Back to Index

The enemy within: Southern African militaries' quarter-Century battle with HIV and AIDS
Martin Rupiya, Ed. Institute for Security Studies (ISS)
October 2006

Download this document
- Acrobat PDF verson (1,469KB)
If you do not have the free Acrobat reader on your computer, download it from the Adobe website by clicking here.

Contents

Context of the study - Martin Rupiya

PART I—HIV/AIDS AND THE EXPERIENCE OF SOME SOUTHERN AFRICAN ARMED FORCES

CHAPTER ONE
Introduction: Southern African militaries' battle against HIV/AIDS
Martin Rupiya with assistance from Lawson Simapuka

CHAPTER TWO
Interventions against HIV/AIDS in the Botswana Defence Force
Raymond Molatole and Steven Laki Thaga

CHAPTER THREE
HIV/AIDS in the Umbufto Swaziland Defence Force
Hamilton S. Simelane, Shayilanga Cornelius Kunene and Tsembeni Magongo

CHAPTER FOUR
HIV/AIDS in the armed forces: Policy and mitigating strategies in Zambia
Anne Namakando Phiri and Lawson Simapuka

PART II—CIVIL SOCIETY PERSPECTIVES

CHAPTER FIVE
Implementation of Tanzanian National Policy on HIV/AIDS in relation to the defence sector
Jonathan Mutayoba Kakulu Lwehabura and Jeanne Karamaga Ndyetabura

CHAPTER SIX
HIV/AIDS in the Zimbabwe Defence Force: A civil society perspective
Reginald Matchaba-Hove

PART III—CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CHAPTER SEVEN
Lessons learned - Martin Rupiya

Bibliography

Index

Context of the study

This study, The Enemy Within: Southern African Militaries' Quarter- Century Battle with HIV and AIDS, traces the experiences of three defence forces-those of Botswana, Swaziland and Zambia-through the eyes of serving senior officers. A complementary perspective on Tanzania and Zimbabwe is provided by civil society researchers with an intimate knowledge of military-civil relationships in these countries.

The result has been the first in-depth social science study to provide insights into the militaries as they have come to grips with the pandemic. It shows their struggle to receive policy guidance from policy makers. When this was slow in coming, the organisations were forced to improvise in order to maintain the integrity of their national mandate, which is to be always ready and prepared to safeguard their countries' national security.

Given the major route of transmission-which has been heterosexual relations that have crossed the boundaries between uniformed forces and the rest of society-the role of civil society participants in the research has been particularly important.

Despite this productive collaboration, we have to acknowledge that we do not know the true extent of the presence and impact of HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa. The available statistics are incomplete, and our methodology has had to rely on partial or extrapolated evidence. This evidence has generally been limited to the results of tests of pregnant women at anti-natal clinics, evaluations of donated blood and the prevalence suggested by the testing of those volunteers who have agreed to a determination of their HIV status. (In post-conflict conditions such as apply, for example, in Angola or the Democratic Republic of the Congo [DRC], even this evidence may not be available.)

Owing to the situation described, any type of research that contributes to our aggregate knowledge is welcome, even where the research has had to take place without an adequate infrastructure or skills base. The conceptual framework and intended focus of our work has recognised these shortcomings.

The study is particularly welcome in the light of the suspicion and stigma created in the mid-1990s by elements in the international community, reinforced by media hype. Various allegations targeted African militaries as one of the major vectors for the spread of the disease.

This activity coincided with international confusion about which organisations could best lead and coordinate the response to the growing HIV/AIDS epidemic. This situation saw, in 1996, the World Health Organisation and the World Bank handing over their previous responsibilities to a newly created cluster1 agency of the United Nations, UNAIDS. Within UNAIDS, the Civil-Military Alliance (CMA) to Combat HIV and AIDS emerged in 1997. The CMA was required to work with the world's armed forces to acquire empirical evidence that would inform policy recommendations. In its wisdom, the CMA began its work by sending out to 120 countries a 40-point questionnaire asking for information on, for example:

• the prevalence rates in each of the militaries;
• the number of HIV-positive recruits;
• the number of HIV-positive persons on active duty;
• the total number of AIDS cases that had been diagnosed to date; and
• aggregated data for regions.

These questions were not universally welcomed by the traditionally suspicious militaries, including those on the African continent. In their view, the information sought by the questionnaire focused on the state of their armies, their composition and their capabilities in relation to their human resources. In their view, therefore, such information should not be released or deposited with a civilian organisation somewhere in the West.

It is therefore not surprising that the CMA initiative soon admitted to a lack of positive response from the majority of militaries targeted.

According to submissions to the 32nd International Congress of Military Medical Practitioners held in Beijing, China in October 1996, there was a disappointing 30% response from Africa.

Another development that exacerbated research relations with the militaries was the question of the genesis and transmission of the virus. We now know that the reports of the empirically documented incidence in the United States San Francisco gay community coincided with the evidence emerging from Kinshasa, and later in Cameroon, that the HI virus may have crossed over from chimpanzees to affect humans. Following this research, there was a deliberate attempt not only to stigmatise the African continent but also to point to the sexual practices of militaries as the major vector spreading the disease.

Following these developments there was a clamming up of information by militaries and a reluctance to work with researchers, most of whom wished to sensationalise rather than to guide their work into constructive channels.

Against this background, it was a significant breakthrough that governments and their militaries signed up to the present research initiative.

This confidence has placed an obligation on those of us who have been responsible for managing the project to safeguard the confidential integrity of the activity through a continuous consultative process. This obligation, however, has had to be balanced against the demands placed on us as social science professionals.

In the event, we are confident that the end-result will prove beneficial for both sides. It is also our conviction that this study will serve to motivate other states in Africa, if not beyond Africa, to document their experience with HIV/AIDS since its 'discovery'.

If this project succeeds in its three initial objectives, namely to:

• trace and document empirically the policy responses by military institutions since the advent of HIV/AIDS;
• develop research and analysis tools on the related issues within both the armed forces and civil society; and
• provide a 'best-practice' template,

we may be provided with an opportunity for a second and much more intensive phase of research, which would take the form of impact studies.

In the same vein and with resources permitting, the present research initiative may be extended to countries in sub-Saharan Africa that we have not yet examined.

Download full document 

Please credit www.kubatana.net if you make use of material from this website. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons License unless stated otherwise.

TOP