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Zimbabwe
- 'The government wants the people to give up hoping'
Steve
Kibble, Extracted from Pambazuka News 155
May 06,
2004
This article
first appeared in Pambazuka News, an electronic newsletter for social
justice in Africa, www.pambazuka.org
Steve Kibble
is the Africa/Yemen Advocacy Coordinator for the Catholic Institute
for International Relations. This article is a shortened version
of a paper to be published in the Review of African Political Economy
(ROAPE) No. 100, of June 2004.
'Give ZANU-PF
credit, it has ridden the crisis, seen off the opposition and now
all it has to do is manage the crisis and aim for re-election and
then change the constitution'
- Zimbabwean human rights lawyer, early 2004.
How are we to
reconcile Zimbabwe's seemingly inevitable slide towards being a
'failed state' and the continued confidence within ZANU-PF that
they can handle the crisis and stay in power until after parliamentary
elections due in 2005? More pertinently, what is the popular response
to the multilayered crisis of the Zimbabwean state?
Since the government's
defeat in the February 2000 constitutional referendum, ZANU-PF has
largely succeeded in reimposing its control through a 'holistic
strategy of repression'. A peace activist described the strategy
as a sort of 'scorched earth policy in terms of social formations
. while it wants to hold elections so as to appear democratic it
wants to prevent thought, communication, information, and analysis.'
Broadly speaking
the strategy entails a continuation of the militarisation/securitisation
of the country, under which these sectors are immune from the law
and occupy increasingly prominent positions in intelligence, provincial
administration, electoral administration and the like. Secondly,
it includes the use of presidential powers - supposedly introduced
as part of attempts to clamp down on corruption - allowing police
to hold opponents of the regime in prison for up to a month without
legal process on charges of 'subversion'. Thirdly, the regime continues
its sustained attack on any foci of independence or opposition.
This strategy
has the following elements:
- A state-driven
violent land occupation process without resolving contradictions
in the rural economy. · The use of the police and security apparatus
against opponents, including the use of sexual violence as retribution.
- The use of
terror and judicial intimidation as well as ideological demonisation
of the opposition to shut down space for independent voices.
- The 'restructuring'
of the judiciary towards complete compliance.
- Legal and
extra-legal harassment of the independent media, notably through
the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act which
shut down the Daily News.
- Destabilisation
of trades unions, NGOs and other civic bodies. The draft legislation
already exists for NGOs to be the next target.
- Widespread
torture and intimidation. The opposition has been softened up
by four years of sustained repression and abuse. There has been
a crackdown on the human rights sector, although brutal intimidation
has often been replaced by more subtle forms.
- The co-option
or denigration of religious leadership.
- The reorganisation
of ZANU-PF structures to ensure a strategy of coercive mobilisation.
- Use of violence
as an election strategy with the bodies responsible for electoral
administration firmly under government control including use of
military personnel.
- The use of
the land reform process, the indigenisation strategy, the stripping
of state assets and the politically partisan use of government-controlled
food as a 'primitive accumulation' tool to create a new economic
bloc based on party affiliation and loyalty (although its sustainability
is open to question).
- An authoritarian
economic nationalist ('anti-imperialist') rhetoric that has resonance
in the region and continent, bringing together race, land and
historical injustice in order to demonise the internal opposition
and legitimise and maintain ZANU-PF's rule through repression.
ZANU-PF rides
out the crisis?
Since
the decision in December 2003 by Harare to react to continued suspension
by withdrawing from the Commonwealth, events have seemed to turn
ZANU-PF's way. There have been victories in by-elections marked
by the usual violence and intimidation, including retaking the urban
constituency of Zengeza in late March 2004.
The Reserve
Bank Governor Gideon Gono responded to recent dramatic collapses
in the banking sector linked to endemic corruption by changing the
foreign exchange system leading to an initial decline in inflation.
This was combined with a drive against corruption. A prominent ZANU-PF
MP and proponent/symbol of black economic empowerment, Philip Chiyangwa,
was briefly (and illegally) detained over charges of corruption.
