the operationalization of social capital remains an unresolved issue. In this work we have used the tools of livelihood cells and livelihood networks (see Section 4) and believe this to be an effective means of responding, at least partially, to justified criticisms of the social capital "box" (see Fine, 2000). Livelihood frameworks are not only useful for *ex-post* studies of resettlement. They should be used for planning resettlement schemes and policymaking on spontaneous resettlement. This would improve both plans and policies by permitting an understanding of the role of livelihood diversification, the different livelihood trajectories of settlers, and the need to balance the goal of increasing productivity and income with that of reducing vulnerability and managing risk. Promoting settler social capital through encouraging informal associations and settler controlled formal organizations would become an important element of plans and policies rather than an afterthought. A combination of livelihood frameworks with Scudder's (1984) grounded theory of the stages of resettlement should be feasible and could both reduce costs and improve performance.

(c) *Adopting a multiple actor policy framework*

This study has shown, as have others (see Deininger, 2003; Hulme, 1988; McMillan, 1994), that rather than "going it alone" policies of state control, multiple actor frameworks need to be adopted. These incorporate a role for personal agency, market transactions, and non-governmental organizations. [30] Relaxing the rules on land sub-division while increasing taxes on land above a certain size could encourage landowners to deliver more land to the market. Establishing a fund to offer credit to groups or individuals who want to purchase land would help the vulnerable non-poor to do so. Non-government organizations can also play a role in innovating participatory models of resettlement particularly among poor and landless groups. To safeguard equity considerations in situations like South Africa, Namibia, and (until recently) Zimbabwe where land distribution is so skewed, the state could still be involved in directly acquiring and redistributing land to chronically poor households for whom the market may not work. The benefits of state involvement must also be recognized. Of paramount importance in this study is the state's ability to identify very poor and landless households and help them to access land. Government selected settlers were generally poorer than spontaneous settlers prior to resettlement.

Adopting multi-actor frameworks would not only improve official settlement planning but would highlight the need for state assisted spontaneous resettlement policy. This could provide spontaneous settlements with low cost basic infrastructure and services early on in their establishment. By such means, resettlement "targets" might be met and unit costs per resettling household might be reduced.

Official policy should be more flexible and appreciate that spontaneous resettlement is socially embedded and will always occur. Tolerance and regularization of this form of resettlement, when it does not compromise development plans, would be an ideal approach in frontier regions. One of the key findings of this study is that spontaneous resettlement had the ability to deliver land of roughly comparable quality to official schemes quickly without too much difficulty. Once resettled however, households could not provide for essential economic, financial, and human capital in an unstable macro-economic setting. This factor compromised their ability to make a living. On the other hand, state sponsored resettlement was slow to deliver land, inflexible, and generally seen as bureaucratic. Once resettled, however, initial state support in the provision of economic, human, and financial capital helped in rebuilding livelihoods. These findings suggest the need for an approach that mixes the speed, simplicity, and flexibility of spontaneous resettlement, with the enhanced access to human, financial, and economic capital of the state sponsored resettlement schemes.

A key finding is that the state sought to create small farmer livelihoods. In a dry land farming region, this was unrealistic as it made resettled households vulnerable. New resettlement models should recognize that in such regions, diversity of livelihood activities is an important part of risk management. Instead of viewing all settlers as model farmers, policy must recognize that most smallholders in southern Africa pursue multiple livelihoods. In addition to dry land farming, off-farm and non-farm livelihood activities need to be factored in at the planning stage. It may be important to include training in skills other than agricultural for use when arable agriculture fails. This study has shown the invaluable role played by such off farm activities in income and consumption smoothing particularly once the annual crop receipts are exhausted.