Indeed the anti-corruption drive in April 2004 claimed the arrest
of the recently appointed finance minister but political lightweight
Chris Kuruneri on charges of corruption in terms of illegally dealing
in foreign currency.
Does this mean
that after years of presiding over gross corruption, systemic human
rights abuses, and spectacular economic and political decline, the
Mugabe government is about to reform (as in the February Cabinet
'reshuffle '), re-enter the 'civilised world' (as a victory for
the 'quiet diplomacy' of the Mbeki government) and aim for clean
parliamentary elections in 2005?
Certainly Thabo
Mbeki has given June 2004 as a 'final deadline' for serious negotiations
to be underway and (hopefully for him) lead to a government of national
unity under a reformed ZANU-PF, but not necessarily under Robert
Mugabe. Few in the region and even fewer in Zimbabwe find this believable:
so many promises, so many broken - and so many basically untrue
claims from Mbeki that genuine talks are about to start.
Perhaps a greater
indication of South Africa's stance was its backing at the UN Human
Rights Commission in Geneva on 15 April 2004, just before South
Africa's own elections, for a successfully carried African/Asian/Russian
'no action' resolution on the human rights situation in Zimbabwe
- for the second year running.
Brian Kagoro,
coordinator of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, said: 'It is disheartening
. that ... the human rights of the people of Zimbabwe have been
reduced to the flexing of muscles between the global South and the
global North.' As long as Mbeki still (in public at least) accepts
the Mugabe rhetoric that the crisis is not about 'governance' and
human rights but about resolving the triangle of race, land and
colonial dispossession, serious pressure or ending of South African
financial support seems unlikely.
The arrest of
Chiyangwa is supposedly linked to the three factions fighting within
ZANU-PF over the succession to Mugabe - John Nkomo, party boss,
Emmerson Mnangagwa, and Defence Minister Sydney Sekeramayi. Mugabe
is thought to have removed his support for Mnangagwa after the latter
was named in a recent UN report as heavily involved in the illegal
diamond trade from the Democratic Republic of Congo. However both
Mnangagwa and Sekeramayi are long term Mugabe allies and were involved
in the massacres in Matabeleland in the 1980s. Conversely the Nkomo
group are his key allies inside Matabeleland.
This is all
part of what appears to be conflict between continuing the 'succession
debate' on behalf of Mnangagwa and having no succession debate,
meaning Mugabe stays in power. The easiest strategy is for Mugabe
to put the succession on hold and proclaim he is staying out his
period of office until
2008. This does
little, however, to resolve internal and external questions of the
legitimacy and sustainability of the regime or Mbeki's diplomatic
strategy.
ZANU-PF is likely
to continue a strategic mix of coercion, bribery and electoral manipulation
for the forthcoming 2005 parliamentary elections. According to the
Justice in Agriculture Group there is likely to be a 'ring around
the cities' with land being granted to pro-ZANU-PF settlers in peri-urban
areas plus some redrawing of urban constituencies to draw in rural
dwellers under the party's control. The Harare government thus hopes
to get a 'free and fair' verdict which would take the heat off,
challenge the international community to lose interest and then
be in a strong position to have the upper hand in post-election
negotiations with the opposition Movement for Democratic Change
(MDC).
In terms of
negotiations after elections some elements of the MDC, weakened
and weary of constant repression, infighting and lack of direction,
may well be tempted to join a 'government of national unity'. Civil
society would of course reject such a course given their demand
for broad-based negotiations rather than elite deals but their capacity
to push this demand is very limited at present.
Another element
of the ZANU-PF strategy is the continued use of food as a political
weapon in a situation where an estimated five million Zimbabweans
will be reliant on food aid. The Famine Early Warning System estimates
that Zimbabwe's 2004 season is likely to see a harvest of between
800,000 and
900,000 tonnes,
33 to 38 per cent below its cereal requirements. The government
however has stockpiled 240,000 tonnes of maize, has supposedly bought
70,000 tonnes from South Africa and according to diplomatic sources
has additional stocks that it has seized. Although the World Food
Programme and international NGOs report little overt political interference,
the grain at the government's direct disposal provides it with a
powerful weapon at election time.
Nor have the
Zimbabwean churches in what is a very religious society managed
to present a united voice in response to the crisis (or crises).
It seemed in mid 2003 that there had been a recovery of the prophetic
voice when the leader of the Zimbabwe Council of Churches publicly
apologised to Zimbabweans for not bearing witness to the crisis,
but this has now been downplayed by the churches seeking to push
a negotiations and peace building strategy. The church leaders'
dialogue process with ZANU-PF and MDC appears on and off - possibly
depending on how much pressure ZANU-PF feels itself under electorally,
regionally and internationally (seemingly little at present).
Even if ZANU-PF
has the upper hand it has substantial problems. According to the
IMF in April 2004, 'Zimbabwe's economy has experienced a sharp deterioration
in the last five years. Real GDP has declined by about 30% and is
still contracting. Inflation doubled in each of the last three years
to reach 600% at the end of 2003. Unemployment is high and rising,
poverty has doubled since 1995, school enrolment declined to 65%
in 2003, and the HIV/AIDS pandemic [affecting 25% of the sexually
active population] remains largely unchecked.'
After a staff
visit in March 2004, the IMF called for tripartite talks between
government, business and the unions. This was in response to Kuruneri's
attempt to reach accommodation with the IMF by making some small
repayments to service debt. The IMF had suspended technical assistance
in
2002 and in
late 2003 initiated Zimbabwe's compulsory withdrawal due to Harare's
lack of cooperation and unwillingness or inability to repay the
US$273 million owed (53 per cent of its quota). Nor did Zimbabwe
pay US$110 million owed to the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility
(PRGF) - the first and only country ever to have protracted overdue
obligations to the PRGF.
It is unlikely
that the dual interest rate regime, or the continuing fast track
resettlement with its lack of recognition of property rights for
either commercial farmers or the new settlers, will appeal to the
IMF any more than Zimbabwe's chronic inability to pay its debts.
Nor is Gono's
financial strategy guaranteed success economically or politically.
Politically, big questions arise immediately - did the Cabinet understand
the strategy and will Gono have the heavyweight political backing
to carry it through? As Lovemore Madhuku asked, what happens when
key ZANU-PF 'untouchables', such as those given licences to import
oil without open tendering or favoured by other forms of party/state
patronage, become dragged into the war against corruption?
There is little
strategy either to address what a local activist in the Catholic
church described as the country's simultaneous deprofessionalisation
(driving professionals overseas and destroying the sector's autonomy)
and decapitalisation. Fifteen to 20 per cent of the population (ie
2-3 million) is living outside the country, mostly as economic refugees,
and 500,000, largely farmworkers, are internally displaced.
Even with all
of its strategies for staying in power, most delivery systems have
collapsed in Zimbabwe making it hard to sustain patronage systems,
especially in the rural areas where ZANU-PF needs to maintain its
iron grip. And whilst the factions inside ZANU-PF may have been
temporarily silenced over the succession, the struggle remains ready
to erupt again within the context of fighting over the Gono recovery
strategy. Although renewed targeted sanctions against the elite
are unlikely to have much material impact, the elite resents them,
and they suggest not just (some) international disapproval, but
also unwillingness to invest or lend money
(not that Zimbabwe
has much to offer at present).
There remains
the possibility that Mbeki, freshly mandated from the April 2004
elections in South Africa and ready to concentrate on outside matters
(although it would seem that peacekeeping in Burundi is of higher
importance), will actually put more weight behind his June 2004
deadline. Few Zimbabweans I spoke to would, however, welcome a government
of national unity, given that it would be a rerun of the Unity Accord
of 1987 when ZANU-PF forced PF-ZAPU into the shotgun marriage of
a de facto one-party state.