The viability of state sponsored resettlement has been compromised by a failure to plan how to absorb the second generation "born frees" that have now matured and started their families. In the absence of local employment opportunities outside agriculture, the second generation have to live off the same plot of land allocated to their parents. This has resulted in land fragmentation that threatens the contribution of farm income to livelihoods. The fact that the "born frees" have failed to move off the land to other livelihood activities in particular, suggests the need to begin asking questions about the intergenerational effects of resettlement. Planning the schemes as purely agricultural settlements may have limited the options available to the "born frees." Instead of planning these as enclaves, adopting a regional planning approach that develops small towns and related rural industries as part of resettlement could provide more effective means of thinking about future settlement schemes.

In conclusion, land resettlement can in the short term bring relief to households facing livelihoods crises and raise the assets and incomes of poor households. However in the long term, without sustained institutional support, the initial security of land fails to provide adequate incomes and secure livelihoods. Accessing natural capital (mostly land in this case) is just part of a much wider quest to develop a livelihood. Equally important are a combination of complementing capitals such as financial, economic, and human capital and effective support policies and institutions. Pursuance of land redistribution and dry land farming as a panacea for rural poverty alleviation in particular may result in an extension of "poverty traps" in the long term if these factors are not taken into account.

NOTES

1. The paper uses the term "distorted rural space economy" to mean spatial distortions in economic development between the mainly underdeveloped black "tribal homelands" characterized by poverty and deprivation and the better endowed mainly "white" large-scale commercial farmlands.

2. Land reform is often seen in southern Africa as part of the unfinished business of decolonization.

3. This paper focuses on the pre-*jambanja* (violent seizure of white owned commercial farms) period that began in February 2000.

4. We do not provide a detailed review of livelihood approaches as this has been done elsewhere (see, e.g., Carney, 1999; Ellis, 2001; Murray, 2002).

5. The main criticisms are that: firstly, it does not give adequate treatment to the vulnerability context (Murray, 1998) and can potentially "straightjacket" investigations into the presumption that it is possible to stretch the assets (capitals) pentagon in an incremental fashion through interventions in order to enhance livelihoods. Secondly, it embraces catch phrases, whose interpretation makes objective analysis difficult, especially its use of omnibus terms like *participation* and *sustainability*. Thirdly, it gives the impression that livelihoods are either rural or urban yet there is increasing evidence that livelihoods interlock. Later versions of the framework have however moved away from describing livelihoods as either rural or urban. Fourthly, it assumes a linear transition from vulnerability to sustainable development along a continuum. In many developing countries households are known to go through cycles that may cumulatively not lead to better livelihoods. Lastly, its ability to adequately take on political and structural power analysis has been questioned.

6. Substantial work has been done on the origins of the land problem in Zimbabwe. See Palmer (1971) for colonial policy dynamics and Moyo (1995) and Tshuma (1997) for post-colonial policies.

7. This notion of carrying capacity assumed that the only occupation for households was farming.

8. Up to 2000, the land reform program proceeded by consensus. From February 2000 the program entered a new phase that was characterized often by spontaneous occupation and violent seizure of "white owned" commercial farm land (see Chaumba, Scoones, & Wolmer, 2003, for an elaboration of some of the dynamics of *Jamabanja* phase).

9. Our focus in this paper is model "A" schemes. These consisted of individual settlement in nucleated villages with individual arable land allocation and communal

grazing. Each settler was allocated five hectares of arable land and a grazing right to pasture four to 10 livestock units (LU) depending on agro-ecological region. Although the bulk of beneficiaries were resettled in model A schemes, there were three other model types (see Government of Zimbabwe, 1994, 1998; Kinsey, 1983).

10. Agricultural resettlement has an enduring appeal for politicians who see it as the way out of development problems in rural areas (Hulme, 1987). The irony is that in dry land farming areas failing "farm" livelihoods keep households in a perennial state of vulnerability.

11. One of the important benefits of resettling in a state scheme was the unprecedented initial benevolence. The state helped with ploughing in the first three years of settlement. It also provided free seed packs and fertilizer. From year three, the state facilitated concessionary farm enterprise loans. These were provided as starting capital for a farm business venture. However, because of the successive droughts the state was forced to extend its support each time these occurred. During 1982–2000, there were four such droughts.