Without substantial
constitutional and electoral changes, any such government of national
unity would be suicidal for the MDC. Whilst opposition forces including
the MDC have weakened under sustained assault inside the country
they appear to have some hope that they are regrouping internationally
and in the region. The MDC are currently examining whether or not
they should contest the next elections given the manifest impossibility
of them being free and fair.
What can
outsiders do? What does the future hold?
Many
of Zimbabwe's problems are of long term duration. The inheritance
of violent colonial dispossession and dehumanisation with the response
of (in Brian Kagoro's words) a 'violent and hegemonic struggle for
decolonisation . culminated in a largely symbolic independence devoid
of material gain for the majority black population.' This meant
an authoritarian elite unable/ unwilling to transform the repressive
state colonial structures into democratic institutions, and the
emergence of neo-patrimonialism and clientilist structures along
with long lasting cultures of intolerance and impunity.
What development
there was in the 1980s was concerned with state-building rather
than nation-building, within the context initially of apartheid
destabilisation, followed by structural adjustment. Once the post-apartheid,
post Cold War moments arrived the implications of this history in
terms of repression, corruption and abuse became clearer (except
of course for kneejerk 'anti-imperialists').
So where do
progressives go from here? There is still a massive ideological
battle to be won between the prescriptions of what Patrick Bond
has called 'exhausted nationalism' and global neo-liberalism, in
line with many of the directions pointed to in the various world
and regional social fora. Equally Bond points to an existing tradition
inside Zimbabwe itself with work on alternate policies having in
the past been pursued by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU),
the coalitions on debt, the United Nations Development Programme,
and not least the National Working People's Convention of 1999.
This may help
to counter the pessimism of a Catholic Institute for International
Relations (CIIR) partner who saw at present 'a dearth of "thinking",
a sort of anti-intellectualism in nearly every quarter . and essentially
. a kind of absence of politics in the real sense, of positions
and ideological clarity and coherence, of strategic thinking and
organising. ' He added that it is 'very significant that there is
a very deep malaise and unhappiness among a large proportion of
traditional leaders and spirit mediums, about the disregard for
tradition and cultural wholeness.'
Certainly Zimbabweans,
while happy to observe stayaways, have not shown great keenness
to face the overwhelming firepower of the state on the streets.
The sheer struggle for survival and the fact that remittances from
abroad are helping keep them alive (and as Gono is aware, the economy
as well) cannot be discounted in terms of seeming passivity in the
face of desperate circumstances.
There is little
leadership either from the MDC - which in any case has done well
just to survive itself - from the trade unions or indeed the churches.
Although there have been calls, notably by Morgan Tsvangirai, for
a much greater coherence amongst opposition forces, notably the
ZCTU, the National Constitutional Assembly and the MDC, the sector
has great difficulty in doing this. It also has difficulty agreeing
on tactics, including on mass action and what its aims are - overthrow
Mugabe, force ZANU-PF to the negotiating table, etc. One thing that
is unlikely to occur is any kind of armed response.
Outside Zimbabwe
there have been a number of initiatives regionally and North-South
in bringing together activists and academics in understanding the
nature of the crisis. A particularly resonant one was the bringing
together of the Zimbabwean and South African diasporas in London.
There could be much greater North-South solidarity in a number of
fora - NGO, academic, church and use of links with southern African
organisations. Outside organisations need to provide support for
those in Zimbabwe and the region who are providing information about
the human rights and general situation inside Zimbabwe, and those
under threat standing up to repression.
There is continuing
need for pressure on the ANC government including from within the
region. Pressure also needs to be directed at the other elements
in the tripartite alliance such as the trade unions and the Communist
Party, given Pretoria's assurances to the outside world that Mugabe
would step down and serious negotiations would commence. What is
it about a transition to democracy inside Zimbabwe that worries
them more than the 'chaos that they know'? The International Crisis
Group believes that the focus should be on promoting a free and
fair election for March 2005 rather than pursuing the chimera of
inter-party talks.
There should
also be pressure for the long-delayed African Commission on Human
and Peoples' Rights report on Zimbabwe to be released as called
for by Zimbabwean, regional and human rights organisations.
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