12. The Rukuni Commission Report (see Government of Zimbabwe, 1994) made recommendations for freehold title to be given to the beneficiaries. This recommendation was rejected by a state reluctant to see redistributed land enter the open market.

13. This almost 20-fold increase was well above the 68% average increase in national population over the same time period and occurred when there was no deliberate state program to resettle people.

14. The following features support this. Firstly, most of the early resettlement schemes were located in areas of medium to marginal agro-ecological potential (Kinsey, 1983; Zinyama, Campbell, & Matiza, 1990). Secondly, most resettlement schemes were located on former private or state commercial farm properties abandoned during the war and, initially spontaneously occupied either wholly or in part during or soon after the war of independence (see Ranger, 1986) Thirdly, settlement design and management was centralized around state institutions and there was no beneficiary input (Government of Zimbabwe, 1998).

15. Kinsey (2004) has also observed a similar trend in other resettlement areas in Zimbabwe.

16. In focus group discussions it emerged that the concept of hunger was much broader than just "going hungry." The vernacular meaning is lost in translation but put simply hunger "*nzara*" meant a generalized failure to subsist rather than just food shortages.

17. This unbundling of risk is done for analytical purposes only and does not reflect the way a household in Nyamakate or Rengwe would necessarily conceptualize it.

18. One of the life history interviews in Nyamakate was with a widow who had just been dispossessed of her "fertile portion of land" by a traditional leader soon after the demise of her spouse. At Rengwe, settlements close to our field site were "cleared" by the local government council, to encourage wildlife, as part of CAMPFIRE.

19. Evictions are quite rare though. Official records show that in Nyamakate only one case was reported.

20. This observation is corroborated by studies elsewhere in Zimbabwe, see, for example, Hammer (2001) and Brand (2000). These show the insecurity of tenure among communal households in the frontier regions.

21. Initial state support included provision of physical infrastructure, social services, and some production related support specifically input packages at least for the first three years and after major droughts.

22. The income data came from the small-scale survey. Households were asked to indicate all their farm and non-farm related income. Crop and livestock income included own consumption valued at market price at the time.

23. The FPL is the amount needed to buy a basket of basic food to meet the needs of an average person per year. The TCPL includes non-food items such as clothing, housing, health, and education (see Central Statistical Office, 1998). In 2000, the FPL and TCPL for rural Hurungwe were Z$4,495 and Z$7,700, respectively. The official exchange rate in 2000 was Z$48 to the US$, while on the parallel market this ranged between Z$80 and Z$120 to the US$.

24. This result mirrors the findings of the 1995 poverty study and the district poverty survey of 1999 that found that 77% of the population of rural Hurungwe had incomes below the TCPL (Central Statistical Office, 1998).

25. Households with incomes below the FPL were considered very poor while those with incomes above the FPL but below the TCPL were classified as just poor. Households with incomes above the TCPL were classified as non-poor.

26. Briefcase farming here refers to someone who does not farm themselves but only moves into the farming area during harvests to purchase agricultural commodities from farmers desperate for cash. Often the

crops are sold for a fraction of what the regulated markets offer.

27. From the focus group sessions we generated a list of key household assets essential for livelihoods in the two areas. Households were also asked to indicate type and quantity of the assets they listed at the time they resettled. Using replacement costs (based on the cost of the item at the nearest available source in October 2000 prices) we computed mean values of assets by type for the two areas.

28. Although with hindsight planning them as extensions of communal lands would have considerably reduced the cost of providing infrastructure in the new settlements (ODA, 1988).

29. Born frees is a term generally used to refer to those children born after independence in 1980. However, in Nyamakate, the term refers to children of beneficiaries that were minors at the time of resettlement and have since grown up on the settlement. Initially, it was thought they would leave the land for the cities but most have married and settled locally.

30. See Biggs (1996) for an elaborate and convincing argument about the need for multiple actor frameworks in agricultural research and extension.

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